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Abstract 
 
 
The dissertation aims at understanding and explaining the existence of variation in 
sustainable compliance with EU legislation in two similarly rule-taking countries. The cases 
under examination are Hungary and Poland which have experienced a similar historical 
background, similar environmental problems and have been subject to similar EU conditions 
and requirements for accession. Nevertheless, the EU Annual Progress Reports and the Tri-
Annual Monitoring Reports showed a variation in their compliance with European 
environmental requirements. The existing literature has explained this divergence by taking a 
supply-side approach, focusing on those state actors and incumbents who could decide to 
supply compliance or not. In particular, researchers of compliance and of Europeanisation 
have focused on differences in capacity limitations or incentives to domestic actors. These 
supply-side approaches, however, do not seem to fully explain the existing divergence 
between the performances of Hungary and Poland nor do they sufficiently tackle the issue of 
“sustainable compliance” in the post-Accession period. In my analysis, I instead explain 
variation in sustainable compliance by exploring demand-side explanations. To this end, the 
thesis explores the hypothesis of demand for compliance emerging on the part of stakeholders 
who recognise its potential for profitability and, thus, influence its sustainability. Its starting 
point is the Tsebelis’ study on stakeholders which describes them solely as “veto players” 
along the road to compliance; however, this analysis demonstrates that there is also another 
dimension to the influence they may have. I build my hypothesis around the existence of such 
factors as market incentives and pre-existing cooperative strategies that make compliance 
convenient for stakeholders. Moreover, I consider the role played by external assistance and 
the existence of alliances between external and domestic stakeholders to improve the overall 
compliance performance of less-regulated countries. The study proves the significance of 
market incentives and pre-existing cooperative strategies in fostering sustainable compliance 
while showing how the two strong explanatory variables are interlinked: compliance is not a 
"business" per se. It has a potential to be made a "good deal" via cooperative strategies 
among diverse stakeholders creating a win-win settlement.  
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Introduction 
 
 
On 1st May 2014, Hungary and Poland celebrated ten years as members of the European 
Union (EU). Since their formal application to the EU in 1994, both countries developed 
measures to approximate, adopt and implement European legislation and standards. This 
dissertation analyses the process of implementation of European environmental directives in 
Hungary and Poland: first as EU candidates and then as new EU Member States. It aims to 
understand the reason behind the variation in compliance of these two similarly rule-taking 
countries and, specifically, why their compliance performances differed in the sustainability 
of compliance after assuming Membership in 2004. Hungary and Poland have similar 
historical backgrounds in terms of Communist regimes, transition to a market economy and 
to democracy, and the EU accession process. As well, they share the facts of relatively weak 
administrative capacity and legislative framework as compared to the EU, and they were 
subject to similar conditions and requirements to become EU Members. However, the EU 
monitoring reports have told, in the more practical side of implementation, two different 
stories of compliance: Hungary gradually complying with EU environmental requirements 
from the first years of negotiation for accession and sustaining such performance after the 
achievement of EU Membership, while Poland only partially adopting and implementing the 
EU requirements after accession.  
 The existing literature has analysed variations in compliance by looking at supply-
side explanations that focused on state actors and incumbents who, in presence of specific 
conditions, could decide whether or not to supply compliance. First, scholars have pinpointed 
differences in the pre-existing domestic capacity and administrative traditions. In particular, 
compliance managerial approach recognised a general propensity of states to comply but in 
presence of weaknesses in domestic administrative capacity they would not be able to adhere 
to the EU requirements. Similarly, Europeanisation scholars explained variation in 
compliance with the presence of different initial degrees of 'fit' between domestic and 
European rules, policies and processes. Furthermore, researchers of governance analysed the 
mechanism of 'policy coercion' and highlighted how, in presence of a difference between 
national and European administrative traditions, the typical rationality of national 
bureaucracies was to “protect traditional structures” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, p. 585) by 
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“minimising changes to existing regulatory styles and structures” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, 
p. 590). These approaches then expected that, in the presence of administrative capacity 
differences or misfit between domestic and European policies, processes and traditions, 
domestic change would have incurred high costs of adaptation, making compliance less 
likely.  
 Second, researchers highlighted the role of international incentives and threats in 
forestalling non-compliance. In particular, focusing on the international conditionality, 
governance scholars analysed the use of external resources as incentives to compliance. They 
then defined the mechanism of 'imposition' resulting from pressures exerted on organisations 
or countries due to resource interdependency between organisations or among countries, or to 
conditionality for accession set forth by international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank or the International Monetary Fund (Meseguer Yebra, 2003; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 
Guler et al., 2002; Knill and Holzinger, 2005). Following a similar perspective, conditionality 
scholars explained compliance with the presence of strict conditions imposed by external 
actors, namely, the adoption of EU rules. They then explained the mechanism to achieve 
compliance as “by rewards”; that is, the incentive of rewards1 conditional upon fulfilment of 
compliance encouraged state actors and politicians to comply. Given the similar EU 
membership leverage on the CEE countries, Pollack (2009) argued that “these findings raised 
the disturbing prospect that once the candidate countries had achieved their goal of EU 
membership, the Union would lose much of its leverage over those countries, which might be 
expected to relapse, failing to comply with either the EU's economic rules or its political 
ideas of democracy and the rule of law” (Pollack, 2009, p. 248 but the fear of compliance 
backslide was shared also by Grabbe, 2006; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008; Sasse, 2008).  
 In search for explanations for sustained compliance in the period when “the most 
powerful sanction instrument of the pre-accession phase – withholding membership – is no 
longer available” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 810), researchers have then looked at the EU 
sanctioning role for non-compliance. Already in the early-2000s, Tallberg specifically 
focused on the monitoring role of the European Commission and the deterrent role of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) through the infringement procedure. Following Tallberg, 
researchers studying the CEE post-Accession period expected that “the likelihood of 
continued post-accession compliance” varied “according to the extent to which the EU [was] 
                                                 
1 Rewards for compliance consisted of assistance and institutional ties ranging from access to EU funds and 
commercial treaties to the achievement of EU Membership (Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005). 
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able to sanction (non-)compliance by its members” (Epstein and Sedelmeir, 2008, p. 797). 
The ECJ financial penalties, however, “take time to impose” (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008, 
p. 797); therefore, researchers expected “the EU8 to capitalize on the sanctioning gap that EU 
institutions face after enlargement” and “that good formal compliance is not followed by 
proper application and enforcement and a marked difference in the formal transposition of 
rules before and after accession” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 810).  
 Third, scholars have analysed the role played by stakeholders' preferences and cost-
benefit calculations for compliance. Researchers of the regulatory approach considered the 
regulated entities as “rational economic actors that act to maximise profits” (Rechtschaffen, 
1998). Therefore, according to cost-benefit calculations, the regulated entities complied with 
a given regulation “when the benefit of compliance exceed[ed] the costs of it” (Winter and 
May, 2001). Similarly to this argument, the compliance enforcement approach researchers 
stressed the role of the domestic incentive structure in influencing state actors’ and 
incumbents’ willingness to compliance. Thus, they emphasised that non-compliance 
performances originated from actors' cost-benefit calculations; therefore, they expected that 
high costs of compliance and substantial benefits otherwise would implicate low domestic 
compliance performances. In the pre-Accession period, the dimension of domestic costs was 
hypothesised within the “external incentive model” where high rewards (i.e. EU membership) 
and low – or tolerable – domestic costs influenced domestic compliance performances 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005 but on this point see also Pollack, 2009). Moreover, 
researchers feared that after the EU Accession, the altering of the cost-benefit ratio at the 
domestic level could create “the temptation to cheat once the overarching goal of 
membership had been achieved” (Pollack, 2009, p. 15).  
 Fourth, researchers highlighted the role played by transnational communication 
influenced by socialization mechanisms and knowledge transfer from external to domestic 
actors. According to social constructivists, ideas were conceived as “socially embedded” and 
represented “shared reference points” (Cini et al., 2006) while norms and social knowledge 
were constitutive of actor's identities (Cini et al., 2006); therefore, they considered “socially 
generated convictions and understandings” and “consensual knowledge” (Haas, 1998) as 
reference points in influencing compliance. In particular, Checkel (2001) refers to the role of 
social interaction in which “collective learning, internalization, and persuasion” are the 
dynamics producing compliance which occurs “through a redefinition of interests that takes 
place during the process of interaction itself” (Checkel, 2001, p. 556). Furthermore, 
researchers refer to the mechanism of emulation of institutional models which “only requires 
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agents looking for institutional designs outside their own realm to solve certain problems or 
to mimic the behaviour of their peers” (Börzel and Risse, 2014, p. 9). Hence, they 
hypothesised that the internalisation of international norms by the political elites and 
implementers through mechanisms of persuasion and social learning would positively 
influence compliance.   
 To recapitulate, these four supply-side hypotheses explained variation in compliance 
(including non-compliance) by pointing to weaknesses in pre-existing domestic capacity, EU 
incentives and sanctions, domestic cost-benefit calculations as well as international 
information exchange and communication. However, these hypotheses do not seem to fully 
explain the existing difference in the performances of Hungary and Poland nor do they 
sufficiently tackle the issue of “sustainable compliance” in the post-Accession period. In fact, 
the EU monitoring reports for the pre- and post-Accession compliance of Hungary and 
Poland highlighted similarities in the pre-existing domestic capacity weaknesses of Hungary 
and Poland despite the fact that their performances progressively and substantially differed 
over the period considered. Moreover, despite the absence of the EU conditionality incentive 
and the weak sanctioning role of the ECJ, Hungary improved its compliance performance in 
the post-Accession period. Furthermore, studies on the CEE post-Accession compliance seem 
also to suggest that cost/benefit calculations coupled with socialisation and learning processes 
alone do not fully explain the post-Accession performances of the CEE new Member States. 
In particular, Sedelmeier (2009) and Maniokas (2009) suggested that, in the post-Accession 
period, cost/benefit calculations cannot be deemed to sufficiently explain the sustained 
compliance of the CEE countries as they worked in combination with other domestic factors 
such as supportive governments, as well as strong interest groups and NGOs (Sedelmeier, 
2009; Maniokas, 2009). Furthermore, Epstein (2008) and Sasse (2008) suggested that in 
absence of external incentives, the sustained compliance in the post-Accession period is 
primarily linked to recognition of the appropriateness of the EU norms by domestic actors 
who need to be involved in this process (Epstein, 2008; Sasse, 2008; on this point see also 
Jacoby, 2005). 
 This dissertation then moves on to explore mechanisms that rendered implementation 
compliance sustainable. Building upon a demand-side approach, it particularly analyses the 
demand for compliance emerging among stakeholders who, benefiting from compliance, 
influence its sustainability. The consideration of stakeholders is no novelty in itself; already 
in the past, supply-side researchers have included roles played by stakeholders in their 
analyses. George Tsebelis focused on the occurrence of policy changes in a political system 
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when the number of veto players in a country was low and when the differences in their 
political positions and in their ideological and identity positions were also low (Tsebelis, 
1995; Tsebelis, 2002). Following Tsebelis' hypothesis on veto players, Europeanisation 
researchers analysed the link between compliance and the number of veto players having a 
say in the domestic policy-making process (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Featherstone and 
Radaelli, 2003; Héritier et al., 2001; Green Cowles et al., 2001). A grand majority of these 
studies, however, regarded the role of domestic stakeholders merely as veto players; thus, 
they implied that their only impact on compliance was a negative one. On this basis, they 
hypothesised that a high number of such players made compliance and policy changes less 
likely.  
 Challenging this negative connotation, this dissertation develops a demand-side 
theory that turns the ‘veto player theory’ on its head by stressing the potentially positive and 
essential contribution of commercial and societal actors. It then looks at the existence of two 
conditions under which stakeholders, with the capacity to hinder or support the supply of 
compliance by state actors, might decide to demand compliance from state actors. These 
conditions are the existence of market incentives and the presence of pre-existing cooperative 
strategies. In its analysis of the market incentives, this study hones in on international and 
domestic business actors which, in the presence of incentives arising from within the market, 
may benefit from complying with EU requirements thus becoming instrumental to the 
achievement of compliance. In its analysis of cooperative strategies, the study investigates the 
relationship between domestic state and non-state actors in the policy-making process, as 
well as the emergence of business collaboration between domestic and foreign private actors 
which assured stakeholders on the sharing of compliance costs. In addition to these two 
mechanisms, the dissertation explores the assistance provided by external actors to domestic 
actors, and the relationship between them. However, assistance is not considered here in 
terms of mere transfers of financial resources, technology and knowledge from the principals 
(i.e. the external actors) to the agents (i.e. the domestic actors). On the contrary, assistance is 
considered in terms of development of tasks which target multiple actors and help them to 
overcome implementation problems, thus making compliance sustainable over time.  
 Considering the three hypotheses of market incentives, pre-existing cooperative 
strategies and assistance alliances, this dissertation will demonstrate that Hungary and Poland 
were characterised by two distinct stories of compliance with European legislation. In 
particular, the empirical findings show that the better and sustained compliance performance 
of Hungary was influenced by the existence of economic actors with a dominant position on 
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markets and of a cooperative style of policy-making which also enhanced external assistance. 
As against this, Poland’s partial and poorly sustained compliance was related to the existence 
of fragmented markets and a competitive style of policy-making which hampered the 
establishment of alliances between external and domestic actors and delayed the 
implementation of such assistance programmes.  
 
 
I. The research design  
 
 
In this dissertation, I analyse the process of implementation of public policies in Central and 
Eastern Europe in a comparative perspective. In particular, I compare two countries, namely 
Hungary and Poland, as an area study. Following Macridis and Cox (1953), Lijphart (1971), 
Moses and Knutsen (2007) and Tarrow (2010), through the area approach I maximise the 
comparability of my case studies and, clustering and parametrising the common 
characteristics of this area, I focus on the singular elements that could explain the divergence 
in the performances of the two countries under examination. The rationale behind the 
selection of the cases is a comparison of most similar cases. According to scholars, the “most 
similar systems” research design stems from the idea that “all cases share basic 
characteristics but vary with respect to some key explanatory factor[s]” (Moses and Knutsen, 
2007, p. 98). Furthermore, systems characterised by common factors cannot be explained by 
these similarities but instead, controlling for these common characteristics, it is possible to 
analyse the elements that vary, whose presence or absence can be used to explain variation in 
the outcomes (Moses and Knutsen, 2007). In point of fact, until late the 1980s, Hungary and 
Poland were both governed by Communist regimes, single party political systems that 
promoted forced industrialization, especially of heavy industry, and collectivisation of 
agricultural land. Moreover, with the collapse of these regimes, Hungary and Poland were 
among the first to organise, at the national level, Round Table Talks on political and 
economic reforms between former Communist authorities and the political figures of the 
nascent post-Communist era2. As well, throughout the 1990s, these two countries underwent 
major political changes such as the adoption of new constitutional laws (in 1989 in Hungary 
                                                 
2 For further details, see Elster J., The Roundtable Talks and the breakdown of Communism, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
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and in 1997 in Poland3) and the free elections, held in Hungary and Poland in 1989 and 1991 
respectively. They also adopted similar structural measures to develop a private market 
economy, and stabilisation packages aimed at price liberalisation, liberalisation of domestic 
trade, restrictive monetary policies, definition of income policies, foreign trade liberalisation 
and balancing of the governments' budget (Lavigne, 1999). 
 After the collapse of the Communist regimes in most of the Central and Eastern 
European countries, the EU saw the possibility of further integrating Europe by enlarging its 
borders to ten candidate countries from the CEE region. This process was unique in that, for 
the first time, the EU dealt with candidates whose different economic, social, cultural and 
political features were palpably different that those that characterised the existing Member 
States (Poole, 2003). In light of these differences, the EU defined a number of conditions to 
guide the CEE candidates in the definition and implementation of the European acquis 
communautaire before formal accession to the EU. In particular, in 1993, the European 
Council meeting in Copenhagen stated that “Accession will take place as soon as an 
associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the 
economic and political conditions required.” In brief, the CEE candidates were asked to align, 
transpose and harmonise their national legislation to that of the EU prior to their accession to 
the EU, with the Commission monitoring this process. Since 1989, Poland and Hungary were 
involved in the Pologne et Hongrie Aide à la Réstructuration Economique (hereafter 
PHARE) programme and, in 1991, they signed the European Agreements4 with the EU. Since 
1991, both countries were members of the Visegrad Group5  and they have been part of the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement6 (hereafter CEFTA) since 1996. Moreover, Hungary 
and Poland both applied for EU Membership in 1994, while in 1997 the EU Commission’s 
Opinion7 recognised these two countries as part of the five frontrunners8 who could officially 
                                                 
3 In Poland, during the Round Table Talks of 1989, was agreed a “rudiment of a Constitution” (Blondel et al., 
2001) which amended the existing Constitution of 1952. In 1992, the Sejm, the lower Chamber of the 
Parliament, adopted a number of temporary measures that further revised the Constitutional law of 1952. 
Then, in 1997, after a number of proposals to change the Constitution, a new text was approved (Blondel et 
al., 2001).   
4 In particular, in the Europe Agreements were set the common political, economic and commercial objectives 
that formed the framework for implementation of the accession process. For further details, see Poole, 2003 
and http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/process-of-enlargement/index_en.htm.  
5 For further details, see http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php 
folderID=941&articleID=3937&ctag=articlelist&iid=1.  
6  For further details, see Poole, 2003 and http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=938. 
7 The Opinion of the European Commission on the CEE candidate countries’ ability to cope with the EU 
acquis aimed at verifying the level of political and economic reforms, the screening of the three Copenhagen 
criteria and the overall readiness for formally starting the CEE negotiations for the accession to the EU. 
8 The other countries that officially started in 1998 the negotiations with the EU have been Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia.    
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start negotiations for accession in 1998. Hungary and Poland then became EU Member States 
on 1 May 2004.  
 In order to explain the variation in Hungary's and Poland's compliance performances, 
I have chosen to concentrate on the environmental sector and specifically on waste 
management. Both countries experienced particular compliance difficulty in this sector due to 
almost non-existent legislation and enforcement structure at the time of the EU accession 
negotiations. Prior to the EU accession process, in fact, one scholar vividly described the 
environmental situation of Central and Eastern European countries as “eco-cide” (Krämer, 
1986). This assessment reflected the highly polluted “hot spots” that were concentrated in the 
main industrialised areas, e.g. Katowice and Cracow provinces in Poland and Borsod county 
in Hungary (Pavlinek and Pickles, 2000; Hicks, 2006). Moreover, after the collapse of the 
Communist regimes in the late 1980s, the period of political and economic reforms that 
followed was marked by a rapid transition to consumerism that further deepened the 
environmental problems of the CEE countries (Hicks, 2006). To give a sense to the legislative 
challenge, I shall simply note that at the point of accession negotiations with the CEE 
candidate countries, the European environmental acquis was comprised of approximately 
three-hundred pieces of legislation; that is, eighty per cent of the overall EU legislation 
(interview 1). The process of approximation to the EU environmental legislation in the CEE 
countries, starting with the opening of the negotiations on the environmental Chapter in early 
2000s, was a massive task for CEE candidates. Unsurprisingly, they asked to negotiate 
transitory periods for the adoption of specific environmental requirements (interview 2). 
 The European Union set the legislation on the waste sector along three paths: (1) 
horizontal legislation that established a framework for the management of waste including 
defining key waste concepts and principles; (2) EU legislation on the two treatment options 
of incineration and landfill, including targets for the management of treatment facilities; and 
(3) EU legislation on the various waste streams, setting dispositions for the collection of such 
wastes, as well as targets for their recovery, recycling and incineration9. In order to measure 
precisely the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland, I selected three European 
directives (and amended versions) related to the waste sector, namely the Waste Framework 
Directive (No. 75/442/ECC; No. 91/156/EEC; No. 2006/12/EC; No. 2008/98/EC), the 
Landfill Directive (No. 1999/31/EC) and the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (No. 
                                                 
9 For further details on the legislation defined at the European level on the management and treatment of 
waste, see the report by the European Environmental Bureau, EU Environmental Policy Handbook:  
A Critical Analysis of EU Environmental Legislation, (eds.) Stefan Scheuer, 2005. 
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94/62/EC). I chose these three directives because they cover different aspects of EU waste 
legislation. Firstly, the Waste Framework Directive sets out the key waste definitions and the 
principles according to which waste should be treated and disposed, as well as the 
responsibilities for the management and the control of municipal solid waste. At the time of 
the EU accession negotiation these were non-existent or fragmented in Hungary and Poland. 
Secondly, the Landfill Directive covers the landfill treatment option, which, according to 
statistics was the most used option in Hungary and Poland since the early 1990s (Eurostat 
online website). Thirdly, the Packaging Waste Directive covers the packaging waste stream, 
which was almost non-existent and totally un-regulated during the Communist regimes. For 
both Hungary and Poland, the transition to a market economy also entitled the generation of a 
great deal of packaging waste, which required the definition of a detailed legislation (Hicks, 
2006). Practical considerations also came into play in the choice of these directives as they all 
contain requirements that were strictly monitored in reports released by the European 
Commission. 
 Turning to environmental compliance, the waste management sector in Hungary and 
Poland was faced with a particularly difficult challenge in view of the drastic increase in 
waste that came in the wake of the free market opening and burgeoning consumerism of the 
1990s. During the Communist times, the systems of collection and treatment of municipal 
and packaging waste of Hungary and Poland were operated by state-owned enterprises and 
there was a general lack of detailed rules on waste management. Soon after the collapse of 
the Communist regimes in Hungary and Poland, foreign and domestic private actors started to 
operate on the Hungarian and Polish waste markets. Nevertheless, the role played by these 
actors in the two countries differed significantly. Since the early 1990s, in Poland a plurality 
of domestic and foreign private actors were established and competed on the market for the 
management and treatment of municipal and packaging waste. These actors had the capacity 
to make voice in the domestic policy-making process but their high fragmentation did not 
facilitate cooperation with state actors in the implementation and sustainability of the waste 
requirements contained in the European legislation. Moreover, their high domestic 
fragmentation did not foster the development of externally induced cooperation in the form of 
knowledge-based and capacity-building European projects and initiatives aimed at improving 
the implementation compliance of Poland. Contrariwise, since the early 1990s, Hungary has 
experienced an active presence of private domestic and foreign actors which rapidly acquired 
a dominant position on the municipal and packaging waste markets by convincing their 
competitors on the need to cooperate for the implementation of European waste requirements. 
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Moreover, having the capacity to make voice in the domestic policy-making, these strong 
private actors cooperated in the definition and sustainability of implementing measures which 
complied with the European waste legislation. The cooperative policy-style between 
domestic state and non-state actors and between private stakeholders also facilitated the 
achievement of positive results from external assistance initiatives which further strengthened 
the Hungarian implementation compliance performance. 
 The period under consideration in this dissertation is the decade between the years 
1999 and 2009. The year 1999 was selected because it marks the first screenings of 
legislation and capacity-building established in Hungary and Poland (as in the rest of the CEE 
candidate countries, Malta and Cyprus) released by the European Commission. These reports, 
also known as the Screening Reports, are considered as the milestone of the accession 
negotiations because they not only depicted the situation of the candidate countries at the 
point at which they began accession negotiations, but they also compared the national 
situations with the European legislations and standards, stipulating as well the specific 
measures to be undertaken in order to become EU members. The year 2009 was selected as 
the last year of analysis because it is the last year for which data contained in the Tri-Annual 
Monitoring Reports, which monitor the implementation of the European directives related to 
waste including the three Directives under examination in this dissertation were available.  
 Data on the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland were collected through 
in-depth semi-structured interviews and archival research that took place during several 
fieldwork missions in Brussels, Hungary and Poland between June 2011 and May 2014. I 
used cross-country data analysis and process-tracing to analyse the data on the performances 
of Hungary and Poland and to test the theoretical hypotheses. In the attempt to explain 
“outcomes in individual cases” (Mahoney and Goetz, 2006; Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009), 
this thesis adopts a ‘causes-of-effect’ approach and develops the analysis “by starting with 
cases and their outcomes and then moving backward toward the causes” (Mahoney and 
Goetz, 2006, p. 230). In other words, assuming an observed “systematic relationship between 
a cause and a particular outcome” it wishes to “scrutinize the nature of the process linking the 
independent to the dependent variable, thereby identifying the underlying causal mechanism” 
(Della Porta and Kaeding, 2008, p. 69 referring to the works of Elster, 1989 and Little, 1991). 
In order to assess the causal relevance of the empirical findings, the thesis adopts the process-
tracing methodology. As researchers have pointed out, process-tracing is generally defined 
“by its ambition to trace causal mechanisms” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 1, but see also 
Bennett, 2008; Checkel, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005). In particular, the process-tracing 
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method has been reported to “identify the existence of causal relations, to go beyond 
correlation and evaluate causality empirically” (Dessler, 1991). It also “allows researchers to 
examine in detail the causal mechanisms and explain how specific variables interact” (Della 
Porta and Keating, 2008, p. 236) and “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – 
the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 1 quoting George and 
Bennett, 2005, p. 206). Process-tracing has then been defined as “the use of 'histories, 
archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process 
a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the 
intervening variables in that case'” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 6 quoting George and 
Bennett, 2005, p. 6).  
 Process-tracing was chosen because it “seeks to make within-case inferences about 
presence/absence of causal mechanisms in single case studies” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 
4). Following the four approaches to causality suggested by Brandy (2003) and considering 
causality as “a process involving the mechanisms and the capacities that lead from a cause to 
an effect” (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 457 quoting Brandy, 2003 and Mahoney, 1999), 
Bennett and Elman (2006) recognise that case-studies “have a relative advantage in the 
search for mechanisms and capacities” (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 457). As mentioned 
earlier, this thesis adopts a small-N research design based on the comparative analysis of two 
similar case studies. The use of process-tracing methodology in a small number of cases has 
then the advantage of allowing “inference about causal mechanisms within the confines of a 
single case or a few cases” (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 459). However, as Bennett and 
Elman (2006) suggest, “causation [in process-tracing] is not established through small-n 
comparison alone, but through uncovering traces of a hypothesised causal mechanism within 
the context of a historical case or cases” (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 459).  
Researchers have highlighted a number of possible limitations in the case study 
analysis which may be overcome through process-tracing. First, when considering a small-N 
research design, researchers have emphasised the existing problem in the generalisability of 
the findings. Bennett and Checkel (2015) recognise that “case-study methodologists have 
argued that a hypothesis is strongly affirmed and might be generalizable if it explains a tough 
test case or a case [..] that it looked least likely to explain”, but they also point out that it has 
been “ambiguous [..] whether these inferences should apply only to the case being studied, to 
case very similar to the one studied, or to a broader range of more diverse cases” (Bennett 
and Checkel, 2015, p. 13). To overcome this problem, this thesis adopts the process-tracing 
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methodology which has been recognised to help to clarify “the scope conditions under which 
a hypothesis is generalizable” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 13). In fact, researchers cannot 
have an idea a priori of whether the case under observation is generalisable until they 
elaborate a clear theory and by tracing the process “this theory can evolve inductively from 
close study of the case itself” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 13).  
Second, focusing on few cases researchers may omit relevant variables from their 
analyses. However, Bennett and Elman (2006) argue that “all methods are vulnerable to 
omitting relevant variables and overlooking the attendant alternative explanations these 
variables offer” (Bennett and Elman, 2006, p. 470). Process-tracing, however, “can minimise 
the problems generated in the theory testing by the so called first mover advantage” that is, 
that researchers tend to “first interpret and explain the data through the lenses of one’s 
favoured theory” (Checkel, 2005, p. 15). Process-tracing, however, allows researchers to 
trace “a number of theoretically predicted intermediate steps” (Checkel, 2005, p. 15) between 
the independent variables and the outcome of the dependent variable. This produces “a series 
of mini-checks” that push researchers “to think hard about the connection (or the lack 
thereof) between theoretically expected patterns and what the data say” (Checkel, 2005, p. 
15). Furthermore, as Bennett and Checkel (2015) point out, it is important “to consider a wide 
range of alternatives despite the effort this entails” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 23). To 
this end, in addition to the three hypotheses derived from demand-side approaches, the thesis 
investigates four alternative explanations from supply-side approaches: (a) on the pre-existing 
capacity and administrative traditions, (b) on European incentives and threats, (c) on 
stakeholders' rational cost/benefit calculations and (d) on information exchange and 
communication. The first two alternative hypotheses are “quickly undermined by the 
evidence” while the last two “require deeper investigation” (Bennett and Checkel, 2015, p. 
24) and are tested in the two empirical chapters through the process-tracing methodology. 
Third, when focusing on causal inference, scholars have emphasised how case studies 
“can make only tentative conclusions on how much gradations of a particular variable affect 
the outcome in a particular case” (Bennett and Checkel, 2005, p. 25). In particular, scholars 
emphasise that “it is often not possible to resolve whether a causal condition identified as 
contributing to the explanation of a case is a necessary condition for that case, for the type of 
case that it represents, or for the outcome in general” (Bennett and Checkel, 2005, p. 27). 
Process-tracing, however, “enables strong causal inference to be made with regard to the 
presence of causal mechanisms in single cases [..] and in particular whether the individual 
parts of a whole mechanism are indeed present in the particular case” (Beach and Pedersen, 
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2013, p. 88). Building on Van Evera’s (1997) four typologies to test predictions10, researchers 
have emphasised how process-tracing can make valuable causal inference according to the 
combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting specific hypotheses and 
alternative explanations (Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). However, “whether a researcher can 
exclude all about one of the alternative explanations for a case depends on how the accessible 
evidence matches up with the proposed alternative explanations, not how many independent 
variables are considered or how many within-case observations are made” (Bennett and 
Elman, 2006, p. 459). As Bennett (2010) highlights, “what matters is the relationship between 
the evidence and the hypotheses, not the number of pieces of evidence” (Bennett, 2010, p. 
219). Nevertheless, Bennett and Elman (2006) also point out that “case study methods have 
emerged […] as a useful but limited and potentially fallible mode of inference” (Bennett and 
Elman, 2006, p. 473).  
In order to understand whether the three hypotheses derived from demand-side 
approaches are necessary and/or sufficient for the sustainable implementation compliance 
outcome, in addition to process-tracing, these hypotheses have been tested in a crisp-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) truth table presented in the concluding chapter 
(and further elaborated in Annex 2). In the words of Schneider and Wagemann (2012), in fact, 
csQCA operates in binary “where cases can either be members or non-members in the set” 
and therefore implies a membership score of either 0 or 1 (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 
p. 13). Moreover, they refer to QCA as “a research phase that aims at conduct a truth table” 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 91). Therefore, QCA “consists of the formal analysis of 
truth tables – the so-called logical minimisation – with the aim of identifying sufficient (and 
necessary) conditions” (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p. 91). In this way, it is then 
possible to evaluate whether the presence or absence of each of the three demand-side 
hypotheses matters for the final outcome of sustainable compliance.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Van Evera elaborates four types of tests: 1) the hoop tests in which “predictions of high certitude and no 
uniqueness provide decisive negative tests” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 31) and therefore “they provide a necessary 
but not sufficient criterion for accepting the explanation” (Bennett, 2010, p. 210); 2) the smoking gun tests in 
which “predictions of high certitude and no uniqueness provide decisive positive tests” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 
31) and therefore “they provide a sufficient but not necessary criterion for confirmation” (Bennett, 2010, p. 
210); 3) the doubly-decisive test in which “predictions of high certitude and uniqueness provide tests that are 
decisive both ways” (Van Evera, 1997, p. 32) and therefore “they provide a necessary and sufficient criterion 
for accepting the hypothesis” (Bennett, 2010, p. 211); 4) the straw-in-the-wind test in which “most 
predictions have low uniqueness and low certitude, and hence provide tests that are indecisive both ways” 
(Van Evera, 1997, p. 32) and therefore “they provide neither necessary nor a sufficient criterion”(Bennett, 
2010, p. 211). 
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II. The plan of the thesis 
 
 
This dissertation aims to explain the observed variation in EU compliance and in its 
sustainability among two similarly rule-taking countries. In particular, the analysis focuses on 
the process of implementation of three European waste-related directives in Hungary and 
Poland in the decade between 1999 and 2009. The first chapter considers the research 
problem and clarifies the research questions, the key concepts and their operationalisation in 
relation to the three European directives under study, namely the Waste Framework, the 
Landfill and the Packaging and Packaging Waste directives. The second chapter explores the 
different theoretical approaches used to analyse the variation in compliance among EU 
Member States, introducing a distinction between supply- and demand-side approaches. In 
reviewing the existing debates in the literature, supply-side hypotheses linked to similarity in 
administrative capacity and traditions, European threats and incentives, cost/benefit 
calculations and exchange of information and knowledge are considered and four alternative 
explanations are elaborated. However, evidence shows that not all the hypotheses seem to 
sufficiently tackle the observed variation in the performances of Hungary and Poland. The 
chapter then explores demand-side approaches that focus on demands for compliance arising 
on the part of stakeholders. Hence, the theoretical framework elaborated in this dissertation 
focuses on three mechanisms; namely, the presence of market incentives, the existence of 
pre-existing cooperative strategies and the establishment of assistance alliances between 
external actors and domestic stakeholders. These three factors may have fostered the 
compliance strategies of specific stakeholders, as well as made sustainable the domestic 
changes occurring with EU requirement compliance. 
 The third and fourth chapters focus on Hungary and Poland. These two chapters study 
Hungary's and Poland's compliance in the municipal waste and packaging dimensions. The 
progress of the two countries are analysed through process-tracing methodology and follow a 
temporal division in three phases: firstly, from the status quo to the transposition of the EU 
requirements in the national legislation; secondly, from the transposition to the 
implementation of the national legislation; and thirdly, from the implementation to the 
sustainability of compliance. While in the Hungarian case the three phases in the municipal 
and packaging dimension are analysed, the Polish case was beset by problems that delayed 
the full implementation of the national legislation transposing the EU requirements, not yet 
achieved by the end of the decade under consideration.  
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The fifth chapter provides a comparative analysis of the empirical findings emerging 
from the study of the Hungarian and Polish cases. It also presents the contributions to the 
existing literature not only in shifting the focus of the analyses from non-compliance to 
compliance and from transposition to implementation of the EU directives, but also 
expanding the literature focusing on the sustainability of compliance in the post-Accession 
period and in the absence of EU membership conditionality. In studying the sustainability of 
compliance after the EU accession of Hungary and Poland, in fact, this dissertation considers 
the theory of 'increasing returns' according to which actors with a stake in the process of 
compliance may gain more from complying than from not complying with EU requirements. 
In particular, in the analysis of compliance with the European waste legislation of Hungary 
and Poland and its sustainability over time, this dissertation shows that when compliance is 
seen by the different stakeholders as a “business”, with benefits accrued by them, they 
demand the full adoption and implementation of EU requirements. This happened in the 
presence of market incentives and cooperative strategies   that influenced the stakeholders’ 
profitability of compliance and determined the move from a situation of non-compliance to 
full compliance. In this sense, this dissertation contributes to the works of Tanja Börzel 
(2003), Liliana Andonova (2004), Börzel and Buzogány (2010) and Julia Langbein (2015). 
Moreover, this dissertation also demonstrated that the external assistance to Hungary and 
Poland was horizontal, multiplex and problem-solving oriented, further contributing to the 
work of Bruszt and McDermott (2011). Finally, it highlights the existing link between 
external assistance and cooperative strategies   that enhance the outcomes of the external 
assistance, thus contributing to the studies of Bruszt, Stark and Vedres (Stark, Vedres and 
Bruszt, 2006; Stark and Vedres, 2006; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013).    
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Chapter 1 
Variation in “implementation compliance” and in its sustainability 
 
 
Over the years, European institutions have defined for and negotiated with EU Member 
States the key legislation and principles that governed the functioning of the EU. Different 
legal instruments have been used for the definition of the EU rules, requirements and targets 
in different policy fields (i.e. regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions). Within these instruments, regulations, directives and decisions are binding but 
while regulations and decisions are binding in their entirety and, in the former case, also 
directly applicable to all Member States, only the result of directives are binding, leaving to 
the Member States the freedom to choose application and enforcement instruments. The 
directives then are to be transposed into national legislative framework through national laws 
and implementing measures which might differ among the EU Member States.  
 While on the one hand the EU left to the Member States the leeway to choose among 
policy instruments for the adoption of the European directives at the national level, on the 
other hand, the European Commission, as the guardian of EU Treaties, was entrusted with the 
responsibility of ensuring that its members complied with the European requirements (Art. 
17, paragraph 1, consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union). Therefore, the Commission monitors the EU Members' 
compliance and the transposition and implementation of EU directives, and Member States 
are obliged to report specific data and complete questionnaires in accordance with annual or 
multi-annual deadlines. The European Commission can also send letters asking for 
explanations of compliance when Member States do not notify it of the transposition of 
specific directives or do not adopt in a timely and accurate manner the requirements set out in 
them. Persistent problems might be referred to the ECJ11. 
                                                 
11 The starting of an infringement procedure is a long process. After the adoption of a new directive or target at 
EU level, the Member States have the obligation to notify to the Commission its transposition in the national 
legislation. If the Commission does not receive the notification or, if after the conformity checking of the 
national law there is still something missing, it sends to the Member state that is non-compliant or non-
conforming a reasoned opinion asking explanations. The Member State can reply agreeing or disagreeing 
with the Commission and in this second case, the Commission sends back a letter of formal notice. If the 
problem still persists, then the Commission addresses the problem to the ECJ that formally starts an 
infringement procedure for non-compliance or non-conformity with the EU laws. For further details see, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/procedure.htm. 
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In recent years, the transposition and implementation of European legislation among 
Member States has been a challenge for national authorities and both delays and differences 
in paths of compliance have been reported in monitoring documents developed by the 
European Commission. Among the European policy sectors, the implementation of 
environmental legislation has been particularly difficult for European Member States. The 
environment has, in fact, been the most identified sector within the European Commission’s 
Infringements Annual Reports 12  since the end of the 1990s. Scholars analysing the 
implementation of environmental legislation among EU Members, too, have reported 
problems (Macrory, 1992; Jordan, 1999) associated with divergent EU Member compliance 
performance (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Börzel, 2001; Börzel, 2003; Knill and 
Lenschow, 2005; Liefferink et al., 2009). 
 The fact of diverging compliance performance among in the EU members has been 
hotly debated in the existing literature. For instance, the Europeanization literature adopting 
“top down” and “bottom up” dimensions has studied the impact of EU policy-making and 
legislation among Member States and also the role of Member States and domestic actors in 
influencing the European political and policy-making arena (Knill and Lehmkhul, 1999; 
Börzel and Risse, 2000; Radaelli, 2000; Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse; 2001; Börzel, 
2003; Radaelli, 2004; Vink, 2003; Jordan, 2005; Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005). This literature 
has also mentioned the problem of varying implementation performances regarding public 
policies (Haverland, 2000; Héritier et al., 2001, Falkner, 2003; Versluis, 2004; Knill and 
Liefferink, 2007) and, in some cases, of an “implementation deficit” of EU legislation in the 
Member States (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Nicolaides, 2001; 
Bursens, 2002; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Graziano and Vink, 2007).  
 However, while studies on the fifteen members of the EU prior to the Enlargements of 
2004 and 2007 covered a wide range of policy fields (for example, see Börzel, 2001; Börzel 
et al., 2007; Falkner et al., 2005; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Kaeding, 2006; Thomson, 
2007) and different groups of countries (for example, see Börzel, 2003; Bursens, 2002; 
Liefferink et al, 2009), the analyses of the performances of the candidates and then members 
from Central and Eastern Europe have been fragmented between the pre- and the post-
Accession periods (for example, see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Andonova, 
2004; Falkner and Treib, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2008; Dimitrova, 2010). Moreover, scant 
attention has been given to the mechanisms that contributed to the sustainability of the CEE 
                                                 
12 For further details on the environmental infringement statistics, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_annual_report_en.htm.    
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countries' compliance for ‘on the ground’ implementation of the EU directives after their EU 
accession. In this dissertation, the performances of CEE countries are assessed in a more 
comprehensive way, through an examination of Commissions’ reports that monitored the 
implementation of EU directives over the period that runs from their candidacy to their 
membership in the EU. In particular, the dissertation analyses the compliance of Hungary and 
Poland with European environmental legislation and specifically with a number of 
requirements contained in three European directives concerning the sector of waste 
management.  
 The chapter is then structured as follows: in the first section the research problem of 
an existing variation in the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland and the key 
questions of the analysis is presented. The second section reviews the concepts of 
implementation and compliance as defined in the literature and in the official European 
documents. Moreover, the concept of implementation compliance as the key concept of this 
dissertation is defined. In the third section, the concept of implementation compliance is 
operationalised in accordance with the requirements set out in the three European directives 
concerning the waste management under examination in this dissertation; namely, the Waste 
Framework, the Landfill and the Packaging and Packaging Waste directives. Finally, in the 
fourth section, an overview of the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland 
regarding the three selected European waste-related directives is provided.  
 
 
1.1 Defining the research problem and the research questions 
 
 
Hungary and Poland share similar historical, economic and political backgrounds. Moreover, 
they developed similar environmental problems. The problematic environmental situation 
was exacerbated by choices made by the Communist regimes, which ruled in both countries 
from the end of the Second World War until the end of the 1980s. These regimes promoted 
forced industrialization in certain geographical areas, failed to define uniform environmental 
legislation and ignored the environment. This resulted in the development of highly polluted 
“hot spots” adjacent to the most industrialised areas of Northern Hungary in Hungary and 
Upper Silesia in Poland (Pavlinek and Pickles, 2000; Hicks, 2006). And, while since the early 
1990s the democratic governments have begun to define specific environmental rules and 
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programmes and have restructured the environmental institutional settings, new pressures on 
the environment have resulted from the move to market economies and the phenomenon of 
consumerism (Hicks, 2006). 
 The EUROSTAT online database, which collects data on the amount of municipal and 
packaging waste management and treatment, offers some information on the initial similarity 
in the amount of municipal and packaging waste generated in Hungary and Poland13. In 1995, 
Hungary generated 460 kilograms per capita (hereafter, kg/capita) of municipal waste, with 
Poland generating 285 kg/capita (which corresponded to 4,752 thousand tonnes for Hungary 
and 10,985 thousand tonnes for Poland). Moreover, at the eve of EU Accession, in 2004, 
Hungary generated 84.5 kg/capita of packaging waste while Poland produced 89 kg/capita 
(which corresponded to 815 thousand tonnes for Hungary and 3,413 thousand tonnes for 
Poland). In spite of differences in the amount of waste generated, linked to the demography 
and the population density of the two countries, the European statistical data on municipal 
waste highlight a similar initial situation in Hungary and Poland in relation to its management 
and treatment14. In 2000, Hungary generated 4,552 thousand tonnes of municipal waste while 
Poland produced 12,226 thousand tonnes (EUROSTAT database); of these total amounts, 
Hungary collected 84% and landfilled 89,7% while Poland collected 87% and landfilled 90% 
(JRC Report, 2003). Additionally, a 2002 EUROSTAT report on the subject does not 
emphasise significant differences in the user charges established by Polish and Hungarian 
municipalities15 for the management and treatment of municipal waste in the year 1999.  
 Since the collapse of the Communist regimes in the CEE countries, the EU has seen 
attempted to further integrate Europe by enlarging its borders to candidates from the CEE 
region. In turn, the CEE countries have considered a “Return to Europe”16. Thus, in 1994, 
Hungary and Poland were the first to apply for EU membership, with other CEE countries 
                                                 
13 Interviews have highlighted the low quality of the national waste data available for Hungary and Poland 
before 2004 and the Membership to the EU (interviews 74; 98; 99). Hence, it has been used the EUROSTAT 
online database (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database) as the source of the data on the 
amount of waste generated per capita by the two countries which cover the period between 1995-2009 (for 
municipal waste) and 1997-2009 (for packaging waste).  
14 Unfortunately, for packaging waste EUROSTAT provides only data on the amount of waste generated but 
does not break-down to collection and treatment of packaging waste.   
15 The Eurostat report titled “Municipal waste management in Accession countries” released in 2002 provide 
information on the amount of municipal user charges which corresponded to EUR 22-80 per tonne of waste 
generated in Poland and EUR 6,4 per capita of municipal waste generated in Hungary (Eurostat report, 2002, 
pages 12 and 30). 
16 The “Return to Europe” argument has been considered as the pillar on which the EU Membership of the 
CEE countries was framed (O' Brennan, 2012). This argument has also been widely debated by scholars (for 
a summary of the academic debates, see Iver B. Neumann, ‘European Identity, EU Expansion, and the 
Integration/Exclusion Nexus’, Alternatives, Volume 23, 1998, pp. 397-416).  
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following closely at the heels17. At the same time, due to differences between the CEE 
candidates and the fifteen EU Members, the EU stipulated a number of conditions to guide 
the former in the implementation of the European acquis communautaire. At the European 
Council of Copenhagen in June 1993, the EU defined the key conditions for membership 
concerning specific economic and political requirements18 and, ultimately, the capacity to 
undertake the obligations of membership (Poole, 2003). This last criterion implied that 
candidates were obliged to take upon themselves the content, principles and objectives of the 
European Treaties as well as the legislation and the jurisprudence of the ECJ by the time of 
their EU accession. There would be no possibility of opting-out from specific requirements 
(Pogatsa, 2004).  
As part of the process of accession to the EU which stipulated as key conditions the 
approximation and implementation of the EU acquis, the European Commission monitored 
the compliance performances of the CEE countries. Despite similar initial difficulties related 
to weak environmental capacity, infrastructures and legislation, the data from the 
Commission’s monitoring reports emphasised notable variations in the CEE countries' 
performances. According to these reports, Hungary and Poland differently adopted and 
implemented a number of requirements contained in European directives concerning waste 
management. Hence, the European monitoring data discloses two distinct paths of 
compliance: Hungary which progressively implemented EU waste requirements since the 
pre-Accession period and sustained and even increased its compliance in the period of EU 
Membership; and Poland who achieving EU Membership adopted only partially and with 
delay EU waste requirements.  
Despite shared starting conditions, then, Hungary and Poland appeared to have taken 
divergent roads with regards to the 'on the ground' implementation of European directives. 
There is a substantial body of literature on variation in EU Member States compliance 
performance. For instance, Europeanisation scholars have noted divergences in the 
implementation of European public policies among EU members who joined the EU before 
2004 (Haverland, 2000; Héritier et al., 2001, Falkner, 2003; Versluis, 2004; Knill and 
Liefferink, 2007) and of low degrees of implementation of EU legislation at the domestic 
                                                 
17  Hungary and Poland were followed in 1995 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia 
in the application to the EU. Moreover, in 1996 applied the Czech Republic and Slovenia (for reference, see 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlargement/e50017_en.htm)  
18 In particular, the political criteria required the achievement of the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” (Poole, 2003) while the 
economic criteria required the establishment of a “functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union” (Poole, 2003). 
 22 
levels (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Nicolaides, 2001; Bursens, 
2002; Knill and Liefferink, 2007; Graziano and Vink, 2007). As well, scholars have explained 
the range of compliance performance among CEE countries through the mechanism of 
“compliance by reward” and thus through incentives. The achievement of EU membership 
has been well analysed as a reward for EU compliance. In a concern strongly linked to this 
incentive structure, these scholars feared a general compliance backslide once the CEE 
countries became members of the EU (Grabbe and Hughes, 1998; Grabbe, 1999; Grabbe, 
2002; Kelley, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
But these fears did not come to fruition. EU monitoring reports on Hungary and 
Poland for the post-Accession period have shown instead that the performances of these two 
countries did not regress with EU accession, but in the case of Hungary improved thereafter. 
This dissertation thus aims at identifying which mechanisms were responsible for divergent 
compliance performances in two countries as similar as Hungary and Poland. The first 
research question addressed in this thesis, then, concerns differences in compliance and is 
formulated as follows: Why is there variation in the process of implementation compliance 
among similarly rule-taking countries? Furthermore, this dissertation aims at exploring the 
mechanisms which characterised the different performances of Hungary and Poland and 
specifically influenced the sustained performance of Hungary in the post-Accession period. 
As a corollary to the first research question, a second question is formulated as follows: 
Which mechanisms influenced the sustained compliance of Hungary in comparison to 
Poland? 
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1.2. Defining the key concepts 
 
 
The adoption of EU legislation among the EU Member States has been intensively 
investigated. Scholars have adopted top-down and bottom-up perspectives to analyse the 
implementation of policies at the national level, distinguishing between the relevance of 
policy decisions and the role of centrally located actors (Sabatier, 1986; Matland, 1995; 
Treib, 2006) or focusing on the number of actors and the importance of the local level 
(Sabatier, 1986; Matland, 1995). A wide range of perspectives has been proposed and the 
empirical findings have been equally multifarious. Hartlapp and Falkner (2009) have noted 
that the chief problem in these divergent findings is the definition of the dependent variable; 
that is, the adoption of EU legislation at the domestic level. Indeed, there is no scholarly 
consensus on this topic (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009). Researchers commonly use the 
concepts of “implementation” and “compliance” to define the process of adoption of EU 
legislation at the domestic level, but “often researchers simply are not talking about the same 
things” (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009, p. 285).  
 
 
1.2.1 The “implementation” concept in the EU documents and in the literature 
 
 
The European Union considers the process of implementation of EU directives as a multi-
phase process that takes place in a number of stages. As far as European legislation, 
directives must be implemented on the national level through national laws before they go 
into effect. Thus, every EU directive must be legally transposed and incorporated into a given 
country's national legislation, after which it must be applied and enforced. This process has 
been defined in a number of EU Commission's policy papers19 and in documents addressed to 
the ten recent CEE candidates in their process of approximation to EU legislation and to 
European environmental legislation. An example is the “Guide to the Approximation of 
European Environmental Legislation20” of 1997 which, aiming at being a road map to EU 
environmental legislation, contained clear definitions of the phases to be followed by CEE 
                                                 
19 For an example, see the Communication on implementing Community Environmental law of 1997. 
20 For details on the definitions, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/guide/annex4.htm.  
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candidates. In this document European Commission classified three main phases:  
transposition, practical application and enforcement of EU rules at the domestic level. The 
first phase of “transposition” required that candidates and EU Members “adopted or changed 
national laws, rules and procedures” in order to facilitate the full incorporation of all 
requirements contained in EU law into the national legal order (Guide to environmental 
approximation, 1997). According to the Guide, however, the transposition phase included not 
only “the reproduction of the words of a directive in national law”, but also “any additional 
provisions, such as the amendment or repeal of conflicting national provisions necessary to 
ensure that the national law properly reflected the provisions of the EU directives (Guide to 
the environmental approximation, 1997). The second phase of “practical application” 
required candidates and members to “provide institutions and necessary budgets to carry out 
the laws and regulations” while the third phase of “enforcement” required candidates and 
members to “provide the necessary controls and penalties to ensure that the law was fully and 
properly complied with” (Guide to environmental approximation, 1997). 
  Unlike the EU documents, the existing literature distinguishes mainly between two 
phases: “transposition” and “implementation” of European directives among the Member 
States. The phase of “transposition” has been generally defined as the moment in which the 
EU directives are incorporated and literally transcribed into the national legislation 
(Cremona, 2012). This phase is the most-studies among the phases. Scholars have focused on 
the accuracy and timeliness of the adoption of EU directives by Member States, and have 
measured “transposition” by looking at the number of infringement procedures started by the 
European Court of Justice for non-conformity and/or non-compliance with EU requirements 
(among them, see Mastenbroek, 2003; Kaeding, 2006; Jensen, 2007; Thomson et al., 2007; 
Leiber, 2007; Versluis, 2007; Toshkov, 2008; Zhelyazkova et al., 2009; König et al, 2009; 
Thomson, 2010; König et al., 2012). Going beyond the cross-national analysis of 
infringement proceedings, scholars have also explored the extent to which national courts 
adopted the rulings or case laws of the European Court of Justice (for a detailed summary, see 
Conant IN Cremona, 2012).  
 There is greater academic confusion, however, regarding the definition of 
“implementation” which corresponds to the stage when national measures should be applied 
to concretely adopt EU directives' requirements at the national level (Prechal, 2005; Hartlapp 
and Falkner, 2009). Firstly, despite the distinction between “transposition” and 
“implementation”, scholars have not always followed a coherent terminology in their studies 
often conflating the terms “implementation” and “transposition” (Prechal, 2005). Secondly, 
 25 
unlike in EU documents, researchers looking at the application and enforcement of EU 
directives at the national level have not clearly distinguished between these two concepts but 
have generally referred to them as part of a single phase of “practical or administrative 
implementation”, which follows the transposition of the EU legislation in national legislation 
(Versluis, 2004). Furthermore, until very recently, this stage was essentially neglected in the 
literature. This “paucity of research” (Cremona, 2012, p. 2) has been driven by mostly 
practical considerations. In fact, according to scholars, it has been difficult for qualitative 
analyses “to establish reliable and representative data on the application on the ground at a 
micro-level analysis” (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2008, p. 11). As well, with the development of 
quantitative studies on EU compliance, the phases of enforcement and application “have 
taken a back seat since there are simply no appropriate quantitative data for analysing the 
'street-level' aspects on implementation” (Treib, 2006, p. 14). Only a few narrowly focused 
qualitative case studies on the application of the EU law by national courts or implementing 
authorities have distinguished and separately analysed the phases of transposition, application 
and enforcement covering specific policy sectors and directives (for example, see Falkner et 
al., 2004; Falkner et al., 2005; Falkner et al, 2008; Hille and Knill, 2006; Falkner et al., 2008; 
Falkner et al., 2007; Falkner and Treib, 2009).  
 
 
1.2.2 The concept of “compliance” in the European documents and the literature 
 
 
The second concept used to define the adaptation of EU legislation among Member States is 
“compliance”. This too has been difficult to define at a European level and in the literature. 
Unlike the detailed definition of the implementation process, the European Union has not 
defined the concept of “compliance” and when searching for specific European documents 
released by the European Commission, the first documents resulting from a general research 
in the official European Commission web page consider compliance as linked to specific 
policy fields21. As against this, in the literature “compliance” has been defined by different 
approaches. The EU legal compliance literature has associated the concept of “compliance” 
                                                 
21 For example, see the results displayed by the EU Commission website (http://ec. 
europa.eu/geninfo/query/resultaction.jsp?SMODE=2&ResultCount=10&Collection=EuropaFull&Collection
=EuropaSL&Collection=EuropaPR&ResultMaxDocs=200&qtype=simple&DefaultLG=en&ResultTemplate
=%2Fresult_en.jsp&page=1&QueryText=compliance&y=0&x=0#queryText=european+union+compliance+
definition&tab=europa&filterNum=1&summary=summary).     
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with the meaning of “enforcement based upon coercion” that corresponded to the 
administrative control and litigation in the courts followed by sanctions (Cremona, 2012, p. 
31). However, according to these scholars, “compliance” cannot “be confined within the strict 
boundaries of coercive means of enforcement” (Cremona, 2012, p. 31) and it is not 
considered as “the result of obedience” but as “the overall process through which obedience 
is gradually constructed” (Cremona, 2012, p. xli).  
From a more political science-oriented perspective, International Relations studies22 
define a situation of “compliance” when countries “adhere to the provision of the accord and 
to the implementing measures that they have instituted” (Haas, 1998) but also “when the 
actual behaviour of a given subject conforms to prescribed behaviour, and non-compliance or 
violation occurs when actual behaviour departs significantly from prescribed behaviour” 
(Young, 1979; Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002). In EU implementation studies, instead, 
particular reference has been made to the fulfilment of specific requirements in the various 
stages of implementation. In other words, “compliance is a potential outcome of the 
implementation process” and “occurs only in those cases where all of its stages are fulfilled 
in a dutiful manner” (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2008, p. 2).  
 
 
1.2.3 The “implementation compliance” concept in my research  
 
 
The concepts of implementation and compliance have been defined differently in the 
literature. The concept of “policy implementation” has referred mostly to the process and the 
different stages of adoption of the legislation at the domestic level (Hartlapp et al., 2009) 
whereas, the concept of “compliance” has been discussed more in the context of conformity 
with a given law (Treib, 2006). Nevertheless, although “compliance is distinct from” it is also 
“closely related to implementation” (Victor et al., 1998; Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002) and 
both aspects are crucial elements when considering the approximation and adoption of 
European legislation at the domestic level. In fact, while compliance is more linked to legal 
conformity with the rule to be implemented, implementation is linked to the policy tools used 
to apply and enforce such rule. Thus, taking a convergent approach, I join the two concepts 
yielding: implementation compliance. In my analysis, then, I define implementation 
                                                 
22 For a broader overview of the discussions within the International Relations and the EU implementation 
studies, see Haas, 1998; Tallberg and Johnsson, 2001; Hartlapp and Falkner, 2008. 
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compliance as the legal conformity with and the adoption of specific requirements set into the 
EU directives.  
 
 
1.3 Measuring the implementation compliance concept 
 
 
Existing studies have measured compliance with EU directives by mining the infringements 
database released by the European Court of Justice. This infringement database detects only 
cases of non-compliance with EU legislation but does not measure or even mention the 
national measures taken to implement such legislation. Hence, the literature is quite biased 
towards analyses of “non-compliance” over situations of compliance with European 
legislation. Moreover, this database covers only data for current EU Members. Article 258 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter, TFEU) stipulates that when 
the ECJ “finds a Member State to be in breach of Community law, the Member State 
concerned must then take the measures necessary to comply with the judgement of the 
European Court of Justice” and, in case of persisting non-compliance after negotiations are 
conducted between the non-compliant Member State and the EU Commission, the ECJ 
initiates infringement procedures. As Hungary and Poland only became members of the EU 
in 2004, the data contained in the ECJ infringement reports do not sufficiently reveal the 
paths of implementation compliance for these two countries. Furthermore, Hartlapp and 
Falkner recently outlined practical and methodological problems in using this database for 
evaluating the timeliness and accuracy of transposition of the European directives in the 
Member States, despite the popularity of the ECJ infringement database among researchers 
(for details, see Hartlapp and Falkner. 2009).  
Unlike the ECJ infringement database, which covers only the period of membership in 
the EU of the CEE countries, other official documents released by the European Commission 
have monitored the CEE candidates' implementation compliance throughout their period of 
candidacy and membership. Since the beginning of the European negotiations23 for their 
accession to the EU in 1998, the Commission has, in fact, elaborated Annual Monitoring 
Reports on the progress made by the CEE countries on the implementation of European 
                                                 
23 The European Commission has started the negotiations for accession in 1998 with Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. In 2000, at the European Council of Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Romania and Bulgaria started the negotiations for accession to the EU. 
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legislation. The monitoring exercise started by the European Commission with the Annual 
Monitoring Reports for the period 1998-2003 continued when the CEE countries became EU 
members, on 1st May 2004. Before Accession, the CEE candidate countries had no power to 
self-report on their compliance progresses but were strictly monitored by the Commission 
which also organised peer reviews initiatives in which Member States' experts visited and 
inspected the CEE candidate countries and then reported the situation at the European 
Council (interview 2). After assuming Membership, the CEE countries were obliged to fulfil 
reporting obligations contained in a number of European environmental directives and valid 
for the EU Member States. These European environmental directives governed the sectors of 
chemicals, waste, air, water quality, noise and horizontal legislation24 and required Member 
States to fill in national questionnaires to be sent back to the Commission and to collect 
statistical data to be sent back to the European statistical office (hereafter, EUROSTAT), in 
accordance with specific deadlines (typically once every year or three years). The CEE new 
Member States were then obliged to self-report environmental data through the compilation 
of national questionnaires which are carefully checked by the Commission and, in case of 
non-correct or delayed transposition and implementation of European environmental 
measures, may be referred to the ECJ which will start infringement procedures (interview 
92).   
While as yet there has been no attempt to use the Tri-Annual Monitoring Reports to 
measure compliance in the CEE countries in the post-Accession period, scholars have used 
the information collected in the Annual Monitoring Reports to assess the monitoring strategy 
of the Commission towards the CEE candidates. Some studies have analysed the use by the 
EU Commission of particular words contained in these reports (Hille and Knill, 2006) or of 
specific aspects, such as the “administrative capacity in the candidate countries” (Moynian, 
2006). However, only a handful of scholars have consistently used these reports as tools to 
track the CEE candidate countries' compliance with the EU acquis communautaire (for 
example, see Hughes et al., 2004). It has been suggested that the lack of precise analyses of 
progress made in each of the policy sectors or a lack of clear definitions of concepts and 
provisions adopted at the national level might be behind the fact that these reports are in 
disuse (in particular, see Moynian, 2006).  
 Despite the critics, the Annual Monitoring Reports offer a unique source of 
                                                 
24 For further details on the EU environmental directives with reporting obligations, see Annexes 1-6 of 
Directive No. 91/692/EEC (available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML 
/uri=CELEX:31991L0692&from=EN). 
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information to measure the performances of Hungary and Poland in the years of their 
candidacy to the EU. The EU Commission has used these reports to monitor the compliance 
with the three criteria for membership defined at Copenhagen 25 ; namely, political and 
economic criteria and the ability to assume obligations of membership (i.e. the Copenhagen 
Criteria of 1993) by monitoring compliance in the thirty Chapters into which the European 
acquis communautaire for the accession was divided. The Environmental Chapter (i.e. 
Chapter 22), in particular, contains the principles, dispositions and requirements set into the 
European environmental directives and regulations that CEE candidates must approximate 
and comply with before formal accession to the EU. Furthermore, after Hungary's and 
Poland's 2004 achievement of EU membership, the European environmental directives 
contained in the Environmental Chapter have continued to be monitored through the Tri-
Annual Implementation Reports based on the national questionnaires filled-out by these two 
New Member States. Through these reports, the Commission has in fact monitored the 
Hungarian and Polish legislation transposition of the European environmental directives and 
also the definition of implementing measures for the adoption of requirements contained in 
these Directives.  
Researchers focusing on post-Accession compliance pointed out that compliance 
monitoring of EU Member States heavily relies on Members' self-reporting. In particular, 
Sedelmeier (2008) specifies that “the EU’s decentralized monitoring mechanism relies 
heavily on private actors at the domestic level to raise complaints with the Commission or to 
litigate in national courts against breaches of EU law” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 809). However, 
he also pointed out that “although transnational links with international institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) might partly compensate for the weakness of post-
communist civil society26” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 809), the societal actors of all CEE countries 
have generally been recognised as weak (Sissenich, 2002; Howard, 2003). Nevertheless, 
interviewees from the Commission emphasised that, also for the CEE countries, the European 
Commission relies on complaints to monitor the implementation of EU environmental 
measures (interview 92) as well as through petitions, questions or simple emails from 
citizens, NGOs and business representatives which are considered a “constant monitor on 
what is going on in the waste sectors” (interview 93). In addition, the Commission relies on 
studies made by international consultancies, NGOs and industries as well as from the 
                                                 
25 For a definition of the Copenhagen Criteria, see 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm.  
26 Sedelmeier specifically refers to the works of Petrova and Tarrow 2007; Stark et al. 2006 on this point. 
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documents released by the national audit offices (interview 93). Moreover, to strengthen the 
new Member States' self-reporting capacity, the EU has provided funds and promoted 
specific projects in statistical offices and environmental inspectorates of CEE countries for 
data at national, regional and local levels. In particular, the Commission has promoted 
projects and set guidelines with EUROSTAT to improve the methodology used by CEE 
countries for compiling data and to harmonise it with the methodology used by remaining 
Member States (interviews 93; 98; 99). Furthermore, the cross-checking of the waste data has 
been made by national statistical offices and the EUROSTAT (interviews 98; 99). The DG 
Environment has also promoted compliance strategies to the EU Members through the 
organisation of events to increase public awareness as well as specific Technical Adaptation 
Committees for policy implementers (TAC) in which CEE environmental experts have 
acknowledged and exchanged best-practices with experts from the other EU Member States 
(interview 93).  
 Furthermore, the NGOs and private actors of Hungary and Poland have relied on the 
European stakeholders to inform the EU institutions on compliance issues. For example, in 
Hungary, the recovery organisation Öko-Pannon has established its contacts at European 
level through Pro-Europe which lobbied on its behalf the EU institutions (mainly the 
Commission's DG Environment and DG Industry) and which has played a role in informing 
the EU on the recent changes of the packaging system and how they may affect compliance 
(interview 34). Polish and Hungarian NGOs have also directly informed the European 
institutions through information campaigns such as the recent study on the waste compliance 
performances of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia released in July 201527. 
 
                                                 
27 For further details, see http://www.humusz.hu/english/hirek/Complying-with-the-Landfill-and-Framework-
Directives-in-the-Visegrad-Four-Countries 
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1.3.1 The operationalisation of implementation compliance in the waste sector 
 
 
As already mentioned, the approximation and implementation of the European environmental 
legislation in Hungary and Poland has been strictly monitored by the Commission since the 
end of the 1990s. Among the different environmental issues monitored by the EU, waste 
management is one of the sectors for which it is possible to measure the progress made by 
these two countries in the period before and after their accession to the EU. Firstly, in the 
Annual Monitoring Reports the EU Commission monitored the CEE approximation with the 
European environmental acquis communautaire, comprising as well all the European 
directives on waste management 28 . Secondly, because these waste-related directives 
contained implementation reporting obligations for the EU Member States, after joining the 
EU, the New Members from the CEE were obliged to fill-out national questionnaires on the 
implementation of these European directives. These data have been controlled by the EU 
Commission and then aggregated in the Tri-Annual Implementation Reports for the years 
2004-2006 and 2007-2009.  
Among the European waste-related directives, as mentioned in the Introduction, I 
have selected the Waste Framework Directive, the Landfill Directive and the Packaging and 
Packaging Waste Directive. The first two European directives considered in this study deal 
with the management and treatment of municipal waste. This type of waste is defined at the 
European level as “the bulk of the waste stream originated from households, though similar 
wastes from sources such as commerce, offices, public institutions and selected municipal 
services” and is that waste that is “collected by or on behalf of municipal authorities, or 
directly by the private sector (business or private non-profit institutions) not on behalf of 
municipalities” (Eurostat webpage 29 ). The Waste Framework Directive and its revised 
versions (No. 75/442/EEC; No. 91/156/EEC; No. 2006/12/EC, No. 2008/98/EC) has 
provided a general frame of the key definitions of waste, the principles according to which 
waste should be treated and disposed and the responsibilities for the management and the 
                                                 
28 In particular, the environmental acquis in force since 1998 comprised 11 directives (and amended versions) 
related to waste issues (waste from titanium dioxide industry, municipal waste incineration, hazardous waste 
incineration, landfill of waste, disposal of waste oils, waste framework directive, disposal of PCBs and 
PCTs, hazardous waste, sewage sludge and soil, batteries and packaging waste). For further details, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/guide/annex2.htm.    
29 The source of the definition of municipal waste is the Eurostat webpage 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/waste/key_waste_streams/municipal_waste).  
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control of municipal waste. The Landfill Directive (No. 1999/31/EC) defined the different 
categories of waste (i.e. municipal waste, hazardous waste, non-hazardous waste and inert 
waste) and also established procedures for the application of permits and for the control and 
monitoring of landfill sites, for closure and after-care, as well as the rules concerning the 
existing sites. The third directive under examination is the Packaging and Packaging Waste 
Directive (No. 94/62/EC) which concerns the management and treatment of packaging waste. 
This type of waste has been defined at the European level as “made of a variety of materials 
including: paper and cardboard; wood; plastic; metal; glass” and is generally managed 
through producer responsibility arrangements which introduce “measures relating to the 
prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution caused by waste and the management of 
packaging and packaging waste” (Eurostat webpage 30 ). This Directive, in particular, 
contained the definition of the operations to treat packaging waste (i.e. recovery, recycling 
and reuse) and the definition of economic instruments to attain packaging recovery and 
recycling.  
 In my analysis, I measure the difference in the implementation compliance and its 
sustainability of Hungary and Poland as a variation in kind rather than in degree for the three 
European waste-related directives. I then consider two specific dimensions: municipal waste 
management and packaging waste management. The dimension of municipal waste 
management is linked to the treatment of municipal waste and particularly to the proximity 
principle. This was defined in article 174 of the Treaty of Rome which required that “waste 
should be disposed of as closely as possible to its place of generation” (art. 174, par. 2). 
Article 5 of the Waste Framework Directive 91/156/EEC referred to the proximity principle 
in the “establishment of an integrated network of disposal installations” which “must enable 
waste to be disposed of in one of the nearest appropriate installations by means of the most 
appropriate methods and technologies in order to ensure a high level of protection for the 
environment and public health” (art. 5). Furthermore, specific requirements for the disposal 
installations and particularly for the landfill sites were defined in the Landfill Directive No. 
1999/31/EC which, in articles 12, 13 and 14, set out the requirements for the operational 
landfill sites and for the closure and after-care of old and obsolete ones31.  
                                                 
30 The source of the definition of the packaging waste is the Eurostat webpage 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/waste/key_waste_streams/packaging_waste).  
31 In particular Article 12 required Member States to “take measures in order that control and monitoring 
procedures in the operational phase meet a number of requirements” (i.e. the operator of a landfill shall carry 
out during the operational phase a control and monitoring programme; the operator shall notify the 
competent authority of any significant adverse environmental effects revealed by the control and monitoring 
procedures and follow the decision of the competent authority on the nature and timing of the corrective 
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 The dimension of municipal waste management then comprises the establishment of 
an integrated network of disposal installations, the compliance of operational landfill sites 
and the closure and after-care of old and obsolete sites. Being a variation in kind, there are a 
number of stages to the process of achieving sustainable implementation compliance, 
numbered 1-5. However, at one point between stages 3 and 4, a shift occurs where 
sustainable implementation compliance appears for the first time. In the operationalisation of 
the municipal waste management dimension, two conditions must be met for us to consider 
the country’s performance as 'sustainably compliant' 32 : the adoption of implementing 
legislation AND the establishment of the specific measures on the disposal sites (i.e. the 
networks in place, the compliant operational sites and the closure and after-care of old and 
obsolete sites). The achievement of 'sustainable compliance status', then, revolves around the 
passage between stages 3 and 4. As mentioned above, stages 1-3 are below the sustainable 
compliance level and thus the countries' performances are to be considered non-compliant 
while the stages 4 and 5 are above this level, and thus such countries shall be considered 
sustainably compliant. In other words, a country may only be deemed to have achieved 
implementation compliance once the compliance has become sustainable.  
Table 1 summarises the sustainable compliance stages in the municipal waste management 
dimension. 
                                                                                                                                                        
measures to be taken). Article 13 (c), defined the requirements for the closed landfill sites and required that 
“the operator shall be responsible for its maintenance, monitoring and control in the after-care phase for as 
long as may be required by the competent authority, taking into account the time during which the landfill 
could present hazards”. The operator was also obliged to “notify the competent authority of any significant 
adverse environmental effects revealed by the control procedures and shall follow the decision of the 
competent authority on the nature and timing of the corrective measures to be taken”. Article 14 required 
Member States to “take measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are 
already in operation at the time of transposition of this Directive, may not continue to operate unless the 
steps outlined below are accomplished as soon as possible and within eight years after the date laid down in 
Article 18(1) at the latest [...]”. 
32  The concept of ‘sustainable compliance’ as discussed herein is to be construed as denoting sustainable 
implementation compliance. 
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Table 1: Operationalisation of the implementation compliance in the municipal waste 
management dimension: 
 
Sustainable 
compliance stage 
Stage Operationalisation 
Non-compliance 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
Implementing legislation either missing or not in force. 
Integrated networks of disposal installations have not been set 
up, the landfill disposal sites in operation are not compliant33 
and those to be closed have not been closed. 
Implementing legislation not in force. Integrated networks of 
disposal installations have not been set up, the landfill disposal 
sites in operation are not compliant and those to be closed have 
not been closed yet but efforts are mentioned. 
2  
Implementing legislation present but not in line34, setting up of 
the integrated networks, measures to improve compliance in the 
operating disposal landfill sites and closure of obsolete ones 
have started but major efforts are required. 
3  
Implementing legislation in line. Planning of integrated 
networks and regional disposal facilities observable in national 
legislation in the adoption of national and regional waste 
management plans. 
Sustainable 
Compliance 
 4  
Implementing legislation in line, integrated networks are set up, 
operating and closed landfill sites are almost compliant, only 
minor efforts are required to improve compliance and after-care 
of old and obsolete landfill sites. 
 5  
Legislation in line, networks are in place and functioning, 
operational landfill sites are compliant and after-care measures 
for old and obsolete sites have been implemented. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
                                                 
33 The compliance requirements of the landfill site in the operational phase are set in Annex 1 of Directive 
1999/31/EC which set requirements on the location of the landfill site (i.e. the distance from residential and 
recreation areas and protection of geological and hydrological conditions, ground waters and nature); the 
control of the waters entering in the site and collection of contaminated water and leachate; the protection of 
soil and ground waters below and in the vicinity of the landfill site; the collection and treatment of landfill 
gas from biodegradable waste; protection from nuisances and hazards and the control on the access to each 
facility. 
34 According to European Commission's Monitoring Reports the legislation is in line when it is adopted and its 
content is conforming to the requirements contained in the European directive which implements.  
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The second dimension concerns packaging waste management. This is linked to the treatment 
of packaging waste and particularly to the “polluter pays” principle established in article 174 
of the Treaty of Rome (amended in art. 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) which required that “the costs of environmental pollution must be borne by the 
polluter” (art. 174, par. 2). Article 7 of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive set out 
the treatment operations for packaging waste, and particularly the establishment of systems 
by the Member States “to provide for return and collection of used packaging or packaging 
from consumers, final users or waste stream” which would channel them “to the most 
appropriate waste management alternatives in participation with the economic operators of 
the sector and the competent authorities” (art. 7). These return and collection systems through 
which packaging recovery and recycling could be attained had to be financed, according to 
article 15, through economic measures defined by Member States in accordance with the 
“polluter pays” principle35.  
 The dimension of packaging waste management, then, comprises the setting up of 
return, collection and recovery systems for packaging and the establishment of economic 
measures to encourage these systems. Similarly to the municipal waste management 
dimension, achievement of sustainable compliance with this dimension may also be 
characterised by five stages. Also in this case, there is a divide between stages 3 and 4 which 
where sustainable compliance is first achieved. The operationalisation of the packaging waste 
management dimension then looks at two elements to consider the country’s performance as 
'sustainably compliant': the adoption of implementing legislation AND the establishment of 
return and collection systems and economic instruments to finance them. Therefore, also in 
this case, the stages 1-3 are to be considered as below the sustainable compliance level and 
such countries' performance is therefore to be deemed as non-compliant. Stages 4-5 are above 
this level and such countries are to be considered sustainably compliant. Again, the 
achievement of implementation compliance may only be claimed once the compliance has 
become sustainable. 
Table 2 summarises the sustainable compliance stages in the packaging waste management 
dimension. 
 
                                                 
35 Article 15 of the Packaging and Packaging waste directive in particular established the definition of 
economic instruments by the Council to promote the implementation of the objectives of packaging recovery 
and recycling contained in the Directive and, in the absence of such measures, required the Member States to 
“adopt measures to implement those objectives”. 
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Table 2: Operationalisation of the implementation compliance in the packaging waste 
management dimension: 
 
Sustainable 
compliance stage 
Stage Operationalisation 
Non-compliance 
0 
 
 
1 
 
Implementing legislation either missing or not in force. Systems 
for collection, recovery and recycling and economic instruments 
have not been set up. 
Implementing legislation not in force. Systems for collection, 
recovery and recycling and economic instruments have not been 
set up but efforts are mentioned. 
2  
Implementing legislation present but not in line. Setting up of 
systems and economic instruments has started but major efforts 
are required to improve their functioning. 
3  
Implementing legislation in line. Systems for collection, 
recovery and recycling have been set up but economic 
instruments are not always consistent. 
Sustainable 
compliance 
 
4  
Implementing legislation in line, systems and economic 
instruments are in line, only minor efforts are required to 
improve their functioning. 
5  
Legislation in line, systems and economic instruments in place 
and functioning. 
Source: own elaboration 
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1.4 The performances of Hungary and Poland in achieving sustainable implementation 
compliance with the municipal and packaging waste management dimensions 
 
 
 
The 1999 Commission’s Screening Report, the Annual Monitoring Reports for the years 
between 2000 and 2003 and the national questionnaires of Hungary and Poland on the 
adoption of the Waste Framework, Landfill and Packaging Directives for the years 2004-2006 
and 2007-2009 reveal differences in implementation compliance for these two countries. 
Beginning with the information contained in the 1999 Commission’s Screening Reports 
which assessed the starting situation in Hungary and Poland and further extending the 
analysis to the Annual Monitoring Reports and the post-Accession national questionnaires, 
the data highlight differences in the implementation compliance with the municipal waste 
management and the packaging waste management dimensions.  
 The performances of Hungary and Poland varied not only among countries but also 
between the two dimensions of municipal and packaging waste management. In the 
municipal waste dimension, Hungary and Poland started at a similar non-compliant situation 
(but different stages) but after accession their performances diverged widely. Since 2004, in 
fact, Hungary achieved stage 4, positioned above the sustainable compliance threshold and, 
therefore, its performance is to be considered as sustainably compliant. Contrariwise, at the 
end of the decade considered, in 2009, Poland was still at stage 2, positioned below the 
sustainable compliance threshold. Figure 1 summarises this data. Further details on how the 
performance of each year has been measured by the European monitoring reports are 
provided in Annex 1.   
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Figure 1: The performances of Hungary and Poland in implementing the municipal waste 
management dimension 
 
 
 
Source of the data: Commission Annual Reports, National Questionnaires 
 
The variation in the performances of Hungary and Poland is clearly marked in the packaging 
waste dimension. In this dimension both countries began with a situation below the 
sustainable compliance threshold but while Hungary began at stage 2, Poland started off at 
stage 0. Despite some improvements made by Poland by 2002, moving it to stage 2, this 
country did not achieve sustainable compliance by the end of the decade considered. In 2004, 
Hungary improved its performance above the compliance threshold and achieved stage 5 and 
full sustainable implementation compliance with all the requirements of the European 
Packaging Waste Directive, and remained at this stage until the end of the period in question. 
Figure 2 shows this data and, also in this case, further details are provided in Annex 1. 
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Figure 2: The performances of Hungary and Poland in implementing the packaging waste 
management dimension 
 
 
Source of the data: Commission Annual Reports, National questionnaires  
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1.5 Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter, I have defined and operationalised the dependent variable of my dissertation. 
Firstly, I have presented the key problem of the research. EU documents have particularly 
emphasised that despite similar historical background, environmental problems and strategies 
adopted by the EU for the membership, there exists a variation in the respective performances 
of the CEE candidate countries and specifically between Hungary and Poland. Variation in 
compliance has been analysed well by Europeanisation scholars focusing on the EU-15 
Member States. Moreover, in the analysis of the compliance performances of the CEE 
countries, conditionality scholars have hypothesised as a key incentive for compliance the 
reward of EU accession, and some of them anticipated a general backslide in compliance 
once these countries joined the EU. Nevertheless, the data reported in the Commission’s 
Annual Monitoring Reports and the Tri-Annual Monitoring Reports have shown not only that 
the performances of the CEE countries have not regressed, but in some cases even improved. 
Therefore, the research problem addressed in this dissertation concerns firstly the existence of 
variation in the compliance with the European directives despite similarly problematic 
starting points. Moreover, extending the time-frame of analysis to the CEE post-Accession 
period, the dissertation aims as well to explore the mechanisms that supported the already 
superior performance of Hungary, leading to achievement of sustainability, against the poor 
performance of Poland stalled at a non-compliance stage also in the post-Accession period. 
Hence, I have defined the key concepts. In doing so, I have particularly referred to 
two concepts which have been used in the literature to delineate the process of adoption of 
EU directives at the national level. Scholars have considered the concepts of 
“implementation” and “compliance” as different but linked aspects of said adoption: the 
former pertaining to process and the latter pertaining to conformity with the legislation. 
Retaining both aspects, I have fused these concepts arriving at implementation compliance. In 
order to operationalise and measure this concept, I have made references to relevant EU 
legislation in the waste sector and selected three directives regulating the management and 
treatment of municipal and packaging waste; namely, the Waste Framework Directive, the 
Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive and the Landfill Directive. Moreover, I defined 
two dimensions related to municipal waste management and packaging waste management 
and created visualisations of various stages of the process for achieving sustainable 
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compliance within the two dimensions.  
Operating within this framework, I presented the respective performances of Hungary 
and Poland in regard to the process of achieving sustainable compliance in the municipal 
waste management and packaging waste management dimensions. In both cases, Hungary 
and Poland started off from different, yet similarly non-compliant stages. I demonstrate how, 
from the perspective of achieving sustainable implementation compliance, the final positions 
of both countries show a strong divergence with Hungary having achieved full sustainable 
compliance and Poland still failing to break through the sustainability threshold. 
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Chapter 2 
The theoretical framework for analysing variation in sustainable 
compliance 
 
 
Many theoretical approaches have been used to investigate rule compliance among EU 
Member States. Theorising different mechanisms for the delegation of power to the 
supranational European institutions, inter-governmentalists, neo-functionalists and social 
constructivists have similarly considered the compliance with European rules as “a matter of 
state choice” (Haas, 1998). The centrality of the state and the preference of state actors have 
also characterised the theoretical approaches focusing on compliance and on the effects of the 
European Union on its members. Compliance managerial and enforcement as well as 
Europeanisation researchers have scrutinised domestic capacity, administrative traditions and 
preferences of state actors in an effort to explain difference in the performance among EU 
Members. Similarly, governance researchers have pointed to different mechanisms of 
“coercive and voluntary transfer” of policy to which governments “may respond” (Holzinger 
and Knill, 2007, p. 779). Furthermore, conditionality researchers have considered the 
European 'rewards' that state actors of the CEE candidate countries could achieve by 
complying with EU legislation. Moreover, constructivists have analysed socialisation 
processes in which state actors were persuaded by external actors on compliance or simply 
emulated existing compliance best-practices.  
 This dissertation analyses the implementation compliance of Hungary and Poland in 
the decade between 1999 and 2009. The extension of the time-frame of analysis from 
previous analyses on CEE countries allows me to introduce the concept of 'sustainable 
compliance'. Recent studies on the CEE post-Accession and EU monitoring reports have 
shown the fears of compliance backslide to be unfounded, and that in some cases the new 
CEE Member States have performed even better than the older ones. Hence, going beyond 
the conditionality argument on the CEE candidate countries, this dissertation explores the 
mechanisms which sustained the implementation compliance of the CEE countries in the 
post-Accession period. The EU monitoring reports analysed in the previous chapter, however, 
also emphasised the existence of differences in the process of achieving sustainable 
compliance of Hungary and Poland in the post-Accession period. Hence, this dissertation also 
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aims at understanding which factors may have influenced such variation. In doing so, I have 
explored theories on the demand-side, and particularly on those stakeholders such as firms, 
non-governmental organisations, experts and local authorities who may decide to press for 
compliance. In particular, the analysis focuses on mechanisms arising from the market, from 
the domestic policy-making and implementation cooperation and from the external assistance 
which may (or may not) have made compliance profitable for these stakeholders and 
sustained the post-Accession compliance. 
 The chapter is then structured as follows: in the first section, I review the supply-side 
approaches to compliance and elaborate four alternative explanations to variation in 
sustainable compliance that point to differences in existing domestic administrative 
limitations, external incentives and threats, preferences of state actors, socialisation and 
learning process. I also discuss the limits of these approaches when applied to the analysis of 
the performances of Hungary and Poland regarding the implementation compliance with 
European directives. Then, in the second section, I begin with a presentation of the demand-
side theories and introduce the theoretical frame, as well as the three hypotheses related to the 
existence of market incentives, pre-existing cooperative strategies and assistance alliances.  
 
 
2.1 The supply-side approaches: alternative explanations to variation in sustainable 
compliance  
 
 
Variation in compliance of EU members has been seen mostly through the prism of supply-
side explanations, with a focus on those state actors and incumbents with the power to decide 
whether or not to supply the institutional change necessary for rule compliance. Since the 
1960s, IR theories have debated the process of European integration as the result of decisions 
taken by national governments. For inter-governmentalists, state actors controlled the 
integration process and delegated limited authority to supranational institutions to achieve 
specific policy goals (Marks et al., 1996) and only for those issues considered important for 
the national governments (Puchala, 1999; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; Rosamond, 
2000; Wiener et al., 2004; Cremona, 2012). For neo-functionalists, national governments 
delegated their authority to European institutions to achieve better outcomes for their own 
interests (Cini, 2006). For social constructivists, governments' choice of compliance was 
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guided by “socially generated convictions and understandings” and “consensual knowledge” 
(Haas, 1998) which made compliance an “internalised obligation” (Cremona, 2012).  
 Following the idea of compliance as a rational or internalised choice, European 
integration theories have analysed under which conditions states decide to comply with rules 
and why there are observed differences in the performances of EU Members. These 
approaches have centred on four main elements: a) domestic pre-existing administrative 
capacity and traditions, b) European incentives and threats, c) stakeholders' cost-benefit ratio 
and d) transnational communication processes. These four notions constitute the alternative 
explanations considered in this dissertation as against the three hypotheses derived from 
demand-side approaches. 
 
 
2.1.1 Similarity in pre-existing capacity and administrative traditions 
 
 
Different approaches have highlighted how pre-existing institutional settings, administrative 
capacity and traditions attached to them matter for the compliance with European policies at 
domestic level. Europeanisation researchers pointed to the degree of compatibility between 
European and national legislation, administrative capacity and institutional settings to explain 
variation in compliance among EU members. These scholars considered that compliance with 
EU rules was likely when national rules, policies and processes had a high degree of 
similarity (or “goodness of fit”) with the European ones. In particular, they hypothesised that, 
at the beginning of the process of approximation with the EU rules, the initial degree of 
“fit36” determined the extent to which domestic institutions had to change in order to comply 
with the EU rules and policies (Green Cowles et al., 2001). Therefore, the higher the 
incompatibility and distance between the EU processes, policies and institutions and the 
Members' processes, policies and institutions, the higher the changes needed at domestic 
level to comply with the EU rules and policies and the higher the expected implementation 
                                                 
36 Over the years, scholars have focused on the existence of policy (Héritier et al., 1996; Börzel et al., 2000; 
Börzel, 2000 and 2003) and institutional misfits (Börzel, 1999; Knill and Lenschow, 2000; Knill, 2001; Knill 
and Lenschow, 2001) to explain the impact of Europeanisation at domestic level (Duina 1997 and 1999; 
Green Cowles et al., 2001). In particular, the concept of ‘policy fit’ has been operationalised to look at the 
distance between the EU and domestic rules and practices that affect also policy goals, regulatory standards, 
instruments and problem-solving approaches while for the ‘institutional fit’ it has been considered the 
distance between EU and national administrative structures and the collective understandings or traditions 
linked to them (Börzel, 2000).  
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problems at domestic level (Duina, 1997 and 1999; Duina and Blithe, 1999; Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998 and 2000; Börzel et al., 2000; Green Cowles et al., 2001).  
 In the same vein of the “goodness of fit” argument, researchers of the compliance 
managerial approach specified that states had a general propensity to comply but in presence 
of domestic financial, administrative or technical capacity weaknesses they would not be able 
to adhere to the EU requirements (Young, 1992; Haas, Keohane and Levy, 1993; Mitchell, 
1994; Chayes and Chayes, 1993 and 1995; Keohane and Levy, 1996; Chayes, Chayes and 
Mitchell, 1998; Levy, Keohane and Haas, 1993; Jacobson and Brown Weiss, 1998; Sissenich, 
2005, 2007, 2008; Dimitrova, 2002; Curtin and Van Ooik, 2000; Mbaye, 2001; Berglund et 
al., 2006; Hille and Knill, 2006; Kaeding, 2006; Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Linos, 2007; 
Perkins and Neumayer, 2007; Toshkov, 2007; Berglung, 2009; Knill and Tosun, 2009; Börzel 
et al., 2010 and 2012; Konig and Mader, 2013; Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; Trauner, 
2009; Jensen, 2007; Hartlapp, 2014). The presence of high capacity limitations would then 
result in high adjustment costs and in low conformity with the EU legislation. In other words, 
the capacity limitations of a country would increase the distance between the EU legislation 
and its domestic compliance.  
 Similarly to Europeanisation and managerial compliance approaches, researchers of 
governance highlighted the importance of similarity between the European and domestic 
administrative structure and traditions to overcome bureaucracy resistance. In particular, 
when looking at the modes of policy convergence, researchers hypothesised the mechanism 
of policy coercion which considered European legislation as legally binding and left little 
room for discretion to the administrative bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Knill and Lenschow 
(2005a and 2005b) highlight how “the EU policy often assumes a given administrative model 
with the effect that national bureaucracies face a double challenge of adaptation” (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2005b, p. 116). Hence, they emphasised that the typical “rationality of national 
bureaucracy” to react to this mechanism is to “protect traditional structures” (Knill and 
Lenschow, 2005a, p. 585) by meeting “policy obligations while minimising changes to 
existing regulatory styles and structures” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005a, p. 590). In other 
words, bureaucracies put forward a strong resistance against full policy convergence when 
“coercive EU measures [..] are in contradiction with deeply entrenched national 
administrative traditions” so that the institutional changes “are generally restricted to 
incremental and piecemeal adjustments” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005a, p. 591). 
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Based on the three theoretical approaches above-mentioned, the following hypothesis on 
similarity in the pre-existing domestic capacity and administrative traditions can thus be 
defined: 
 
Hypothesis on pre-existing administrative capacity and traditions similarity 
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases, if domestic administrative capacity 
and traditions are similar to the EU policy administrative model. 
 
To measure the degree of pre-existing administrative capacity and traditions of Hungary and 
Poland, I rely on the data contained in the monitoring reports released by the EU Commission 
over the decade considered (1999-2009). These documents37 contain information on Hungary 
and Poland's environmental administrative capacity and infrastructures i.e. numbers of staff, 
division of competences and funds available to the Ministry of Environment and the 
Environmental Inspectorate (at national and regional levels). The reports, however, show 
similar administrative capacity and traditions of Hungary and Poland for the decade under 
consideration and with no difference between pre- and post-Accession periods.  
 Since the first European documents analysing and screening the starting 
environmental situation of Hungary and Poland, the administrative capacity and traditions of 
these two countries appear similar. The Commission Opinion for Hungary (1997) emphasised 
the low level of environmental investments in terms of share of GDP in comparison to the 
European average and the “limited availability of public funds for environmental 
improvements” (p. 91). Furthermore, it emphasised the need of “[M]ore efforts [...] in 
implementing and enforcing environmental policies, especially in relation to supervision and 
enforcement structures” (p. 92), a better coordination between the Ministry of Environment 
and the enforcement bodies at national and regional level as well as “greater financial and 
human resources” (p. 111). Similarly, the Commission Opinion for Poland (1997) highlighted 
a drop in the amounts of financial resources for protection of the environment as well as the 
need of a strengthening of administrative capacity which was considered as “understaffed at 
the policy level but overstaffed at the level of routine administration” and of “poor quality” 
(p. 105). Moreover, the Screening Report for Hungary on the Environment Chapter (1999) 
                                                 
37 For the pre-Accession period, I consider the information contained in the 1997 Opinion on the readiness of 
the CEE countries for Accession, the 1999 Screening Reports and the Annual Monitoring Reports (1999-
2003) released by the European Commission. For the post-Accession period, I rely on the data contained in 
the Environmental Performance Reviews of Hungary and Poland prepared by the OECD in 2008 and 2015. 
 48 
showed coordination problems between Ministries in charge of environmental competences 
and between different implementing authorities as well as the need of additional staff and 
investments for the waste sector. Similarly, the Screening Report for Poland (1999) 
highlighted fragmentation in the division of environmental competences between the 
Ministry of Environment and the regional and local authorities in charge of the 
implementation of environmental measures as well as the need to increase the environmental 
investments.  
  Similar weaknesses in the administrative capacity of Hungary and Poland were also 
emphasised in the Annual Reports for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. In 2000, the Hungarian 
Report highlighted persisting coordination problems between ministries on environmental 
issues as well as the need for a revision of the structures and responsibilities of the Regional 
Inspectorates and the training of their staff. Similarly, the Polish Report discussed 
coordination problems as well as the need of strengthening the monitoring capacity and of 
training staff on environmental legislation. The 2001 Hungarian Report showed an 
improvement in the number of staff in the Ministry of Environment and increased 
environmental investments, but it also emphasised persisting problems in the coordination of 
environmental tasks in the Ministry of Environment and Inspectorates. Similar problems of 
coordination between central and regional levels were highlighted in the 2001 Polish Report. 
The 2002 Hungarian Report showed still unsatisfactory levels of staff together with a need 
for further training and equipment. Problems in the administrative capacity to implement the 
EU environmental acquis was also emphasised in the 2002 Polish Report in terms of 
investments, environmental staff and staff resources.  
 The availability of detailed post-Accession data on the environmental administrative 
capacity of Hungary and Poland is difficult. However, OECD reports on the environmental 
performances of Hungary and Poland released in 2008 (for Hungary) and 2015 (for Poland) 
highlight some persisting administrative weaknesses in both countries. In particular, the 2008 
Report (which monitored Hungary in the period 2000-2008) showed that Hungary still 
experienced financial and human resource shortage in the monitoring and enforcement 
capacity of inspectorates. Moreover, the environmental financing (also from EU sources) was 
not always adequate to implement new legislation (OECD Environmental Performance 
Review for Hungary, 2008, pp. 16-17). The 2015 Report (which monitored Poland in the 
period 2003-2015) emphasised that Poland had to strengthen the environmental compliance 
promotion by upgrading the supporting monitoring and analytical equipment, further 
strengthen the cooperation between national and regional inspectorates and simplify and 
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streamline the environmental governance system (OECD Environmental Performance 
Review for Poland, 2015, pp. 44-46).  
 The monitoring reports then show the presence of similar weaknesses in the 
administrative capacity, financial capabilities and traditions for both Hungary and Poland 
which persist in the overall period considered. However, while they emphasise an 
administrative similarity, they also reveal a variation in their compliance performances with 
Hungary fully implementing the EU waste requirements and sustaining its compliance while 
Poland only partially implementing them. Considering the lack of difference in this variable 
between the two cases under consideration, I therefore have to reject (and not test with 
process-tracing methodology) the hypothesis that difference in administrative capacity could 
be a factor explaining the observed variation in implementation compliance and in its 
sustainability.  
 
 
2.1.2. European threats and incentives to compliance 
 
 
Governance scholars have analysed the use of resources as incentives or penalties to 
compliance. They then defined the mechanism of 'imposition' ('coercive isomorphism' for 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) resulting from pressures exerted on organisations by other 
organisations “that control critical resources” (Knill and Holzinger, 2005, p. 780 quoting 
Guler et al., 2002, p. 212). On the one hand, the 'imposition' was linked to asymmetries of 
power between countries or institutions due to a resource interdependency between 
organisations or among countries. On the other hand, it was linked to conditionality for 
accession set forth by financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund. This latter mechanism implied exchanging compliance with determined 
conditions for loans or other economic resources (Meseguer Yebra, 2003; Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996 as quoted by Knill and Holzinger, 2005, p. 780).  
 Following a similar perspective, the conditionality approach referred to the metaphor 
of the 'carrot' and the 'stick' to explain the role played by EU conditionality in the process of 
EU law harmonisation in the candidates from Central and Eastern Europe (Grabbe and 
Hughes, 1998; Grabbe, 1999; Grabbe, 2002; Kelley, 2004). In particular, scholars of such 
approach theorised the mechanism of “compliance by rewards” according to which states 
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achieved rewards upon the fulfilment of compliance. In other words, the EU had made 
compliance with its rules the condition for EU political (e.g. EU Membership) and economic 
rewards (e.g. EU funds and commercial treaties); still, the access to such rewards was granted 
to candidate countries only if they fulfilled the condition. Otherwise, EU rewards were 
withheld (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Furthermore, some researchers also feared 
that once candidates have achieved the EU rewards, compliance with EU rules would 
deteriorate and backslide (Grabbe, 2006; Pollack, 2009; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008; Sasse, 
2008). 
 Based on the above-mentioned approaches which recognise the role played by threats 
and by incentives to compliance set by supranational institutions, the following hypothesis 
can be defined: 
 
 
Hypothesis on European threats and incentives to compliance 
 
The likelihood of implementation increases with high incentives and threats to compliance set 
by European institutions. 
 
The focus of this alternative explanation is on the incentives and threats defined by the EU 
institutions to enhance compliance in its member/candidate countries. When considering the 
EU incentives to compliance, studies on the CEE Enlargement have primarily focused on the 
EU membership (for a review, see Cini et al., 2006). However, the mere provision of “EU 
membership” appears powerless to properly explain post-Accession compliance performance 
of CEE countries. In fact, with the EU Accession, the incentive of membership (and the threat 
of non-membership) no longer plays a role in influencing compliance in the CEE countries. 
Moreover, the European Monitoring Reports for the post-Accession period as well as recent 
studies have shown not only that the good performance of the CEE countries has maintained 
after their accession to the EU, but also that the CEE countries have “generally performed far 
better than the old member states” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 822) thus demonstrating that the EU 
concerns of a rising “Eastern problem” have been “unfounded” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 822).  
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) have also defined as EU incentives to the CEE 
countries' compliance the provision of EU financial assistance and institutional ties through 
trade and cooperation agreements. Similarly, Pollack (2009) argued that some studies on the 
CEE post-Accession period have suggested that the lack of compliance backslide could be 
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explained by the fact that “the EU retains considerable post-enlargement sources of leverage 
vis-à-vis the new members, particularly when it comes to the continued importance of EU 
funding” (Pollack, 2009, p. 250).  
 Nevertheless, in-depth interviews with Commission's officials held in Brussels 
revealed that in the pre-Accession period the access to the EU funding was not considered as 
an incentive to compliance but rather as an important aid to fulfil the conditions (interviews 
1; 72). A Commission's official recognised that “without that money” the CEE countries 
would have hardly approximated with the EU environmental acquis in the pre-Accession 
period (interview 1), therefore, rather than an incentive, the EU funding has been an aid 
mechanism to achieve compliance. Similarly, Commission's officials recognised that the 
access to the EU Structural and Cohesion funds can be equally considered an aid to 
compliance for the post-Accession period (interviews 33; 30; 73; 76). Researchers focusing 
on the post-Accession have also considered the 'sanctioning' role played by the withholding 
of the EU funds in the CEE countries after their Accession to the EU (Pollack, 2009). 
However, while the 'freeze' in EU funding was effectively put in practice by the EU against 
Bulgaria (for details, see Trauner, 2009; Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2009), interviews with 
Commission's officials highlighted that such leverage was never used against Hungary and 
Poland in the decade under examination (interviews 28; 33; 30; 73; 76). 
 When considering the EU compliance threats, conditionality researchers recognise 
that the “pre-Accession alignment was largely underpinned by the conditional incentive of 
membership” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 810) and non-membership was considered the main 
threat. In the pre-Accession period, the membership incentive and non-membership threat, 
however, were the same for Hungary and Poland. However, in the post-accession period, the 
“rationalist perspective would expect the likelihood of continued post-accession compliance 
to vary […] according to the extent to which the EU is able to sanction (non)compliance” 
(Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 797). In fact, in the post-Accession period, the CEE new 
Member States are subject to the infringement procedures of the ECJ which is entitled to 
“ultimately impose financial sanctions on members that infringe EU law: a lump sum 
payment and/or daily penalty payments until compliance with the ECJ decision is achieved 
(according to the severity of the infringement and the capacity of the member state to pay)” 
(Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 810).  
 Nevertheless, information from interviews held in Brussels reveal weaknesses in the 
effective “deterrent role” of the ECJ infringement procedure considered to be an extremely 
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long process38  (interviews 92; 93). Additionally, interviews held in Hungary and Poland 
reveal that the long process of detecting infringements has negatively influenced the 
sanctioning role of this procedure which has then been considered as not sufficient to effect 
compliance (interviews 17; 44). Moreover, the disclosure of a breach in the EU legislation at 
EU level has resulted in the common practice adopted by the Commission of resolving the 
problem during the bargaining negotiations phase between Commission and non-compliant 
Member States in order to avoid the ECJ infringement procedure considered “long and 
ineffective until it arrives in Court where a Member State is condemned and has to pay fines” 
(interview 92). Furthermore, recent studies on post-Accession have shown that the CEE new 
Member States 'outperformed' their EU-15 counterparts with none or early settled 
infringement procedures (for example, see Sedelmeier, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2009; 
Schimmelfennig and Trauner, 2009). 
 As demonstrated above, information derived from studies and interviews shows the 
presence of similar EU incentives and threats for both Hungary and Poland. Moreover, 
despite changes in the incentive/sanctions structure from pre- to post-Accession as discussed 
in studies focusing on the CEE countries compliance, available data does not show 
differences in the effectively applied EU incentives and sanctions between the two countries 
under examination. However, despite the lack of such differences, EU monitoring reports 
highlight a variation in the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland. Considering the 
similar European incentives and threats between the two cases, I have to reject (and not test 
with process-tracing methodology) the hypothesis that differences in EU incentives and 
sanctions could be a factor explaining the observed variation in implementation compliance 
and in its sustainability.  
 
                                                 
38 The ECJ infringement procedure consists of a pre-referral bargaining phase between the Commission and the 
non-compliant EU Member State. In the specific, after detecting a compliance problem, the Commission 
sends a letter and asks explanations to which the Member State has to reply agreeing or disagreeing with the 
points raised by Commission. If the Commission still detects problems then sends the letter of formal notice 
officially asking for explanations and for the correction of the problem. If after this official document the 
Commission “still thinks there is a problem” it the addresses the ECJ which only then imposes financial 
penalties (interview 92). 
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2.1.3 Transnational communication 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, IR social constructivists explored the emergence of collective 
understandings and identities and the role played by the process of EU integration in affecting 
discursive and behavioural practices of the Member States (Wiener et al., 2004; Rosamond, 
2006). According to social constructivists, ideas were then conceived as socially embedded 
and represented shared reference points while norms and social knowledge were constitutive 
of actors' identities (Cini et al., 2006); it was, in fact, through the internalisation of the norms 
that actors acquired their identities and established their interests (Rosamond, 2006). 
Moreover, it has been recognised that “the constructivist value added should be to explore 
complex social learning, a process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped through 
and during interaction” (Checkel, 2001, p. 561). Hence, researchers adopting a constructivist 
approach hypothesised that the internalisation of international norms by the political elites 
and implementers would positively influence compliance.  
 Constructivist approaches particularly “hint at processes of persuasion, deliberation, 
and argumentation as the micromechanisms driving social learning” (Checkel, 2001, p. 561). 
Risse (2000) and Checkel (2000 and 2001) highlight the argumentative character of 
persuasion. According to Risse (2000), “arguing implies that actors try to challenge the 
validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative 
consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles 
and norms guiding their action” (Risse, 2000, p. 7). Checkel (2001) refers to the role of social 
interaction in which “collective learning, internalization, and persuasion” are the dynamics 
producing compliance which occurs “through a redefinition of interests that takes place 
during the process of interaction itself” (Checkel, 2001, p. 556). He then defines 
'argumentative persuasion' as “an activity or process in which a communicator attempts to 
induce a change in the belief, attitude, or behavior of another person ... through the 
transmission of a message in a context in which the persuadee has some degree of free 
choice” (Checkel, 2001, p. 562). Hartlapp (2007) categorises 'deliberation' as part of the 
persuasion approach and, referring to the work of Neyer and Zürn (2001), she argues that “a 
greater degree of political interaction leads to a higher political, legal and societal 
internalisation of rules” (Hartlapp, 2007, p. 657).  
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 Furthermore, scholars have focused on the dimension of 'policy learning' and the 
circumstances under which programmes could be transferred from one place to another 
(Haas, 1990; Rose, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Levy, 1994). Exploring these 
circumstances, researchers defined ‘lesson-drawing’ as the “voluntaristic process whereby 
government A learns from government B's solution to a common problem” (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005, p. 783 quoting Rose, 1991). Within these studies, particular emphasis has been 
given to the epistemic communities which, working as informal networks, linked together 
experts at different levels (Haas, 1990; Rose, 1991). Europeanisation scholars further 
hypothesised the role of norm entrepreneurs towards domestic change by affecting the 
internalization of EU policies, ideas and collective understandings on the EU norms (Green 
Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Héritier et al., 2001). In particular, Börzel and 
Risse (2000) identified as norm entrepreneurs the epistemic communities whose supply of 
knowledge influenced domestic change. Epistemic communities have then been defined as 
“knowledge-oriented work communities in which cultural standards and social arrangements 
interpenetrate around a primary commitment to epistemic criteria in knowledge production 
and application” (Holzner and Marx, 1979).  
 Furthermore, researchers have analysed different forms of knowledge transfer. While 
they considered the copying or mimic of existing policies as a direct and complete transfer 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), they also recognised that knowledge transfer on 
new programmes “can take many different forms” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 783). In 
particular, as Knill and Lenschow (2005) emphasised, there are two objectives at the heart of 
the policy transfer: “the stimulation of information exchange and mutual learning between 
national policy-makers and the development and promotion of innovative regulatory models 
or concepts – best practice – to be applied in the Member States” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, 
p. 587). Scholars often refer to the mechanism of emulation of institutional models in relation 
to the two objectives of policy transfer. Policy emulation “requires agents looking for 
institutional designs outside their own realm to solve certain problems or to mimic the 
behaviour of their peers” (Börzel and Risse, 2012, p. 9). This mechanism is of “voluntary 
nature” and “policy suggestions leave broad leeway for interpretation and adjustment to 
domestic conditions” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, p. 587). However, the “embeddedness of 
national bureaucrats and policy-makers in transnational expert networks implies [..] that these 
actors can observe and learn from developments in other countries” but they also “are 
'observed' by their counterparts i.e. They have to demonstrate the quality and legitimacy of 
their concepts vis-a-vis external actors” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, p. 588).  
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 Despite the fact that persuasion and emulation may be considered as single 
mechanisms and hence may be separately theorised (for example, see Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2005), scholars have also recognised similarities between them (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005; Börzel and Risse, 2012). In particular, Holzinger and Knill (2005) summarise 
under the term 'transnational communication' these “different but related mechanisms” 
emphasising that they share the similar characteristic of “information exchange and 
communication”. Therefore, these scholars predict that their theoretical expectations on 
policy convergence “are rather similar” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 783). Based on the 
common element of information exchange and communication, the following hypothesis can 
be defined: 
 
Hypothesis on transnational communication 
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases with information exchange and 
communication between international and domestic actors. 
 
The concept of transnational communication implies both the promotion of international 
ideas by providing an authoritative model through information exchange in peer-reviews and 
learning from best practices, and the promotion of ideas as legitimate/true through reason-
giving and argumentative persuasion (Börzel and Risse, 2009). Researchers recognised that 
mechanisms related to social constructivism constitute “the most prominent alternative to 
rationalist explanations of conditionality” for the CEE compliance in the pre-Accession 
period (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 18 quoting the works of Checkel, 2000 and 
Kahler, 1992). Interviews with Commission's officials involved in the Accession process of 
Hungary and Poland, in fact, reveal that the Accession negotiations have also been 
characterised for being a “knowledge-based activity” (interview 48). Beside the 
Commission’s close monitoring of the CEE candidates' EU legislation approximation, the EU 
established specific twinning, peer-reviews and exchange of best-practices between officials 
of CEE candidate countries and Member States as well as the arrangement of country visits 
(interviews 1; 48; 47; 72). However, scholars found that constructivist explanations played 
only a limited role in influencing the CEE candidates' pre-Accession compliance performance 
in comparison to incentive-based explanations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; but 
see also Kelley, 2004).  
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 Although it has been recognised that conditionality “might have been highly effective 
in prompting pre-accession rule adoption” it was also emphasised that it “is much less so 
when it comes to sustained post-accession compliance” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 811). Epstein 
and Sedelmeier (2008) further suggested that the “the mixed [compliance] record of the 
incentive-based approach after enlargement should encourage us to revisit those original 
findings to assess the explanatory power of competing approaches” (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 
2008, p. 802). They recognised that “the uneven legitimacy of IOs, the social context, 
persuasion and socialization could have been a bigger part of the story than is often 
recognized because of the methodological difficulty of separating incentives from social 
forces” (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 802). Therefore, they argued that “post-accession 
could be a more favourable context for observing alternative mechanisms, as they are no 
longer crowded out by overwhelming incentives” (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008, 803).  
 A number of post-Accession studies have then analysed the role that socialisation and 
learning mechanisms might have played in explaining the CEE compliance performances in 
the post-Accession period. Empirical findings from studies on post-Accession compliance in 
the CEE countries particularly suggest that socialization and learning differently influence 
compliance in these countries (for an early analysis on variation in emulation outcomes in the 
CEE countries before Accession, see also Jacoby, 2004). For example, Epstein (2008) 
focused on the existence of “a narrow social context” which “affords international institutions 
the power to assign particular meanings to policies” (Epstein, 2008, p. 895). Therefore, with 
the presence of a specific social context “international actors were able to orchestrate a shift 
in which domestic actors, who began the transition believing that protecting domestic 
ownership was rational and desirable, ended up embracing policies premised entirely on the 
efficiency of financial institutions, regardless of power considerations” (Epstein, 2008; p. 
895). Contrariwise, Sasse (2008) argued that “through a change in attitudes or behaviour” 
socialization can ‘lock in’ bigger structural problems (Sasse, 2008, p. 856). Additionally, 
following Jacoby's argument on the link between the openness of the policymaking process 
and social-learning mechanisms (Jacoby, 2005), Kriszan (2009) recognised the role of social-
learning in the enforcement of equality policies in Hungary. Similarly to the empirical 
findings of these studies, interviews with Commission's officials as well as interviews with 
members of transnational networks reveal that Hungary and Poland have differently carried 
out EU knowledge-based and capacity-building projects (interviews 40; 8; 57; 58; 28; 16; 32) 
as well as being differently engaged in information exchange practices (interviews 4; 5; 34; 
42; 52; 11). 
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 In summary, information from studies and interviews show that transnational 
communication (which includes information exchange and persuasion initiatives) towards 
Hungary and Poland have differently impacted these two countries. Considering the variation 
in this variable, I therefore include this variable in the in-depth analysis of the two cases and 
test it through the process-tracing methodology. In order to account for the role of the 
transnational communication in the compliance of Hungary and Poland, particular attention is 
given to the analysis of the knowledge-based and capacity-building projects promoted by the 
EU Commission and financed through PHARE, ISPA, Cohesion and Structural Funds. 
Furthermore, in the empirical chapters are also considered the initiatives promoted by 
European private and societal stakeholders to the Hungarian and Polish environmental NGOs 
and firms. The information has been primarily collected through in-depth interviews with 
policy officers in the Commission, representatives of the Brussels-based NGOs and industry 
lobbies as well as to Polish and Hungarian former or current government officials, business 
representatives and members of NGOs. 
 
2.1.4 Stakeholders' adjustment cost/benefit ratio 
 
Scholars of the regulatory approach considered the regulated entities as “rational economic 
actors that act to maximise profits” (Rechtschaffen, 1998). Therefore, according to cost-
benefit calculations, they expected that the regulated entities complied with a given 
regulation “when the benefits of compliance exceed[ed] the costs of it” (Winter and May, 
2001). Similarly to this approach, the compliance enforcement researchers stressed the role of 
the domestic incentive structure which influenced state actors’ and politicians’ rational cost-
benefit calculations on compliance (Olson, 1965; Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane; 
1986; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1992; Bayard and Elliot, 1994; Downs, Roche and 
Barsoom, 1996; Dorn and Fulton, 1997; Maniokas, 2009; Trauner, 2009; Leiber, 2007). Thus, 
they emphasised that states' non-compliance performances derived from domestic cost-
benefit calculations. Therefore, they expected that where costs outweighed benefits, that is, in 
presence of high costs of compliance and high benefits of shirking, domestic actors would 
have tried to avoid compliance. Studies highlighted that costs arising from the alignment with 
the EU acquis in the pre-Accession period would generally create high financial and 
administrative costs for the candidate countries (for example, see Schimmelfennig et al., 
2003). Therefore, “the domestic disruption associated with the transfer of EU policy regimes 
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increased ‘the likelihood of persistent compliance problems in key policy areas’” 
(Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 808 quoting Goetz 2005). 
 The problems arising from high domestic adjustment costs have also been analysed by 
researchers focusing on post-Accession compliance. In particular, scholars highlighted that 
the presence of high domestic costs of implementing EU legislation would “lead to deliberate 
‘cheating’ at the implementation stage” (Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 808). In particular, researchers 
argued that problems arising from the alignment with the EU acquis in the pre-Accession 
period would generally create high financial and administrative costs for the CEE countries 
that could hamper “a durable influence of rules adopted during the pre-accession period” 
(Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 810). Hence, they expected the adherence to EU rules as “driven by 
rational cost-benefit calculations and [by] actors in pursuit of maximising their own power” 
(Trauner, 2009, p. 68 quoting Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Dimitrova 2002; 
Grabbe 2003; Vachudova 2005).  
 Based on the above-mentioned approaches, the following hypothesis can be defined: 
  
Hypothesis on stakeholders' adjustment cost/benefit ratio 
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases, if stakeholders perceive a high 
cost/benefit ratio.  
 
Researchers of conditionality generally considered the domestic cost/benefit calculations as 
part of the “external incentives model” (Pollack, 2009) for the pre-Accession period 39 . 
However, as Schwellnus et al. (2009) specified, the “external incentives alone are therefore 
not sufficient to induce rule adoption – they also have to surpass domestic adoption costs” 
(Schwellnus et al., 2009, p. 128). This clarification then suggests a 'theoretical independence' 
of the role played by the domestic adaptational costs in the compliance performances of the 
CEE countries. A number of studies have then investigated the dimension of “costs”. For 
example, Falkner (2003) considered 'costs' as “a crucial element of any estimation of misfit 
caused by EU regulation” and defined this variable as “the economic consequences of a 
required reform for the addressees on all levels” (Falkner, 2003, p. 4).  
 Testing this variable, researchers have looked at differences between CEE and 
                                                 
39 For an analysis of the rationalist hypotheses on enlargement and a specification of the enlargement 
preferences of applicants and members in terms of costs and benefits, see Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeir, 
2002.  
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European costs and found that in presence of high domestic costs, domestic state actors 
would not-comply with EU rules (for example, see Duina, 1997; Börzel, 2000; Jordan, 2004; 
Leiber, 2007). European and international documents reported the existence of high 
adaptational costs to approximate and adopt the EU environmental legislation in the CEE 
candidate countries. In particular, EU studies approximated the total costs of compliance with 
the European environmental legislation for all the CEE countries between one hundred and 
ten (110) and one hundred and twenty (120) billion ECU and annual costs estimated between 
eight and twelve (8-12) billion ECU (EU Report, 1998; Hager, 2002). Nevertheless, the 
Commission cautiously asserted that the exact amount of “these costs and their impact will 
depend on the timing of investments and the selection of most cost-effective policy 
measures” (Communication on Accession Strategies, 1998, p. 17). Furthermore, the World 
Bank estimated the costs of compliance with the EU waste requirements for Hungary and 
Poland: between 1.8 billion and 4.4 billion ECU for Hungary (World Bank, 1999) and 
between 2.5 billion and 4.4 billion US dollars for Poland (World Bank, 1999).  
 The helpfulness of domestic adaptational costs in explaining variation in compliance 
has also been tested in two recent studies addressing the sustained compliance of the CEE 
countries in the post-Accession period. In the analysis of the compliance performance of 
Lithuania in the transposition of EU directives, Maniokas (2009) argued that compliance 
enforcement explanations linked to the political will and cost-benefit calculations better 
explained post-Accession compliance (Maniokas, 2009). Moreover, Sedelmeier (2009) tested 
in a crisp-set QCA the role played by adaptational costs, favourable government attitudes and 
specialised NGOs in the implementation of the EU equality policy in four CEE countries 
after their accession to the EU. However, while he found that “the absence of high adjustment 
costs” and “the combination of strong social democratic governments and NGOs specialising 
in EU gender equality legislation” (Sedelmeier, 2009, p. 118) have a strong impact on 
compliance, he also argued that neither of the two variables “is sufficient by itself” to explain 
the CEE post-Accession compliance performances (Sedelmeier, 2009, p. 118). 
 European and international reports as well as recent post-Accession studies highlight 
limitations in the sole use of domestic “adaptational costs” to explain variation in 
implementation compliance. Despite differences in the exact amounts of the estimated 
environmental compliance costs between Hungary and Poland, both Commission and World 
Bank reports considered them to be similarly substantial and recommended to both countries 
to undertake “substantial investments” to achieve full-compliance (World Bank, 2000, p. 43), 
and reduce the time expected for the effective implementation of the measures (World Bank, 
 60 
2000). Moreover, researchers looking at the “domestic adaptational costs” in the post-
Accession period suggest that this variable in itself fails to sufficiently describe the CEE 
compliance performances in the post-Accession period. The mere focus on the “adaptational 
costs” then does not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation to the existing variation 
between Hungary and Poland.  
 In a recent study, however, Pollack (2009) specifically links the dimension of 
adaptational costs to benefits by arguing that “the adjustment costs of complying with a body 
of EU economic and social regulations designed primarily for western European countries 
could be considerable, creating the temptation to cheat once the overarching goal of 
membership had been achieved” (Pollack, 2009, p. 15). In other words, Pollack seems to 
suggest that despite the high costs, the benefits that domestic actors can get from supplying 
compliance with the EU rules may vary in the CEE countries. Following this view, Maniokas 
(2009) proposes that in “the absence of a strong EU pressure” in the post-Accession period, 
rational cost-benefit calculations may be assessed by coalition governments but also by 
“interest groups” whose role “is growing stronger” (Maniokas, 2009, p. 53). These 
calculations may well vary between Hungary and Poland where domestic actors may 
differently recognise benefits from becoming (or not) agents in the implementation of the EU 
legislation. I therefore include this variable in the in-depth analysis of the two cases and test it 
through the process-tracing methodology. To assess the rational calculations influencing (or 
not) the supply of rule compliance by domestic actors, I analyse the role played by 
stakeholders in domestic policy-making and implementation of municipal and packaging 
waste measures. I then rely on information from interviews with private and societal actors as 
well as the officials from the Ministries of Environment and Regional Development of 
Hungary and Poland. 
 
 
2.2 The demand-side approach: the three hypotheses for variation in sustainable 
compliance  
 
 
The focus of this thesis is to explain the variation in the implementation compliance and in its 
sustainability of Hungary and Poland. Supply-side explanations have analysed mechanisms 
that influenced the choice of domestic state actors and incumbents to supply compliance. 
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These explanations were developed to explain the CEE pre-Accession compliance 
performances such as the hypothesis elaborated by the conditionality approach on “rewards” 
upon the fulfilment of rule compliance or by managerial researchers on motivations for non-
compliance linked to the presence of domestic administrative capacity weaknesses. These 
explanations, however, do not sufficiently grasp the variation in the performances of Hungary 
and Poland nor explain the good compliance of the CEE new Member States in absence of 
Accession conditionality. In order to uncover the motivations for variation in the sustainable 
compliance of Hungary and Poland, I build upon a recent article by Sedelmeier (2012) in 
which was introduced the concept of “institutional lock-in”. In Sedelmeier's view, this 
occurred when the costly institutional changes introduced through the conditionality pre-
Accession process were “locked in”, thus influencing the sustainability of the institutional 
changes in the post-Accession period (Sedelmeier, 2012).  
Building upon Sedelmeier, this dissertation further analyses the mechanisms that 
induced the pre-Accession compliance to be sustainable in the post-Accession period. Similar 
to Sedelmeier, who takes into account the works of North (1990), Pierson (1997 and 2000) 
and Streek and Thelen (2005) on the concept of institutional change and lock-in, this 
dissertation considers the theory of 'increasing returns' influencing compliance and 
specifically the sustainability of compliance in the post-Accession period. Unlike Sedelmeier, 
however, this thesis takes up the sustainability of compliance ‘on the ground’, meaning in the 
phase of domestic implementation of European directives. Hence, in order to consider the 
variation in the sustainable of Hungary and Poland, I explore explanations linked to the 
demand-side which scrutinise situations in which domestic stakeholders with the capacity to 
influence incumbents are, or become supporters of rule-taking.  
 Supply-side studies had already explored the role of societal actors in the policy-
making process. The most prominent has been George Tsebelis who considered the role of 
veto players in understanding the logic of different institutional settings40. In his comparative 
study on the capacity for policy change within different institutional alternatives41, he defined 
“veto players” as “any player who can block the adoption of a policy” and “whose agreement 
[...] is required for a change in policy” (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 301). Tsebelis argued that policy 
changes in a political system depends on three characteristics of veto players; namely on their 
                                                 
40 Before Tsebelis, Arthur Benz pointed out the existence of veto points in supranational decision-making 
which may have influenced losses of decisional power or oppose the proposed policy (as cited in Héritier A., 
Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe: Escape From Deadlock, 1999). 
41 G. Tsebelis, Decision-making in Political systems: Veto players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, 
Multicameralism and Multipartitism, British Journal of Political Science, Vol., 25, No. 3, 1995. 
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number, their congruence and their cohesion. He hypothesised that these changes could be 
achieved when the number of veto players in a country was low and when the differences in 
their political positions and in their ideological and identity positions were also low (Tsebelis, 
1995; Tsebelis, 2002). Following Tsebelis' veto players hypothesis, Europeanisation scholars 
further analysed the link between compliance and the number of veto players42, having a say 
in the domestic policy-making process. These scholars consider the presence of multiple veto 
points within the political system of a country which could constrain the capacity to “foster 
domestic consensus or 'winning coalition' necessary to introduce institutional changes” 
(Green Cowles et al., 2001, p. 9). Implying a negative correlation between the number of 
domestic veto players and policy compliance, these scholars contend that a high number of 
these players could impede or slow down the capacity of domestic actors to achieve policy 
changes and reform a country (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; 
Héritier et al., 2001; Green Cowles et al., 2001).  
Contrariwise to the Europeanisation researchers' argument on veto players, a small 
number of works covering very different subjects have taken a different perspective on 
analysing domestic societal and private actors by considering their demands for compliance 
with externally-defined rules. Vachudova (2005) pointed to the EU traction on domestic 
political parties and its capacity to convince office-seeking opposition parties on the need of 
adopting pro-European platforms to defeat their opponents (Vachudova, 2005). Earlier also 
Innes (2002) explored the link between the rise of catch-all parties in the CEE and the EU 
enlargement process (Innes, 2002). Haughton (2007), in contrast, argued that the EU 
influence on domestic actors in the process of EU Accession of the CEE candidate countries 
has not been so pivotal (Haughton, 2007). Furthermore, analysing the emulation of Western 
organisational models in Meiji's Japan, Westney (1987) pointed out how domestic factors 
shaped the process of policy emulation which resulted in policy innovation from the original 
Western models. In her analysis, in fact, she emphasised how Japan's selection of Western 
models was linked to the image of the “rational shopper” (Westney, 1987, p. 19) and 
accomplished through a “selective emulation” process (Westney, 1987, p. 27) in which 
                                                 
42 Researchers have debated on whether state or non-state actors had to be considered as veto players. Tsebelis, 
for example, while mentioning the existence of interest groups of specific policy areas or the army which 
could become powerful veto players (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 306), has also focused attention on institutional (i.e. 
president, chamber) and partisan (parties) veto players. Moreover, Knill (1998) discussed the domestic 
administration and administrative traditions as factors filtering implementation effectiveness (Knill, 1998). 
Héritier (1999) and Héritier et al. (2001) also distinguished between formal veto players proper of the 
political system and factual veto players such as the interest groups within specific policy areas (Héritier et 
al, 2001). Furthermore, Steunenberg (2007) and Dimitrova (2010) identified politicians and members of the 
administration as veto players (Steunenberg, 2007; Dimitrova, 2010).  
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domestic actors chose the features to adopt from the original model while not losing sight of 
the Japanese tradition and environment. Focusing on institutional transfers in post-Second 
World War Germany (East and West), Jacoby (2000) further developed Westney's argument 
on emulation by emphasising that policy transfers from abroad have been effective and 
persistant in driving institutional change when they were “'pulled in' by social actors rather 
than decreed by policymakers alone”, and “must be embraced by domestic actors” even when 
they were initiated by the policy elites (Jacoby, 2000, p. 15).  
 Demand-side approaches then analysed the role of domestic actors in “pulling in” the 
adoption and implementation of externally-defined rules. Tanja Börzel (2000) elaborated the 
“push-and-pull” model with a “pull” factor arising from below and a “push” factor from 
above. In particular, she specified that domestic NGOs could “pull” for the adaptation of the 
European legislation43 by mobilising the public opinion or by being “watchdogs” of the 
implementation of the EU rules while the Commission could “push” for adaptation through 
the opening of infringement procedures for non-compliance. Hence, when public authorities 
were “sandwiched” between these two factors, Börzel recognised that “EU environmental 
policies have a good chance of being implemented more effectively, even if implementation 
involves high costs owing to policy misfit” (Börzel, 2000, p. 148). 
 Despite the possibility of a “pull” from NGOs which could act as “watchdogs” or 
mobilise the population on specific issues as specified by Börzel, scholars analysing CEE 
societal non-state actors have considered them as weak and characterised by “low levels of 
organisational membership and participation by ordinary citizens” (Howard, 2002; Howard, 
2003). Moreover, individual-level surveys have also shown a general low level of political 
participation and environmental activism in the CEE region (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2008 as 
quoted in Börzel and Buzogány, 2010, p. 166). When focusing specifically on environmental 
NGOs in the CEE countries researchers have also recognised that the involvement of the CEE 
green NGOs in European pre-Accession twinning and knowledge-based programmes or in 
the financial and technical assistance within the European aid programme PHARE, the 
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (hereafter, ISPA) and the Special 
accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (hereafter, SAPARD) have 
been mostly “top-down” (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010a). Moreover, they noted that the 
empowerment of NGOs by the EU did not automatically correspond to “sustainable 
cooperative state-society relations” (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010a, p. 728) and that the weak 
                                                 
43 In her paper, Börzel also refer to the “pull” enacted by political parties raising concern on the proper 
implementation (Börzel, 2003, p. 148) 
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capacities of state and non-state actors in these countries often prevented them from “pooling 
resources to make EU policies work” (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010b, p.159).  
 A number of studies, however, have challenged the assumptions of “dormant” societal 
and private non-state actors in the CEE countries. For instance, recent works have reviewed 
the idea of including CEE civil society organisations as partners in public governance 
(Gasior-Niemiec, 2010; Pleines, 2010). Moreover, Börzel and Buzogány (2010), analysing 
the role of CEE environmental NGOs in the promotion of European legislation, have stressed 
how EU accession has empowered these actors by fostering their role as “policy facilitators, 
consultants and lobbyists of government” (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010a, p. 728). 
Furthermore, adopting Europeanisation and political economy theories and challenging the 
current focus of the enlargement literature on intergovernmental cooperation, Andonova has 
underscored the role of European integration on domestic economic actors and 
representatives from the private sector (Andonova, 2004). In a co-authored paper, she has 
also recently investigated the role of environmental transnational networks in strengthening 
the capacity and the interests of societal and private non-state actors in countries with weak 
administrative capacity (Andonova and Tuta, 2014). Similarly, Langbein (2015) has 
uncovered the role of domestic and foreign firms in the process of EU policy convergence in 
Ukraine (Langbein, 2015). 
 Building upon these works, this dissertation analyses the role played by domestic and 
foreign actors operating in the CEE countries during the ‘implementation on the ground’ 
phase. I then identify a range of stakeholders of the municipal waste and packaging waste 
management dimensions and specifically three categories: (1) business actors and their 
associations or lobbies (for the municipal waste dimension: private national or foreign and 
municipal waste collecting companies while for the packaging waste dimension: packaging 
producers and fillers and recovery organisations) (2) environmental NGOs; and (3) the 
municipalities and local authorities and the regional authorities. By analysing this wide range 
of stakeholders, the thesis focuses not only on state actors' preferences but also on those of 
societal and private actors who, when recognising the existence of ‘increasing returns’ from 
compliance with the three European waste directives, may decide to sustain implementation 
compliance domestically.  
 The first hypothesis considers those stakeholders who, in the presence of specific 
incentives arising from the market, might have demanded or sustained compliance with the 
EU requirements. Taking into account that the environmental NGOs of the CEE countries 
might have been weak in demanding compliance with EU requirements, this hypothesis 
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spotlights private stakeholders who may have demanded and sustained compliance with EU 
requirements. The hypothesis contrasts two market mechanisms which see either domestic 
firms such as waste collecting companies and recovery organisations, or foreign and 
multinational firms penetrating the Hungarian and Polish less-regulated-markets. The 
underlying assumption is that firms recognise the competitive advantage of complying with 
the EU rules when their preferences converge. In order to have converging preferences, firms, 
which are profit-oriented, must recognise compliance as the only possible way to make 
profits in that policy area.  
 The second hypothesis explores the style of policy-making and policy-implementation 
set up in Hungary and Poland which may be linked to two strategies pursued by societal and 
private actors: they could achieve their own interests, or they could seek to achieve common 
interests by cooperating with the other involved actors (including state actors). The actors 
linked to this hypothesis are waste-collecting firms (domestic and foreign), recovery 
organisations, NGOs, municipalities/local authorities as well as officials from the relevant 
Ministries and the Parliament. The hypothesis states that cooperative strategies pursued in the 
policy-making and implementation of EU waste requirements enhance their compliance. The 
underlying assumption linked to this hypothesis is that the government will adopt the 
European legislation and this will imply costs for domestic state and non-state actors. 
Keeping this in mind, it is then expected that domestic actors will follow strategies for the 
sharing of the compliance costs through cooperation.   
 The third hypothesis considers the involvement of domestic actors in external 
assistance projects, and the impact of such involvement in fostering domestic compliance 
with EU rules. When analysing the adoption of externally defined rules, it is important to 
remember that external and domestic dimensions are intertwined, as rules are set by external - 
EU - actors, but domestic actors are in charge of their implementation. In this dissertation, 
then, external assistance is not understood stricto sensu but always in relation to domestic 
actors because, quoting Jacoby, “external influences can almost never have real purchase 
unless they operate in tandem with domestic influences” (Jacoby, 2006, p. 626). Following 
this idea, it is then hypothesised that when external and domestic actors establish alliances in 
joint problem-solving, the implementation compliance will be more likely. The actors 
considered in this hypothesis are municipalities and local authorities, firms and NGOs as well 
as European institutions, such as the Commission, in charge of knowledge-based and capacity 
building projects, as well as European networks and associations of private actors and NGOs. 
The underlying assumption is that external assistance from the EU and the European 
 66 
networks aims at ascertaining compliance with EU requirements. However, the effectiveness 
of the external assistance is strictly linked to the domestic actors' environment.  
 
 
2.2.1 The market incentives 
 
 
Scholars in the fields of political economy, market regulations and governance have debated 
the mechanisms of European market integration and the relationship between domestic and 
external firms and multinationals. Governance researchers, in particular, have hypothesised 
the role played by ‘regulatory competition’ in driving policy convergence (Holzinger and 
Knill, 2005; Knill and Lenschow, 2005). Their key argument stemmed from the idea that 
economic integration among countries puts “competitive pressure on national states to 
redesign domestic market regulations in order to avoid regulatory burdens restricting the 
competitiveness of domestic industries” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 782). Moreover, they 
hypothesised that “the more exposed a country is to competitive pressures following on from 
high economic integration […] the more likely it is that its policies will converge with other 
states with international exposure” (Holzinger and Knill, 2005, p. 789). The elements of 
domestic redesign of market regulations to enhance the effectiveness “in achieving certain, 
politically defined objectives” (Knill and Lenschow, 2005, p. 585) and the domestic exposure 
to international economic competition have been similarly conceptualised by political 
economy researchers.  
 On the one hand, political economists have focused on domestic economic actors 
which, entering a more regulated market, had to adjust to its standards (Vogel, 1995; Vogel 
and Kagan, 2004). This phenomenon has been defined as “the California Effect”, a model of 
firms’ behaviour which postulated a “ratcheting upward of regulatory standards in competing 
political jurisdictions” (Vogel, 1997, p. 561). Researchers have generally assumed that trade 
liberalisation would influence a regulatory “race-to-the-bottom” in which firms (and 
countries) would lower their standards “towards the lowest common denominator in order to 
maintain competitiveness” especially in relation to environmental regulation (Kelemen, 2010, 
p. 336; but on this point see also Knill et al., 2008 and Knill and Tosun, 2009). Furthermore, 
Kelemen and Vogel (2010) argued that the adoption of environmental standards by 
governments “is shaped by how such agreements affect the competitive position of domestic 
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producers” (Kelemen and Vogel, 2010, p. 444). They expected that where a country has (or is 
soon to have) strict domestic standards, producers are less likely to oppose international 
treaties. By contrast, they will oppose their adoption when domestic standards are weak.  
 The findings brought about by Vogel (and Vogel and Kagan), however, reveal the 
opposite. The “California Effect” model assumed that in the presence of large and highly 
regulated markets, domestic firms who seek to export into these markets may be forced to 
enact their standards, thus inducing them to push for higher standards in their own countries 
(Vogel and Kagan, 2004). It was then hypothesised that the likelihood of a regulatory “race to 
the top” increased if the establishment of stricter regulations represented a source of 
“competitive advantage” for the domestic firms that supported their adoption (Vogel, 1995). 
In the presence of international market competition, in fact, specific regulations may create a 
competitive advantage for domestic firms which, considering asymmetries in the burden of 
costs of compliance, may be willing “to support stricter regulations than they would have in 
the absence of foreign competition” (Vogel, 1997, p. 560).  
Following in the footsteps of Vogel’s and Vogel and Kagan’s works on the “California 
Effect”, Anu Bradford analysed the process of “unilateral regulatory globalisation”, according 
to which single states were able to “externalise” outside their borders laws and regulations by 
using market mechanisms which then resulted in the globalisation of such standards 
(Bradford, 2012, p. 3). This scholar argues that the main conditions for this “unilateral 
regulatory globalisation” are the existence of “a large domestic market, significant regulatory 
capacity, and the propensity to enforce strict over inelastic targets” (Bradford, 2012, p. 5). 
Furthermore, an important pre-condition for this “unilateral regulatory globalisation” is that 
the benefit of adopting this unilateral standard must exceed the benefit of adopting multiple 
standards (Bradford, 2012). Then, Bradford analyses the role of the European Union in 
influencing the standardization of regulations in specific fields. She proposes that 
multinational corporations operating in the EU may “have the incentive to standardise their 
production globally and adhere to a single rule” with the consequence that the EU rules 
become global (Bradford, 2012, p. 6). The mere adoption of EU rules by these corporations 
corresponds to a “de facto Brussels Effect” which, however, may lead to the adoption of EU 
rules in the countries of origin of these corporations. The firms that early adopted EU rules to 
be competitive in this market, in fact, might have a competitive advantage in lobbying for 
stricter requirements at the domestic level, thus triggering a “de jure Brussels Effect” 
(Bradford, 2012). 
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On the other hand, political economy researchers considered the effects of foreign 
direct investments and technology spill-overs from foreign and multinational companies in 
less-regulated markets (Caves, 1974; Globerman, 1979; Blomström and Presson, 1983). 
Technology spill-overs and a foreign presence have been found to have “had a positive 
impact on the productivity of local firms” (Kokko, 1994). For instance, in his study on 
Canada and Australia, Richard Caves (1974) classified three potential benefits: firstly, 
allocative efficiency in which multinationals might provide an increase in competition in the 
host-country market and reduce the monopolistic distortions; secondly, technical efficiency in 
which the subsidiary firm in less-regulated countries might induce a higher level of technical 
efficiency in domestic firms that compete with it; and thirdly, technology transfer, in which 
the subsidiary firm might speed up the transfer of technology and innovation to domestic 
firms. Moreover, Blomström and Kokko (1998) analysed the benefits for host countries from 
foreign investments in situations when foreign multinational companies carried out their 
operations in fully-owned affiliates (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). According to these 
scholars, local firms might decide to imitate technology, hire workers from the multinational 
firms or, with the broader foreign competition, decide to introduce new technologies to 
remain competitive on the market.  
However, Kokko (1994) and Blomström et al. (1999), investigating the determinants 
of efficiency of FDI productivity spill-overs, have written that theoretical consideration of 
these determinants have been relatively “ad hoc” (but for a detailed literature review on the 
determinants of FDI spill-overs, see Blomström et al., 1999). In more recent years, scholars 
have started to look at the domestic firms which may benefit from the technology spill over. 
Blomström and Kokko (2003) asserted that “spillovers do not occur automatically” but rather 
“the ability and motivation of local firms to engage in investment and learning to absorb 
foreign knowledge and skills” play an important role on the successful realisation of such 
spill-overs (Blomström and Kokko, 2003). Theorists have contended as well that in the 
presence of multinational companies exporting in the domestic market, these multinationals 
may “pave the way for local firms to enter the same export markets, either because they 
create transport infrastructure or because they disseminate information about foreign markets 
that can be used also by local firms” (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). 
 Both mechanisms may be relevant in the analysis of implementation compliance of 
Hungary and Poland. Since the 1990s, with the processes of market liberalisation and the 
privatisation of former Communist state-owned companies, Hungarian and Polish private and 
municipally-owned companies have emerged. These firms might have de facto adopted the 
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EU rules to do business in the EU’s market and then, considering the competitive advantage 
of adopting EU requirements in light of their EU membership might have lobbied their 
governments to adopt them de jure. Similarly, after the fall of the Communist regimes in 
Hungary and Poland, foreign and multinational companies entered their waste markets and 
established subsidiaries. These foreign and multinational firms, established and operating in 
the EU Member and Western countries44, had better and cleaner technologies than their CEE 
counterparts. Arguably, then, these firms might have shaped the less-regulated-markets of 
Hungary and Poland by providing technology spill-overs. Moreover, these foreign and 
multinational firms, operating already in other EU Member States, already had in place 
stricter European standards and regulations. Thus, they may have benefited from following 
these European standards also in these two countries and they may have provided to their 
subsidiaries or partners knowledge of European regulations and standards.  
 Based on the above political economy approach which looks at mechanisms of market 
access and penetration as drivers for the adoption of stricter regulations (and compliance), the 
following hypothesis on market incentives can thus be defined: 
 
Hypothesis on market incentives  
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases, if (a) domestic companies recognise 
a competitive advantage in adopting EU requirements and lobby for their adoption at the 
domestic level, or if (b) foreign and multinational companies recognise a competitive 
advantage in adopting EU standards when operating in less-regulated markets. 
 
 
In order to test these two hypotheses on market incentives, I have relied firstly on material 
collected by international organisations, such as the European Investment Bank and research 
groups such as the Public Services International Research Unit of the University of 
Greenwich (hereafter, PSIRU), which have documented the market shares and multinational 
companies in the sector of waste management penetrating in Hungary and Poland since the 
early 1990s. As well, I interviewed Hungarian and Polish businessmen who dealt with 
packaging and municipal waste from the early and mid-1990s. These interviewees provided 
                                                 
44 For the details on the country of origin and operating countries of those European and multinational waste 
management firms which entered the Hungarian and Polish waste markets, see PSIRU, 2006. Further details 
are also provided in the empirical chapters on Hungary and Poland. 
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me with knowledge of the systems established for the management and treatment of 
municipal and packaging waste. Moreover, I gained information on the composition of the 
actors operating in the municipal and packaging waste market in terms of shares of market, 
type of firms (i.e. the pioneer domestic firms and the multinationals penetrating the market) 
and the existing interactions between European/multinational firms and their 
subsidiaries/partners in providing technology transfer and knowledge of the EU requirements.  
 
 
2.2.2 The pre-existing cooperative strategies  
 
 
There is a broad consensus among scholars that institutions and institutional characteristics 
influence policy change and performance of EU members (Hille and Knill, 2006). The link 
between democracies encompassing consensual mechanisms and policy performance has 
been studied by Arend Lijpart in his comparative work on consensus and majoritarian 
democracies (Lijpart, 1984; 1994; 1999). Further, Joel Hellman, studying the post-communist 
countries, has emphasised the role of inclusive political systems in adopting and 
implementing economic reforms (Hellman, 1998). Moreover, scholars focusing on 
environmental policy compliance have stressed the consensual capacity of countries as the 
institutional condition necessary for a successful environmental policy (Lundqvist, 1980; 
Brickman et al., 1985; Badaracco, 1985; Jänicke, 1992; Carew-Reid et al., 1994; Jänicke et 
al., 2002). The role of consensus in policy-making has been recognised as well by researchers 
examining the preferences of domestic actors. Earlier in this chapter, I asserted that supply-
side explanations of compliance have considered domestic actors as veto players within the 
process of decision-making and implementation of EU legislation. However, George Tsebelis 
while hypothesising the negative correlation between the number of the “veto players” and 
the policy change, has also considered the importance of the congruence and cohesion of 
these players. He honed in the role of agreement between (institutional) veto players “as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for policy change” (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 302). Moreover, 
political economy scholars have highlighted the importance of consensus among veto players 
on the direction of policy change to foster economic reforms in post-communist European 
countries (Gehlbach and Malesky, 2007). 
 When looking more deeply into the existing link between actors' agreement and 
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policy implementation, scholars have identified different styles of formulating and 
implementing policies in Western Europe and in the United States (Richardson et al., 1982; 
Lundqvist, 1980). Richardson et al. (1982), for example, drawing from different 
categorisations developed in previous studies on policy typologies45 defined the concept of 
“policy style” by looking at the relationship between a government and the stakeholders 
involved in the policy-making processes (Richardson et al., 1982). Furthermore, scholars of 
Europeanisation have proposed that different policy styles proper of each Member State have 
influenced their compliance performances (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Jordan and 
Liefferink, 2004). Börzel (2002), in particular, has explained members' style of policy-
making as a cost-sharing strategy. Domestic non-state actors, considered by Börzel as veto 
players, could achieve their own interests or, they could seek to achieve common interests 
and therefore cooperate with the other domestic actors involved in the policy-making process. 
However, she also recognised that countries with more consensus-oriented or cooperative 
decision-making cultures, were more likely to have domestic change because cooperative 
strategies assured veto players of cost-sharing (Börzel, 2002). Different theoretical 
approaches, then, have stressed the role of a consultative policy style and cooperation among 
domestic state and non-actors for compliance with EU rules. The following hypothesis on 
pre-existing cooperative strategies can thus be defined: 
 
Hypothesis on pre-existing cooperative strategies    
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases, if domestic state and non-state actors 
pursue cooperative strategies in the domestic policy-making process. 
 
Cooperative styles of policy-making might have reassured domestic stakeholders operating in 
the waste management sectors of Hungary and Poland of the cost-sharing occurring with 
accession to the EU and compliance with EU environmental directives. In applying the 
analysis of policy style to Hungary and Poland, I hone in on the relationship between 
government and other actors in the policy process (Richardson et al., 1982), on the 
relationship between formal domestic actors such as the Ministry of Environment and the 
Parliament and the domestic stakeholders involved in the policy-making process as well as on 
the relationship between private and municipal firms. As mentioned earlier, the stakeholders 
                                                 
45  For example, see the works of Lowi, 1964. 
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considered in this dissertation are those of the municipal and packaging waste dimensions 
and particularly the environmental NGOs, the firms and the local and regional authorities. In 
this section, I also consider the academics who, as experts on specific environmental issues, 
took part in the decision-making process by advising at ministerial and parliamentary levels 
in both Hungary and Poland.  
To assess the interrelations between these actors and to grasp if such interrelations 
affected the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland, I look at existing 
environmental consultative bodies and committees in which state and non-state actors 
discussed the municipal and packaging waste legislation and implementing acts. At the 
ministerial level, I analyse the National Council on Environment (Országos 
Környezetvédelmi Tanács, hereafter also OKT) in Hungary and the National Council on 
Environmental Protection (Państwowa Rada Ochrony Srodowiska, hereafter also PROS) in 
Poland. At the parliamentary level, I consider the work of the Hungarian Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Environmental Affairs. I also consider the work of the Polish 
Committee on the Environment Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry in the Sejm 
(Komisja Ochrony Środowiska, Zasobów Naturalnych i Leśnictwa, hereafter also OSZ) and 
the Environmental Committee of the Senate (Komisja Środowiska). Moreover, I analyse the 
direct and the bilateral contacts between state and non-state actors which occurred during the 
discussion of environmental draft legislation and implementing acts at both the ministerial 
and parliamentary levels in Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, I also consider the 
development of cost-sharing strategies between private and municipal firms in joint-ventures 
and partnerships for the management and treatment of waste.  
The information to assess cooperation in policy-making was collected during 
fieldwork in Hungary and Poland, through semi-structured in-depth interviews with current 
or former members of the ministerial advisory councils and parliamentary committees but 
also with stakeholders directly involved in the bilateral meetings. Particular attention has also 
been paid to the position papers and the meeting minutes of the environmental advisory 
bodies to the Ministries of Environment, i.e. the OKT in Hungary and the PROS in Poland, 
which have discussed extensively drafts of legislation concerning the management and 
treatment of municipal and packaging waste. Additionally, the information to assess 
cooperation between firms was collected through in-depth interviews with businessmen of 
Hungary and Poland and to officials from the DG for the Regional and Urban Policy of the 
European Commission as well as through archival research. 
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2.2.3 The assistance alliances 
 
 
In recognising external assistance as a mechanism for helping to transfer rules from external 
actors to the domestic environment, Bruszt and Holzhacker have criticized approaches that 
take for granted that external actors can assist domestic actors based on the possession of the 
“right” information on implementation problems in diverse local settings (Bruszt and 
Holzhacker, 2009). This view has indeed marked a number of studies in which the 
establishment of a principal-agent relationship in the process of implementation of EU 
legislation was assumed, and which specifically identified the European institutions as 
principals and the national governments as agents of rule implementation (for a detailed 
review of these studies, see Tallberg, 2003). In this principal-agent relationship, the principal 
decided to delegate certain decisions to the agents and expected them to act in order to 
produce the principals' desired outcomes (Tallberg, 2003). This took for granted that external 
actors had the “right” incentives and knowledge to “best serve recipients' interests” while the 
domestic actors were considered merely as “exogenous factors” of the rule transfer process 
(see a critique of that view in Bruszt and Holzhacker, 2009). However, Tallberg (2003) but 
also Sabel and Zeitlin (2010) have particularly stressed the existence of information 
asymmetries between the principal and the agent, meaning that generally the principal had 
only a vague idea of its own goals in comparison to the agent (Tallberg, 2003; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2010). This information asymmetry could ultimately result in the agents' shirking 
(Tallberg, 2003) or in degrees of discretion left to the agent by the principal (Sabel and 
Zeitling, 2010 but on the discretion left to “street-level bureaucrats”, see also Lipsky, 1980 
and Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).  
 Studies on external assistance have also pointed to domestic actors who, far from 
being considered as “exogenous factors”, may play an active role in the implementation of 
externally-defined rules. In particular, international political economy scholars have analysed 
more horizontal interactions among external and domestic actors by focusing on transnational 
networks involving international and European societal and private actors, and also domestic 
societal and private actors (for example, see Andonova and Tuta, 2014). Horizontal 
interaction could also occur in the enlarged European market between international and 
multinational companies and domestic companies (for example, see Blömstrom and Kokko, 
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1993). Furthermore, considering assistance as a tool to help domestic actors overcome 
problems and move from non-compliance to compliance situations, scholars have identified 
two elements which may ensure that domestic actors meet the compliance goal: multiplexity 
and joint problem-solving. These elements have been firstly defined by Bruszt and 
McDermott (2011) within the conceptualisation of the Transnational Integration Regimes 
(hereafter also TIRs); this concept refers to the integration of developing countries in 
transnational institutional arrangements which also induce an upgrading of the domestic 
institution-building process. Within this frame, Bruszt and McDermott highlighted that TIRs 
that emphasize multiplex assistance that involves diverse state and non-state actors in joint 
problem-solving and monitoring better adjust assistance programs to diverse contexts and  
“empower a variety of state and non-state actors to experiment, coordinate and contest one 
another’s institutional needs and solutions” (Bruszt and McDermott, 2011, p. 744). TIRs that 
build their assistance programs on different principles may in the worse cases induce “formal 
legal changes that favour entrenched groups” but which offer fewer resources or participatory 
channels for broader and sometimes weaker groups of actors at domestic level.   
It has been recognised that the EU has provided multiplex assistance and joint 
problem-solving forms of assistance and monitoring to CEE candidate countries but actual 
assistance programs might differ country by country, and sector by sector. In order to 
specifically measure the presence of elements of multiplexity and joint problem-solving 
assistance provided to Hungarian and Polish domestic actors, this dissertation specifically 
focuses on the “quality” of such assistance. This term refers to the capacity of external actors 
to generate alliances with domestic actors (Stark, Vedres and Bruszt, 2006; Stark and Vedres, 
2006; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013). Scholars have found that the involvement of multiple actors 
and the establishment of alliances with them in the financial, capacity-building and 
knowledge-based assistance projects strengthens the identification of the problems which 
prevented that country from complying with the EU requirements.  
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Thus, the following hypothesis on assistance alliances between external and domestic 
actors can be defined: 
 
Hypothesis on assistance alliances 
 
The likelihood of implementation compliance increases, if external actors create alliances 
with domestic stakeholders in joint problem-solving programmes.  
 
 
In order to account for the existing alliances between external and domestic stakeholders, 
particular heed is paid in this dissertation to EU funded projects that have engaged with both 
capacity-building and knowledge-based activities and those initiatives promoted by European 
business associations and NGOs lobbies. To this aim then, I considered the pre-Accession aid 
programmes PHARE and ISPA and the post-Accession Cohesion Fund, which have had 
projects targeting specifically the promotion of compliance with EU requirements in 
municipal waste management and treatment. To analyse these EU-funded programmes I 
relied on the information available online in the Commissions’ web pages of the Directorate 
General for the Enlargement (for PHARE) and the Directorate General for the Regional and 
Urban Policy (for ISPA and Cohesion fund). I also relied on the information collected during 
my fieldwork in Brussels, where I met officials from the European Commission who were in 
charge of EU pre-Accession aid programmes and EU funds for Hungary and Poland. I further 
used information I gathered from interviews held in Hungary and Poland with Hungarian and 
Polish clerks from the relevant Ministries in charge of the management of these EU funds. As 
well, I considered in my analysis those initiatives promoted by Brussels-based business and 
societal lobbies. To acknowledge the existence of assistance alliances in these types of 
initiatives I recurred to the information I collected during fieldwork done in Brussels where I 
held interviews with representatives from Brussels-based associations (i.e. business and 
environmental NGOs) which had among their members relevant business associations, 
recovery organisations or environmental NGOs from Hungary and Poland.  
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2.3 Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical frame for analysing and explaining the existence of 
the different compliance performances of Hungary and Poland for municipal and packaging 
waste dimensions. Beginning from an analysis of the supply-side approaches which privilege 
state actors and incumbents, I have elaborated four hypotheses to explain variation in 
compliance in these two similarly rule-taking countries. Building from arguments developed 
by Europeanisation, managerial and governance researchers, the first hypothesis focused on 
administrative capacities and traditions implying that divergence between the domestic and 
the European model reduced the likelihood of implementation compliance. Furthermore, 
conditionality and governance researchers have honed on the external incentives and 
sanctions posed by European institutions for the compliance with externally-defined rules. 
The second hypothesis elaborated then addressed the European threats and the incentives to 
compliance predicting implementation compliance when these were both substantial. 
Evidence from European and international monitoring reports and interviews as well as 
recent studies on the CEE post-Accession compliance performances have however 
highlighted shortcomings in these two hypotheses. Firstly, data on the administrative 
capacities and traditions of Hungary and Poland show, in fact, the existence of similar 
weaknesses in comparison to the European model even despite compliance performance 
differences. Secondly, information from studies and interviews show the presence of similar 
incentives and threats offered by the European Union to Hungary and Poland. Despite 
changes in the European incentive/sanctions structure from the pre- to the post-Accession 
periods, in fact, the data show similarities for the two countries under examination. 
Considering the similarities highlighted by empirical data and studies despite variation in the 
performances of Hungary and Poland, I reject these two first hypotheses as explanations to 
the research problem under consideration in this dissertation.  
  Among the supply-side explanations I considered two further hypotheses which, in 
the light of evidence and studies on post-Accession, may explain Polish and Hungarian 
variation in compliance performances. The first of the two stemmed from a constructivist 
perspective and focused on the role that information exchange and communication 
between external and domestic actors plays in enhancing compliant paths. Evidence from 
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interviews suggest that Poland and Hungary may have been differently impacted by processes 
of persuasion and emulation. Therefore, this variable is considered in the empirical chapters 
and tested through process-tracing methodology. Furthermore, I elaborated a hypothesis 
based on the compliance enforcement approach which addressed differences in cost/benefit 
ratio. Evidence from international reports and interviews suggested a similarity on the side of 
the domestic adjustment costs, considered high in both countries, but a variation when 
considering the gains that Hungarian and Polish domestic actors perceived in complying with 
the European rules. Hence, considering a difference in the cost/benefit ratio between the two 
countries this variable is further analysed in the empirical chapters and tested through the 
process-tracing method.  
 In elaborating the theoretical frame of this dissertation, I have also considered 
demand-side explanations which focus on domestic stakeholders who did not simply supply 
compliance with externally-defined rules, but benefitting from compliance, may have 
demanded it, enhancing as well its sustainability over time. As this dissertation centres on the 
implementation of the EU requirements at the domestic level, my analysis privileges those 
actors involved in this phase of the policy-making process, and specifically those 
stakeholders of the municipal and packaging waste dimensions (i.e. firms, NGOs, local and 
regional authorities). Supply-side approaches had already included societal and private actors 
in their analyses. Tsebelis, then followed by Europeanisation scholars, has focused on the role 
of veto players in policy compliance but argued that these players acted only to oppose or 
delay compliance. Questioning the negative connotation of domestic veto players, this 
dissertation looks at the existence of specific mechanisms which made compliance more 
likely and sustainable in the post-Accession period. The hypotheses then concern market 
incentives, pre-existing cooperative strategies and assistance alliances found among external 
and domestic actors.  
 Within the market incentives hypothesis, two aspects have been explored: domestic 
private actors demanding compliance and foreign firms exporting their standards in Hungary 
and Poland. To develop the hypothesis it has been taken into consideration the work of Vogel 
(1995), Vogel and Kagan (2004), Kelemen (2007) and Bradford (2012) as well as Caves 
(1974) and Blomstrom and Kokko (2003). Building from these studies, it has then been 
hypothesised an existing variation in the possibility that Polish and Hungarian firms may 
have had access to the better-regulated EU market, or in the possibility that foreign firms 
already operating in the EU started to penetrate the Polish and Hungarian waste markets and 
differently exported their technology and stricter EU standards in these two countries. In 
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elaborating the pre-existing cooperative strategies   hypothesis, I looked at the works of 
Richardson et al. (1982), Lundqvist (1980), Börzel and Risse (2000), Börzel (2002) as well as 
Jordan and Liefferink (2004). It has then been considered the existence of strategies that 
reassured domestic stakeholders on the sharing of the costs of compliance in the form of 
cooperations between state and non-state actors in the policy-making process (within 
advisory bodies and committees discussing the rule implementation) and between private and 
municipal firms in the management and treatment of waste. Moreover, in framing the 
assistance alliances hypothesis, I relied on the work of Jacoby (2006), Bruszt and 
McDermott (2011) as well as various works by Bruszt, Stark and Vedres (Stark, Vedres and 
Bruszt, 2006; Stark and Vedres, 2006; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013). The analysis then 
investigated the quality of the assistance programmes, and specifically the capacity of 
external actors to generate alliances with domestic actors. It has then been hypothesised a 
variation in the capacity of external actors to create alliances with Polish and Hungarian 
beneficiaries of the European/international programmes and initiatives through which 
domestic actors could gather, process and use context-specific information on implementation 
problems and alternative ways to solve them.  
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Chapter 3 
Hungary 
 
 
In the late 1980s, Hungary became one of the CEE pace-setters in the relations with the 
European Union. In 1988, it was the first to sign the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with 
the European Community 46  (EC), also signed by Poland in 1989 (Pogatsa, 2004). This 
Agreement promoted trade on the basis of non-discrimination and reciprocity between the EC 
and the Central and Eastern European countries, and formalised bilateral relations and 
technical agreements between the two parts of the “Iron Curtain” (EIPA, 1993; Pogatsa, 
2004). After the collapse of the Communist regime, Hungary was among the front-runner 
group of CEE countries to rapidly reform its economic and political system into a market 
economy and a democracy (Pogatsa, 2004). Furthermore, in 1989, the EU signed the PHARE 
aid programme with Hungary and Poland (Poole, 2003) while, in December 1991, Hungary 
signed the European Agreements in which the political, economic, financial and commercial 
objectives that formed the framework for implementation of the EU accession process were 
set out (Ott and Inglis, 2002; Poole, 2003; Pogatsa, 2004). Moreover, immediately after the 
ratification of the European Agreements in February 1994, on 1st April 1994 Hungary applied 
for EU membership (interview 7).  
 As part of the accession strategy defined in the Agenda 2000, the European 
Commission in 1998 started to monitor the performance of Hungary and the other candidate 
countries from the CEE in carrying out the economic and political criteria defined at 
Copenhagen in 1993 and in approximating to the European acquis communautaire. Among 
the different Chapters in which the EU acquis had been divided, the EU analysed the 
environmental protection policy established in Hungary and started to monitor the different 
environmental areas whose European legislation and requirements was to be transposed and 
implemented upon Hungary' accession to the EU. As previously shown in the explanandum 
chapter, the performance of Hungary in the implementation of the waste management sector 
                                                 
46 According to the Glossary of the European Union and European Communities, by European Communities 
(EC) has been defined as “the collective body that resulted in 1967 from the merger of the administrative 
networks of the European Atomic Energy Community (hereafter, EURATOM), the European Coal and Steel 
Community (hereafter, ECSC), and the European Economic Community (hereafter, EEC)”. The Treaty of the 
European Union of 1992 established the European Union as a body of three pillars namely, the European 
Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home 
Affairs. For more details, see Nugent, 2010 and http://www15.uta.fi/FAST/GC/eurgloss.html.  
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was characterised by a gradual compliance path in the dimensions of municipal and 
packaging waste management; Poland, in contrast, still had not fully complied with all the 
EU requirements at the time of its accession. These two similar countries then differently 
performed in the implementation compliance of EU waste requirements at the domestic level. 
In this chapter, I explore in detail the compliance path of Hungary in adopting and 
implementing the three European waste-related directives under examination in this 
dissertation namely, the Waste Framework Directive, the Packaging and Packaging Waste 
Directive and the Landfill Directive. I take special note of the development of municipal and 
packaging waste management and treatment systems, of the interactions between domestic 
state and non-state actors as well as those between domestic and international actors that 
might have influenced the compliance performance of this country.  
 As the information on the Hungarian case is analysed through the process-tracing 
method, the data is presented in chronological order, highlighting the observations that 
contribute to the outcome of sustainable compliance. The chapter is then structured as 
follows: the first section deals with the municipal waste management dimension. After a brief 
review of the elements considered to measure the country’s compliance performance, the 
analysis follows a division into three historical periods constituting three phases of policy 
implementation compliance, from status quo to the transposition ‘on the books’, from 
transposition to implementation and from implementation to sustainable compliance. Each of 
the three phases ends with the achievement (or not) of an intermediate outcome, namely 
transposition, implementation and sustainable compliance. In these three phases, the 
empirical data which is linked to the five testable hypotheses presented in the theoretical 
chapter are set out. The second section deals with the packaging waste dimension. In this case 
as well, the data are presented following the same three-phase division adopted for the 
municipal waste dimension. Finally, in the conclusions, the key elements for understanding 
the performance of Hungary in the municipal and packaging waste dimensions are pointed 
out. These are further discussed in the comparative and concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
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3.1 The Hungarian process of implementation compliance with the municipal waste 
dimension 
 
 
The first dimension under analysis in this dissertation deals with the management and 
treatment of municipal waste defined in the European Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives (and amended versions). In order to measure the degree of sustainable compliance 
in this dimension I selected a number of requirements contained in both Directives linked to 
the “proximity principle” established in article 174 of the Treaty of Rome. This measured 
compliance by looking at the transposition of the Directives into the national legislation and, 
more practically, at the establishment of an integrated network of disposal installations and 
the fulfilment of specific requirements concerning operational and old landfill disposal sites.  
 The process of implementation compliance with the municipal waste management 
dimension is then analysed following three temporal phases which have seen Hungary move 
from a stage of non-compliance (stage 2 out of 5) in 1999, to sustainable compliance (and 
compliance stage 5) in 2009. The first phase covers the period from the end of the 1980s until 
the adoption of the 2000 Act on Waste Management (No. XLIII). In this first phase, the 
mechanism of market incentives applied by foreign firms linked to cooperative strategies 
between private and municipal firms as well as between societal, private and state actors 
influence the transposition 'on the books' of the requirements contained in the European 
Waste Framework and Landfill directives. The second phase begins after conclusion of the 
transposition “on the books” and comprises the process of implementation of such measures 
which produced the National Waste Management Plan whose adoption at the end of 2002 
marks the end of this phase. The phase is characterised by the continued interaction between 
market incentives and cooperative strategies as well as by the establishment of alliances 
between external and domestic actors in carrying out EU knowledge-based and capacity-
building projects. The third and final phase concerns the development of measures for the 
sustainable compliance of the European waste directives after the adoption of the National 
Waste Management Plan in December 2002 and the Regional Waste Management Plans in 
2003. In this phase, Hungary achieves full compliance with the requirements thanks to the 
interaction between market incentives and cooperative strategies which enhance also the 
establishment of alliances between external and domestic actors in realising EU projects.  
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3.1.1 From the end of the 1980s to 2000: the transition from the municipal waste status 
quo to the law “on the books”  
 
 
At the close of the 1980s, the management and treatment of municipal waste was governed 
by a “semi-state” system. The Governmental Decree No. II.1 of 1986 entrusted Hungarian 
municipalities and local authorities with the management of municipal waste (Dax et al. 
2001) and granted them the right to organise the collection of waste at municipal and county 
levels by delegating it to private companies or by establishing municipal companies owned 
by the state (interview 8). In fact, according to this Decree, only “specialised public sector 
enterprises established for the purpose”, “other public enterprises”, “small entrepreneurs” and 
“small individuals who have received requisite permits” were authorised to fulfil public 
sanitation and waste management services (Dax et al., 2001, p. 54). Such collection was 
operated within a specific municipality where the private and municipal companies collected 
the waste directly from the households and disposed it in landfills owned by the state and 
managed by the public health services (interview 9).  
 The “semi-state” system was financed through the Central Environmental Fund (in 
Hungarian, Környezetvédelmi Alap Célelőirányzat, hereafter also KAC). This fund 
guaranteed investments to the state waste-collecting companies (interview 10; interview 11) 
operating in the collection and recovery of municipal waste within a municipality (interview 
12; interview 8) but, based on the size of that municipality, these investments could be 
extended to neighbouring villages (interview 8; interview 13). The KAC was established in 
1986 and most of its revenues derived from pollution fine payments and product charges47, 
which could not be used for purposes other than environmental protection (REC, 1994; REC, 
2001). It was organised within the structure of the Ministry of Environment, but final 
decisions on the fund were approved within the Inter-ministerial Committee which grouped 
ministers or representatives from relevant ministries (i.e. Transport, Telecommunication and 
                                                 
47 In particular, according to Act LXXXIII of 1992, the main sources of revenues of Fund revenues were fines 
on air pollution, hazardous waste, noise and vibration, wastewater, nature conservation, ozone layer, 
transport of hazardous materials and environmental product charges on fuels (REC, 1994). Other sources 
were emission charges; tax revenues forgone by the state budget; international aid on environmental 
protection; direct allocations from state budget; voluntary payments and donations; principal and interest 
repayments; damage remediation costs (REC, 1994). 
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Water, Industry, Agriculture, Finances, Welfare and Internal Affairs) and representatives from 
NGOs operating in the sectors of environment and trade (REC, 1994; interview 14) such as 
the Waste Alliance (hereafter also HUMUSZ48).  
Soon after the collapse of the Communist regime in Hungary, the Communist state-
led system of municipal waste management and treatment began a gradual change. Act No. 
LXV on Local Governments, approved by the Hungarian Parliament in 1990, granted to 
municipalities the authority to “take care of municipal tasks related to waste treatment, ensure 
settlement hygiene, provide for collection, disposal, treatment/neutralisation and utilisation of 
solid and liquid communal wastes and designate the deposit areas for disposal” (Sect. 63/a, 
par. e). Above all, the 1990 Act recognised that the management of municipal landfills lay 
with municipalities and small settlements (interview 15). Moreover, it entrusted 
municipalities with the selection of the areas in which landfills could be constructed 
(interview 16). However, it still did not define a detailed legislation on the issue. Hence, 
municipalities generally solved the problem by constructing their own landfill sites in the 
vicinity of each municipality (interview 15; interview 16), without following any coordinated 
and organised strategy for the construction of integrated disposal facilities (interview 16).  
 The collapse of the Communist regime had implications also for the actors in the 
system of municipal waste management and treatment. On the one hand, in the early 1990s 
some of the state waste-collecting companies became of municipal ownership (interview 10; 
interview 8). These new municipally-owned companies were generally established in bigger 
cities where they had higher incentives to invest in adequate waste-collecting machinery 
(interview 8; interview 14). For example, in the city of Budapest the FKF49  (Hungarian 
acronym for Fővárosi Közterület-fenntartó Zártkörűen Működő Nonprofit Részvénytársasá), 
created in 1895 as a Public Sanitation Office and in the 1990s becoming property of the city, 
grew in importance. On the other hand, recognising the Hungarian waste sector as a “good 
business” in the early 1990s (interviews 17; 10), foreign firms began to invest in the 
Hungarian waste market by establishing branch offices, buying existing regional and local 
waste collecting companies or establishing joint-ventures50 with municipalities (Dax et al., 
2001; interview 17). Many small Hungarian settlements and villages, in fact, did not have the 
financial capacity to invest in their own waste-collecting companies and they partially or 
                                                 
48  HUMUSZ is the Hungarian abbreviation for Hulladék Munkaszövetség. 
49 For further details, see the FKF Zrt. web page http://www.fkf.hu/portal/page/portal/fkfzrt/vallalatrol (in 
Hungarian).  
50  According to the Country Commercial Guide for Hungary released by the U.S. Department of State in 1996, 
the term “joint-venture” was used in Hungary to refer to “any venture which involved foreign participation”. 
 For further information, see http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/commercial_guides/Hungary.html.  
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totally privatised the existing ones through partnerships with foreign firms. The establishment 
of joint-ventures can well be explained by the mechanism of cooperative strategies. To work, 
this mechanism assumed a certainty in the adoption of the EU legislation by the government 
which enhanced the domestic actors' strategies of compliance costs' sharing. In this case, 
municipal companies established joint-ventures to share the costs of compliance with the EU 
rules.  
The first foreign companies to enter the Hungarian waste market were Austrian and 
they generally established themselves in Hungary by setting up their own subsidiary 
companies or joint ventures with already existing municipal companies (interview 17; 
interview 10; interview 8). Among the Austrian companies, Saubermacher51 was the first to 
penetrate the Hungarian municipal waste market in 1991. They created joint-ventures with 
municipal companies and established separate collection systems in the Western and Southern 
parts of the country (interview 19; PSIRU, 2000). This firm was followed by other Austrian 
companies such A.S.A., AVE and Pyrus-Rumpold which, when entering the Hungarian 
market generally established their own branches such as AVE Hungary and Pyrus-Rumpold 
Hungary (interview 17). A.S.A. started to operate in Hungary in 1992 by establishing a 
partnership in Debrecen for the construction of a landfill disposal site (i.e. the A.K.S.D. Ltd. 
Debrecen 52 ). In 1993 it created its own subsidiary, namely A.S.A. Hungary 53 . These 
companies were soon followed by German and French companies, such as the German 
companies Rethmann and RWE which established their subsidiary companies in Szolnok and 
Rem and the French ERECO and Vivendi which established their own branches in the 
country (PSIRU, 2000; interview 10). 
At first, foreign and joint-venture companies offered their services for the treatment of 
municipal waste and the strategies they followed were threefold: a) in some cases, these 
companies bought and started to invest and modernise already existing non-conforming 
disposal sites (interview 17); b) they managed landfills of municipal ownership and exported 
EU standards (interview 17); and c) they constructed new EU-conforming landfill sites. 
According to Dax et al. (2001), in particular, foreign companies contributed to the 
construction of “the first modern EU-conforming landfills in Hungary” (Dax et al., 2001). 
The EU-compliant strategies pursued by these foreign firms in the treatment of municipal 
                                                 
51 For further details, see http://www.saubermacher.com/web/en/news/archive_details.php?nid=449.  
52 The AKSA Debrecen was one of the first joint-ventures established in Hungary. It was created in 1992 as a 
consortium of investors: three foreign investors (A.S.A., AVE and Kröpfel-Spreitzer) which owned 51% of 
the shares and the city of Debrecen which owned 49% (Dax et al., 2001). For more information on this joint-
venture, see also http://www.aksd.hu/cegunkrol/ (in Hungarian).  
53 For details, see http://www.asa-group.com/en/Hungary/Company/History.asa.  
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waste can be well explained by the market incentives mechanism. It assumed that firms 
would comply with the EU rules when they recognised that compliance was the only way to 
make profits. In this case, acknowledging that Hungary would soon adopt the EU standards, 
since the beginning foreign firms (also as partners in joint-ventures) exported and 
implemented their standards, machinery and technology that conformed with EU waste 
legislation (interview 8; interview 17; interview 16). Moreover, when investing in and 
constructing disposal facilities, foreign firms expanded the operation of a facility beyond the 
borders of a single municipality in compliance with the integrated network of disposal 
installations approach set out in the European Waste Framework Directive (Dax et al., 2001; 
interview 16).  
Unlike in the operation of municipal treatment where municipalities sold or 
cooperated with foreign firms, the collection of waste was mostly managed by municipal 
companies (Dax et al., 2001). These companies operated in cities where they could have 
larger profits from the compulsory waste collection in municipalities established in the 1990 
Act on Local Governments. However, this Act did not specify any financing system (Dax et 
al., 2001). It then became common practice of the municipalities to finance waste collection 
services through the municipal budget and then collect taxes from citizens (interview 13). As 
well, many municipalities started to regulate in contractual terms the municipal waste 
collection by establishing “collection fees” which had to be paid directly by the households to 
the municipal collecting companies (interviews 17; 13). Nevertheless, the majority of the 
problems occurred in rural areas in which waste collection was considered as not mandatory. 
It happened, in fact, that many neighbouring municipalities required the payment of 
collection fees also in these agglomerations. Being against this duty, private households then 
started to file cases before the Hungarian Constitutional Court54 to solve the problem (Dax et 
al., 2001; interview 13). The Constitutional Court then ruled on the need for a change in 
legislation and asked the Parliament to elaborate and adopt a specific law in which the 
financial means and prices for municipal services including waste collection were clarified 
(interview 13; interview 17).  
As a result of the Constitutional Court rulings, in 1995, the Parliament passed Act No. 
XLII on the Mandatory Use of Certain Local Public Services. This Act recognised the right of 
                                                 
54 In particular, citizens challenged the right of municipalities to impose the payment of fees in areas where the 
collection of waste was not obligatory. In 1994, the Court asked the municipalities to withdraw municipal 
regulations on waste management because they considered them to counter the national framework 
legislation (interview 17). Moreover, the Court argued in favour of the households by specifying that 
municipalities could not set prices when these prices were not reflected in the guarantee of the service 
(interview 13; interview 17). 
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local governments to regulate waste management services, and obliged households for the 
payment of “collection fees” defined by the local governments (Dax et al. 2001; interview 13; 
interview 17). Moreover, it obliged households and property owners to use public services for 
the collection of municipal waste and obliged private collecting companies to obtain a permit 
to operate within a specific municipality (interview 16). However, it also recognised that 
municipal waste collection could be operated by municipal and by private companies 
(interview 13; interview 16) and, in the latter case, municipalities had to select the private 
waste collection companies through competitive public tender procedures, in accordance with 
the European legislation on public procurement55 (Dax et al., 2001). The tender procedure 
was also established for the management of municipally-owned landfill disposal sites (Dax et 
al., 2001). 
At first, the disposition of organising public tenders came “as a shock” for most 
municipalities. Until then, in fact, municipalities had managed the collection of municipal 
waste by establishing and delegating the operations to their own companies (Dax et al., 2001, 
p. 55). Hence, the writing of the first tenders was patchy because municipalities either lacked 
experience in writing public tenders or “were satisfied with the status quo” (Dax et al., 2001, 
p. 55). The situation was further complicated by the European legislation, which set out that 
fully-owned municipal companies were not subject to public tender procedures 56 . Then, 
according to the 1995 Act, when municipalities fully owned their own waste-collecting 
companies and treatment facilities, these companies were automatically appointed for 
providing the service of waste collection and the treatment for that municipality (interview 9; 
interview 16). After several years, however, the Hungarian waste collection and treatment 
system accommodated to the European public tender procedure (interview 17). In 
                                                 
55  According to the European legislation “public procurement refers to the process by which public authorities, 
such as government departments or local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from companies 
which they have selected for this purpose”. For more information on this legislation, see 
http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/public-tenders/rules-procedures/index_en.htm.  
56 In 2003, the European Court of Justice ruled on the matter of lawfulness in the award of a contract for waste 
services without a public tender procedure (i.e. Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH vs. 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna). In the specific 
case, the city of Halle appointed the RPL Lochau, a company in majority owned by the city of Halle, for the 
collection of waste without the establishment of a public tender. In its ruling, the European First Chamber 
Court recognised that “a public authority […] has the possibility of performing the tasks conferred on it in 
the public interest by using its own administrative, technical and other resources, without being obliged to 
call an outside entitles not forming part of its own departments”. Furthermore, it also recognised that “in that 
case, there was no question of a contract for pecuniary interest concluded with an entity legally distinct from 
the contracting authority” and, thus, “there was no need to apply the Community rules in the field of public 
procurement” (Section 48 of the ruling). For further details, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62003CJ0026.  
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municipalities without a fully-owned municipal waste collecting company, municipalities 
were obliged to establish public tender procedures for the definition of waste-collecting 
companies and treatment facilities in use within that municipality (interview 16). In this case, 
private waste-collecting companies and joint-ventures between municipal and private 
companies competed for shares on the market through public tenders (Dax et al., 2001).  
The tendering system introduced with the 1995 Act could have had an impact on the 
strategies of the foreign firms in which cost/benefit calculations could have had influenced a 
regulatory “race to the bottom”, but this did not happen. On the contrary, with the 
introduction of the 1995 Act, the foreign companies expanded their services to the collection 
of municipal waste. Following cost/benefit calculations and the pursuit of bigger profits, they 
then obtained permits from the municipalities to operate for the collection of waste and 
participated to public tenders. However, recognising the EU compliance as the only way to 
make profits, they did not lower their standards and, winning many contracts with 
municipalities they then exported their EU-conforming collection machineries and standards 
in the waste collection market too (interview 8; interview 17; interview 15; interview 18). In 
some cases, foreign companies participated in different public tenders and operated in 
different municipalities either for municipal waste collection, for the treatment of municipal 
waste with their sorting and disposal facilities or for the collection of other waste streams 
such as packaging waste (interviews 13, 19, 20). The Hungarian system defined for the 
management and treatment of municipal waste in 1995 then resembled systems set up in the 
EU Member States. This had been deeply influenced by foreign firms which, in cooperation 
with municipal firms through joint-ventures or winning tenders, recognised the competitive 
advantage of exporting knowledge and technology that was compliant with EU standards. 
Hence, contrariwise to what assumed by cost/benefit calculations and the logic of profits at 
the lower costs, foreign firms exported costlier services and machinery because considered 
more profitable the EU rule compliance. 
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The system and the main actors operating in the municipal waste collection and treatment 
established in Hungary since the 1995 Act is outlined in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Hungarian municipal waste management system  
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In 1995, the system of municipal waste management and treatment successfully enforced the 
European tendering procedure, however, the process of approximation of the Hungarian 
legislation to the concepts and principles contained in the EU Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives still lagged behind (interview 17). Since the Communist era, Hungary had defined 
some waste-related principles in general Acts on environmental protection 57  while 
environmental groups such as the Green Future Group and the Danube Circle58 promoted the 
protection of the environment. Taking advantage of the “relatively empty political space” left 
by the Communist government on this issue, the Hungarian environmental movement rapidly 
became an arena for discussions on the environment (Hajba, 1991), but it also had a general 
focus on political opposition to the Communist regime (interview 21). This focus rapidly 
grew to the point that the dissent to the regime became “implicitly represented by the green 
movement” (Hajba, 1993). Hungarian academics and experts, in fact, concur that the 
transition to democracy and the fall of the Communist regime was influenced by the 
existence of a strong environmental movement in Hungary (interview 22; interview 13; 
interview 21).  
 After the change of regime, many environmental experts from the green movement 
went into politics in different political parties and lobbied for environmental protection 
legislation at the parliamentary level59 (interview 22; interview 21) and in the ministerial 
advisory bodies 60 . Nevertheless, there was a general feeling that the Ministry of 
Environment and the existing parliamentary committee on environmental issues were “often 
'over-politicised'” and party interests came “to the front” in comparison to environmental 
protection issues (Hajba, 1992, p. 21). Representatives from the environmental movement 
then established more direct contacts with the government to influence the environmental 
                                                 
57  For example, the Act No. II on the Protection of Human Environment adopted in 1976 had been the first 
unitary act conceived as a “container” for the environmental legislation because it was very theoretical and 
short i.e. only ten pages (interview 21). In the waste sector, the Act mentioned the problem of the disposal of 
waste in landfill sites (HOE, 2011) and the recognised the responsibility of controlling the landfill disposal 
sites to the public health services (interview 9). 
58 These environmental groups were established in the early 1980s in reaction to the problematic state of the 
Hungarian environment and to protest for single environmental issues (Hajba, 1993).  
59  Since May 1990, with the opening of the first session of the Hungarian Parliament, a system of committees 
comprising standing and special committees was established (Hajba, 1996). Among these standing 
committees, the committee for Environmental Affairs was set up. In the parliamentary period 1990-1994, 
this committee was very active in the development of twenty-three committee's independent proposals 
involving in its discussions a variety of stakeholders (Hajba, 1996). Moreover, the Committee established 
direct links with environmental NGOs and experts through the organisation of “open days” for discussion 
(Hajba, 1996) and developed regular consultation exercises with environmental NGOs, associations and 
clubs (Hajba, 1993).  
60 In the early 1990s, it was common practice for ministries to have “their own” advisory groups which were 
established on personal bases by each minister (interview 23). 
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policy-making which, in some cases, resulted in a privileged relationship between the 
Ministry of Environment and the environmental NGOs61.   
 The enthusiastic pro-environment period of the early-1990s strongly impacted on the 
development of cooperative strategies in the environmental policy-making of Hungary. Soon 
after the change in the regime, the Hungarian government realised that it had to renew the 
Hungarian environmental legislation by defining a new Act on Environmental Protection. 
This work involved academics - mostly environmental lawyers - and a “good balance” 
between economists and lawyers from the Ministry of Environment who discussed in special 
meetings in the Ministry the content of the draft Act which was then discussed in public 
forums and disseminated to a wide range of stakeholders (Hajba, 1995; interview 8). In 1992, 
an independent group appointed by the Hungarian Parliament prepared a seven-hundred page 
draft, which was circulated by the Ministry of Environment for comment among a wide range 
of NGOs, business interests, academics and officials from other ministries (Hajba, 1995). 
However, given the length of the draft, it was not accepted into the parliamentary discussions 
(interview 21). In 1993, a new draft of environmental legislation was adopted by the 
government, but it failed to win parliamentary approval. This failure, according to Hajba, was 
“owing to the delaying tactics used by some members of Parliament” (Hajba, 1993). This 
situation created a stalemate between the Parliamentary Commission led by the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Hungarian Democratic Forum representatives in the Ministry of 
Environment who could not agree on the draft (interview 24). The situation changed when a 
group of environmental activists led by the Göncöl Foundation 62  offered a compromise 
between the different political parties (interview 24). Thanks to this initiative and the support 
of the green activists, Ferenc Baja, the Minister of Environment in charge of drafting the Act 
(in office from 1994 to 1998), was finally able to overcome the stalemate (interview 24). In 
December 1995, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Hungarian Environmental Protection 
Act (No. LIII, hereafter HEPA).  
 By the time the Act was adopted, the green movement was in a strong bargaining 
position. It made request specific requests that were partially responsible for a number of 
                                                 
61 Since the 1990s, the Ministry had established specific channels with the NGOs, such as cooperation within 
the Green Spider, a network regularly used by more than two-hundred environmental protection NGOs in 
which the Ministry of Environment put out semi-annual draft statutes to the Green Spider members 
(Jendrośka, 1998; REC, 1998). Moreover, a number of governmental decrees on the functioning of the 
Ministry of Environment (i.e. Decree No. 20/1983 and Decree No. 10/1995) established the participation of 
NGOs within the committees dealing with environmental issues. For example, NGOs could send 
recommendations for the distribution of the KAC and nominate their representatives in the Inter-ministerial 
Committee (Jendrośka, 1998; interview 14). 
62 For details on this Foundation, see http://www.goncol.hu/indexb35c.html?menu_id=448.  
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provisions being adopted within the HEPA63. The major footprint of the environmental NGOs 
in the HEPA was, however, the introduction of channels of open stakeholders’ participation in 
the draft- and decision-making of environmental legislation, considered as “an essential 
'technique' of the green organisations” (Hajba, 1996, p. 11). This resulted in the establishment 
of advisory bodies in the Ministry of Environment and the creation of the National Council 
on Environment (hereafter, OKT). The OKT, in fact, was part of the package accepted by 
Ferenc Baja who agreed to the establishment of such council in exchange for the green 
movements' support in the adoption of the HEPA (interview 24). In the establishment of the 
OKT in 1996, Hungarian policy-makers analysed existing models of advisory councils 
established in Germany and the Netherlands to emulate (interview 23). Nevertheless, the 
model that was then adopted for the OKT differed from the European ones. It was, in fact, 
established as “alien to the system” (interview 15) and had to work as a “cross-cutting body” 
in cooperation with the Ministry of Environment. However, it was not directly subordinated 
to any Ministry or state administration (interviews 23, 15 and 24). Moreover, despite the fact 
that the Minister of Environment was appointed by law as member of the Council and was 
invited to attend its sessions, the selection process within the Council removed the 
government from any role in appointing its members64 (Rose-Ackerman, 2005).  
 The discussions within the OKT have been clear examples of cooperative policy-
                                                 
63 This Act recognised the right of knowledge and information on environmental issues, and particularly on 
“the state of the environment, the level of environmental pollution, environmental protection activities as 
well as the impact of the environment on human health” (Art. 12.1 of the HEPA as quoted in Jendrośka, 
1998, p. 186). Furthermore, the HEPA gave importance to cooperation among different stakeholders by 
stating that “state organs, local governments, natural persons and their organizations, business organizations 
and the organizations safeguarding the interests of all the above, as well as other institutions, shall co-operate 
in the protection of the environment” and also that “the right and responsibility to co-operate shall extend to 
all phases of achieving the environmental objectives” (Art. 10, par. 1).  
64 The OKT grouped three main fields of representatives: from the universities, the industry and the civil 
society (NGOs). The general representation principle within the Council was defined by Professor Miklos 
Bulla who established that each of the three fields could elect seven representatives (i.e. seven academics, 
seven from the business and seven from the NGOs) for a total of twenty-two members. In the HEPA of 1995, 
Section 45 contained a number of paragraphs concerning the OKT established that its members had to be 
representatives from “public organisations registered with environmental goals” and from “agencies 
representing professional and economic interests” who were “elected in a manner determined by 
themselves” and representatives “appointed by the scientific community and the president of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences” (Section 45, paragraph 3). Furthermore, the HEPA established that these 
representatives had to be in number “up to 22” (Section 45, paragraph 1) and had to “participate in equal 
proportion” (Section 45, paragraph 3). Nevertheless, the HEPA did not establish the proportions of the seats 
among the three fields and the Minister of Environment appointed the Secretary of the Council, Professor 
Bulla, for this task (interview 23).It established a rotation in the chairmanship between the three fields and 
each group defined its own rules of delegation (Interview 23). The representatives from the three fields were 
then selected independently. In particular, the representatives of the NGOs were elected by the National 
Gathering of Environmental and Nature Protection Forum which grouped the different environmental groups 
(interview 15); the representatives of the universities were appointed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(HEPA, Sect. 45, par. 3); the representatives of the business were appointed by the MGYOSZ, the National 
Association for Hungarian Manufacturers and Industrialists (Rose-Ackerman, 2005).  
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making in which the members from business and from civil society have learnt that “the other 
part is not an enemy” (interview 25). The HEPA specifically obliged the Minister of 
Environment to send to the OKT all legislative drafts, assessment analyses and national 
concepts concerning the protection of the environment (Sect. 43, par. 1) as well as drafts of 
plans or programmes that contained environmental reports for evaluation (Sect. 43, par 4 and 
Sect. 44, par. 2b). Moreover, the Council could give opinions on assessment analyses and 
drafts of plans or programmes, propose legislative measures to improve the efficiency of the 
environmental protection and nature preservation as well as express its opinions on matters of 
strategic importance in relation to the protection of the environment (Sect. 45, par. 2). Hence, 
from a procedural point of view, the government was obliged to ask the OKT an opinion on 
environmental legislation; otherwise, such a draft could be declared invalid65 (interviews 23; 
25; 9; 26). Moreover, according to the internal regulation of the Council, in the event that the 
Council in plenary session did not achieve a consensus, it was possible to elaborate majority 
and minority opinions. These opinions were sent to the relevant governmental and 
parliamentary authorities, who then acknowledged that on that specific issue a consensus 
among the three parties did not exist (interview 23). However, even when there was a dissent 
among the OKT members, the different representatives cooperated to find a common solution 
to specific topics and draft legislation (interview 25). 
 The cooperative policy-making within the OKT positively influenced the adoption in 
the Hungarian legislation of stricter principles and concepts connected to the European 
legislation on waste issues. Despite the novelties introduced in 1995 with Act No. XLII on 
the Mandatory Use of Certain Local Public Services and the provisions in the HEPA66, at the 
end of the 1990s the Hungarian legislation had not defined detailed requirements for landfill 
sites and lacked clear definitions of the term “waste”, unambiguous divisions of 
responsibilities on waste issues as well as the definition of individual permits for specific 
waste-related issues (interview 17). However, it soon became clear to the government as well 
as to domestic private and societal actors that Hungary had to start approximating to the 
                                                 
65 Interviewees recall four or five times in which the Constitutional Court cancelled a law because the 
Government did not previously consult the OKT (interview 23; interview 25). Nevertheless, the Government 
and the Parliament are neither obliged to accept the opinions in the final versions of Decrees and Acts nor to 
report back to its members (interviews 25; 26).  
66 The HEPA established the general rules for environmental protection and “arranged the already existing 
legal instruments into a comprehensive system” (Ágh et al., 2007) by encompassing the key environmental 
principles such as precaution, prevention and restoration and by detailing the duties and the obligations of 
the institutional bodies such as the Parliament and the Government (Ágh et al., 2007). Furthermore, Section 
Thirty required local governments to develop municipal programmes and regulations concerning the disposal 
of municipal waste and established obligations for the “user of environment” to provide for the treatment of 
wastes (OECD, 2000).  
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European legislation concerning waste (interview 17). Discussions on a draft legislation on 
waste then occurred within the OKT which, on 1st September 1999, approved a common 
position. This position specifically emphasised the need to transpose all the definitions and 
principles concerning waste defined by the EU. Moreover, OKT members recalled the need 
to involve a broader number of stakeholders involved at local level in the management of 
municipal waste such as representatives of small neighbouring villages and private waste-
collecting firms.  
 The 1999 OKT position strongly influenced the inclusion of EU waste-related 
provisions in the Act on Waste Management (No. XLIII), adopted on 23 May 2000 by the 
Hungarian government. This Act “took over as a framework law the system of communal 
waste management regulation” (Ágh et al., 2007, p. 97) previously based on the HEPA of 
1995 (National Waste Management Plan, 2002). According to Professor Gyula Bandi - an 
environmental lawyer who contributed to the drafting of this law - the 2000 Act could be 
considered as “relatively good” and “a step forward” in waste legislation (interview 17). This 
Act clarified the responsibilities of municipalities and the duty of households to use the 
municipal waste services for the collection of waste at the local level (interview 17). It also 
contained the main definitions and principles of waste management, the general duties and 
requirements for waste management and set out the requirements for waste treatment and 
recovery. Moreover, it fully transposed all the key principles and requirements contained in 
the European Waste Framework Directive (interview 26; interview 17). This Act also 
addressed specific dispositions related to municipal solid waste and hazardous waste, set out 
the duties and the division of competencies between the different authorities and defined the 
fines and the fees systems (HOE, 2011). Moreover, Chapter III of the Act contained 
regulations for the treatment and recovery of municipal and hazardous wastes including the 
operations of incineration and disposal into landfills. Section 19, in particular, stipulated the 
requirement of obtaining a permit for the disposal of waste into a landfill site (section 19, art. 
1 a), established the construction of new disposal sites only for regional purposes (sect. 19, 
art. 4) and forbade the disposal of non-pre-processed waste unless otherwise stated in other 
Acts (sect. 19, art. 5). In addition, it established that the conditions to set up a disposal 
installation (sect. 19, art. 2), provisions for the design, construction and management of the 
disposal installations as well at those related to the closure and after-care of old sites (sect. 
19, art. 3) were subject to separate legal acts.  
 
From the end of the 1980s until the Act on Waste Management of 2000, progress was made 
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towards the transposition of the European municipal waste requirements and principles in the 
Hungarian legislation. This improvement was firstly influenced by market incentives and 
specifically by the strategies pursued by foreign firms which recognised EU compliance as 
profitable. Therefore, instead of lowering their standards when penetrating the Hungarian 
market, they exported their costly standards, technology and machinery conforming to the 
European waste legislation. Additionally, a strong environmental movement played a crucial 
role in the recognition of cooperative strategies in the environmental policy-making through 
the creation of the OKT. Within this advisory body, members originating from business, NGO 
and academia circles cooperated in the adoption of common positions aimed at strengthening 
the compliance of Hungary with the European municipal waste principles and requirements. 
In this period we saw no form of assistance from external actors. 
 
 
3.1.2 From 2000 to 2002: the changeover from the municipal law “on the books” to its 
implementation compliance 
 
 
With the Act on Waste Management of 2000, Hungary had transposed the European 
legislation on the management and treatment of municipal waste. This Act also contained a 
number of provisions to further strengthen the implementation compliance of Hungary. On 
the one hand, the Act urged the adoption of measures in the treatment of municipal waste and 
specifically the establishment of compliant operating disposal landfills as well as the closure 
and after-care of the obsolete ones (Section 3, paragraph h). Moreover, it emphasised the 
need to reduce the hazard of generated waste and the safe disposal of non-reusable waste 
(National Waste Management Plan, 2002). On the other hand, the Act stressed that “to 
achieve the strategic goals of waste management and the objectives defined in this Act and to 
implement the principles of waste management” it was necessary to “adopt a National Waste 
Management Plan” (Section 33). 
 By that time, the majority of the municipal waste disposal sites were still unregulated 
and without any sanitary or environmental standards in terms of control and insulation of the 
soil (interview 16; interview 15; interview 27). Thus, the lack of technical regulation on 
landfill sites still influenced the creation of different types of landfills, namely those which 
followed and those which did not follow the sanitary requirements for the disposal operations 
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or the closure and after-care of obsolete sites (interview 16). Impetus to resolve the problems 
of unregulated and unsanitary landfills came from the assistance alliances established 
between EU and domestic stakeholders.  
 In December 1999, the EU Commission adopted a twinning project financed by 
PHARE 67  (No. HU9911-01) to improve the knowledge on the Hungarian waste deposit 
system (hereafter also PHARE Survey). This project aimed at surveying the number of 
existing sites in use in Hungary from the 1950s and at classifying them among those in 
operation and those closed or illegal (interview 8). The project was promoted by a Dutch firm 
which, in cooperation with the Hungarian regional and local authorities, reported the 
existence of two thousand six hundred and seventy (2670) disposal sites since the 1950s of 
which: half was not in use any more and closed in 2000; eight hundred and eighty-seven 
(887) were closed but did not conform to the EU requirements on re-cultivation of the soil 
(interview 11); sixty/seventy (60-70) were fully (or almost fully) compliant with the 
European requirements (interview 8). Additionally, there existed some 620 sites with a small 
capacity (National Waste Management Plan, 2002). Then, considering that at the beginning of 
the 2000s there were approximately three thousand two hundred (3200) municipalities and 
small settlements, it could be said that “practically each settlement had its own dump” (Dax 
et al., 2001, p. 13).  
 In addition to surveying the number of existing landfills, the PHARE twinning 
assessed their ownership (interview 8). The results of the Survey had a strong impact on the 
strategies pursued by private firms and municipalities. On the one hand, the Survey 
recognised that most of the compliant landfills were of foreign ownership and had been built 
between the end of the 1980s and the 1990s (interview 8; interview 16). The level of 
compliance of foreign or jointly managed landfill disposal sites with the European 
requirements can be explained through the market incentive mechanism and the assumption 
                                                 
67 Before the 1999 PHARE Survey, Hungary has been targeted by other EU initiatives financed by PHARE 
which aimed at strengthening the Hungarian environmental institutional setting and capacity-building. In 
particular, between 1994 and 1998, the EU spent EUR 14.5 million on developing the Hungarian 
environmental policy, harmonising the environmental legislation, upgrading the laboratories within the 
Regional Environmental Inspectorates and providing funds for local authorities in the environmental sector 
(OECD, 2000). PHARE has been extremely important specifically for the institution building and legislative 
harmonisation process covering up to 30-50% of the institution building costs for the EU's preparatory 
readiness of Hungary (interview 28). PHARE has also supported the construction of municipal waste 
treatment facilities such as the construction of two regional landfill sites in 1994 (Dax et al., 2001) or other 
small regional facilities below the minimum size of five million Euro (interview 16; interview 28; Heil, 
2000). Moreover, since the late 1990s, the EU Commission financed a special peer-review project which 
consisted in the establishment of an office in Bratislava where experts from private European consultancies 
held regular meetings, organised seminars and training sessions on how to write and implement the 
European legislation for representatives of the CEE candidate countries (interview 72).  
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that foreign companies considered the compliance with the EU waste requirements more 
profitable than a regulatory “race to the bottom”. The pro-EU compliance strategy pursued by 
the foreign firms was also influenced by their increasingly dominant position on the 
Hungarian market for the collection and treatment of municipal waste. An international report 
reveals that these foreign companies gradually acquired bigger shares of the market to the 
point that, in the early 2000s, they owned already between seventy-five and eighty (75-80%) 
percent of the total Hungarian market of waste collection and treatment (PSIRU, 2000). 
Furthermore, the account was expected to grow “by 8-10 percent in the coming years, due to 
the Hungarian government's commitment to meet the EU environmental standards” (PSIRU, 
2000, p. 11). The high level of foreign ownership of the Hungarian market had been 
emphasised as well by Hungarian interviewees who have implied that the high level of 
investments from foreign companies made them “buy the Hungarian market” (interview 10; 
interview 8; interview 12) and strengthened their position in the Hungarian waste market 
(interview 10). At the beginning of 2000s, the Hungarian waste collection and treatment 
market was then divided between two main actors: few big foreign firms (i.e. Saubermacher, 
AVE, A.S.A., Remondis) and some waste-collecting companies owned by big cities, villages 
or cooperatives of municipalities (interview 29; interview 17; interview 14). Indeed, private 
Hungarian firms never became relevant actors in the Hungarian municipal waste market 
(interview 10; interview 14).  
 On the other hand, the Survey highlighted that most of the operating municipally 
owned-landfills were non-compliant with the EU waste requirements. To improve the 
compliance with the EU requirements of municipal disposal sites, municipalities applied for 
EU ISPA funding. From 2000, the EU has financed twelve projects concerning the sector of 
solid waste treatment and two technical assistance projects to build administrative capacity, 
infrastructure and the ability to manage EU projects and funding (interview 30). However, 
not all the EU-funded projects had been initially successful. For example, delays in the 
adoption of the ISPA legislation by the EU and the definition of projects to submit for 
application68 influenced the approval of projects on the disposal of waste into landfills in the 
vicinity of medium-size and big cities, a move that hardly encouraged thinking on other 
                                                 
68 In Hungary, the preparation for the ISPA projects started already in 1998 “when the regulations pertaining to 
subsidy were not yet finalized” (Szabó, 2007). However, the EU defined the legislation on ISPA only in 2000 
but by that time, Hungary did not have any project ready to be submitted to the EU Commission for approval 
(interview 31). The first projects were then selected among those submitted by municipalities and local 
authorities to apply for the Hungarian national grants and funding which, after being subject to additional 
studies on the requirements for the EU, were submitted by the Hungarian authorities for the EU 
Commission's approval (interview 31). 
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solutions such as waste sorting and recycling (interview 28; interview 16). Moreover, at first 
projects were generally not sophisticated and in some cases they were based on notions that 
were already out-dated by the time of their implementation (interview 32; interview 28). 
These problems were influenced by a poor level of expertise at the local level, manifested in 
lack of knowledge on how to define the projects, procedures for application to EU funds and 
on how to correctly manage the investments by a set deadline (interview 33). Hungarian 
municipalities tend to be small, with the smallest number of inhabitants per municipality on 
the EU continent: their relatively small size has caused “many drawbacks in terms of 
development” (Pogatsa, 2004). Lack of local employment and the tendency amongst those 
trained and educated to relocate had drastically reduced the possibility of providing the most 
basic physical and public infrastructure and an inefficient use of the resources (Pogatsa, 
2004). Additionally, local authorities lacked sufficient experience to carry out the 
implementation of such projects (interview 31; interview 33; interview 32). 
 Weak planning in the definition of EU-funded projects influenced also an over-
capacity of facilities to treat municipal waste in some regions. It could happen, for instance, 
that in one region a foreign firm had built or modernised an existing landfill disposal site to 
the EU requirements and, soon after, neighbouring municipalities applied for the construction 
of own facilities through ISPA or through public funding from the Hungarian central budget's 
target support and the Central Environmental Protection Fund69 (Dax et al., 2001; interview 
16). This for instance was the case in the Hajdu-Bihar region, where the foreign firm A.S.A. 
Hungary managed a consortium in partnership with AVE and the city of Debrecen for the 
construction of a new landfill site in the area of Debrecen (Dax et al., 2001). In the name of 
the consortium, the city of Debrecen applied for and received funding from ISPA for the 
construction of three sub-regional waste disposal sites (No. 2000/HU/16/P/PE/002). In the 
same region, however, the city of Nádudvar had constructed from state subsidies its own 
disposal site which, according to Dax et al. (2001), corresponded to a case of “wasted 
money” considering that this city could have been easily served by the new landfill site 
constructed by the A.S.A-AVE-Debrecen consortium. Moreover, the city of Nádudvar could 
not manage the facility through its own firm and had to call for a public tender procedure. 
This, eventually, was won and then managed by A.S.A (Dax et al., 2001).  
 In order to reduce incidence of problems in the planning phases of EU-funded 
projects, the EU financed two specific technical assistance projects (No. 
                                                 
69 According to Dax et al., between 1992 and 1999 these two mechanisms supported the construction of sixty-
three landfills in Hungary (Dax et al., 2001). 
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2000/HU/16/P/PA/005 and No. 2001/HU/16/P/PA/009) to help in the tendering procedure 
and in the drafting of ISPA projects in 2000 and 2001. Moreover, a list of experts from the 
EU Member States in all sectors was drawn up; these experts provided technical assistance 
before the submission of ISPA projects and checked its contents and development (interview 
31; interview 13; interview 28). The purpose of these projects was the exchange of                                                                                                                                                        
best-practices between European and Hungarian civil servants as in the case of the Szeged 
regional waste management programme (project No. 2000/HU/16/P/PE/005). The drafting of 
the project began in 2000 and was redrawn repeatedly as it contained technical weaknesses 
that could have resulted in a loss of EU financing (interview 28; interview 31). Then, in 
March 2000, experts from the Belgian consultancy Carl-Bro were delegated by the EU 
Commission to help the Hungarian experts in the preparation of the finalised project 
documentation. Following the exchange of information and best-practices from the external 
experts, the project was finally accepted by the EU Commission few months later and the 
Szeged regional programme started to be carried out (Szabó, 2007).  
Despite problems arising in the management of specific EU-funded projects, the 
regional waste management planning was successfully organised in most of the Hungarian 
regions thanks to the establishment of cooperative strategies between stakeholders through 
the establishment of associations of municipalities or public-private-partnerships (hereafter, 
PPPs) between private and municipal firms. Associations of municipalities were created as a 
consequence of the lack of financial capacities to finance individual disposal facilities or co-
finance ISPA projects by the municipalities and local authorities. While the EU favoured that 
small municipalities joined a more centralised system, it happened that in some cases too 
many municipalities were gathered around one single solution (interview 32). At times, 
because of the high number of municipalities within a single region, the municipalities were 
also not able to establish an association responsible for the common facility (interview 32). 
Or, they were able to establish an association, but unable to manage it because of the lack of a 
common governance model at the local and governmental levels (interview 33; interview 32; 
interview 28).  
 Parallel to the associations of municipalities, foreign and municipal firms established 
PPPs which resulted to be more successful in improving the regionalisation of waste 
management in Hungary. Since the early 1990s, there existed public-private cooperation with 
the establishment of joint-ventures for the collection of waste (Dax et al., 2001). Moreover, 
after the approval of ISPA projects, public-private-partnerships became important for the 
management of EU-funded regional treatment projects. In fact, according to Fleisher and 
 99 
Futó (2005), “the objectives and means of programmes co-financed by the EU […] can only 
be realised through public-private-partnerships” (Fleisher and Futó, 2005, p. 14).  
The Act on Waste Management of 2000 set as objective also the regional planning for 
municipal waste management. To achieve this goal, the PHARE Survey has been an 
important source of knowledge for organising the treatment of municipal waste at the 
national and regional levels (interview 9). Furthermore, since 2000, the EU has promoted a 
project (No. HU0004-02) to develop the Waste Management Information System linked to a 
twinning on the definition and adoption of the National Waste Management Plan (interview 
8). This twinning had to be managed by the Public Waste Agency of Flanders (hereafter also 
OVAM) in cooperation with the Hungarian Ministry of Environment and the international 
consultancy COWI (interview 29; interview 8). At the time of the launch of the twinning on 
27th August 2001, however, as part of the Second National Environmental Protection 
Programme, the Hungarian Parliament had already prepared a draft of the National Waste 
Management Plan to cover the period between 2003 and 2008 (interview 8) and discussions 
now revolved around the implementation of the Plan (interview 8; interview 9) and specific 
financial aspects within the OKT70.   
The National Waste Management Plan was adopted by the Parliament in November 
2002 and established that by 2009 there could exist and operate at the national level no more 
than one hundred (100) disposal sites (interview 8, interview 15; interview 9). The rest had to 
be closed down and re-cultivated (interview 31). Within this plan, it was also decided that the 
operating sites had to guarantee a reception capacity for at least six years and they could not 
be located more than fifty kilometres from the point where the waste had been collected by 
2009 (HOE, 2011), in conformity with the European principle of “correction of damage at 
source”. As a consequence of this plan but also of the PHARE Survey, the municipal waste 
management was centralised in one single project at the regional level, and the number of 
landfill disposal sites was reduced to seventy-seven (77) operating for the whole country 
(interview 9; interview 18). The National Waste Management Plan also established the 
adoption of regional waste management plans 270 days after the approval of the National 
Plan; furthermore, municipal governments had to develop local waste management plans 270 
days after the approval of the regional plans (National Waste Management Plan, 2002, p. 9). 
                                                 
70 On 27 July 2001, in particular, the OKT in plenary session approved an opinion concerning the National 
Waste Management Plan which specifically emphasised the need of strengthening the financial means at the 
national level for the realisation of the Plan. This opinion was then taken into consideration by the 
government which discussed the adoption of a six-year financial plan for supporting the implementation of 
the National Waste Management Plan but ultimately decided on an annual amount from the central budget 
(interview 8; interview 9).  
 100 
 The Hungarian government decided that the twinning with the Flemish experts from 
OVAM “would have targeted the development of the regional waste management plans” 
(interview 8). The same National Waste Management Plan stated that regional waste 
management plans had to be based on the National Plan but “in order to complete and unite 
the systems [...] for an overall waste management system [these were] developed within the 
framework of a PHARE program” which supported their implementation by 2003 (National 
Waste Management Plan, 2002, p. 16). The OVAM twinning, which lasted less than two 
years, resulted in the drawing up of a plan “for the establishment of the best institutional 
structure for the management of waste streams, the transfer of know-how on data collection, 
the development of guidelines on waste management planning at regional level and the 
implementation of the necessary staff training” (Project Fiche No. HU0004-02). In particular, 
Flemish experts drafted a guideline manual “to support and coordinate the regional waste 
plans in consultation with the Hungarian Regional Environmental Inspectorates” (OVAM 
web site). Moreover, Flemish experts assisted in guiding the planning process by organising 
training session in Budapest or in the regional Inspectorates as well as organising study tours 
across Europe and in Flanders, where the Hungarian team was introduced to the methods, 
collection management and processing of data in use in Flanders (interview 8). Furthermore, 
clerks from the Hungarian Regional Inspectorates were also invited to Flanders for a study 
tour, during which meetings aimed at the exchange of best practices and also on-site visits to 
the Flemish waste collection and sorting centres, container parks and incineration plants too 
place (OVAM web page).   
 In November 2003, the Hungarian regions officially published regional waste 
management plans. The local governments soon followed suit, publishing municipal waste 
management plans in August 2004 (Hungarian national questionnaire on the transposition and 
implementation of directive 75/442/EEC, 2006). The creation of assistance alliances in the 
twinning project promoted by Flemish experts of OVAM had been essential for the definition 
and implementation of regional waste management plans in Hungary (interview 8; interview 
9). Moving from an initial distance at the beginning of the project, Flemish experts and 
Hungarian regional and local authorities established a cooperative relationship in the 
exchange of information and know-how, which resulted in the adoption of the plans. 
Moreover, this fruitful experience was positively evaluated by the Hungarian Ministry of the 
Environment, which requested to expand the project scope to several other waste issues such 
as the import and export of waste material streams, the treatment of animal waste and the 
packaging waste (OVAM web site).       
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In the period between the adoption of the Act on Waste Management in 2000 and its 
implementation with the adoption of National and Regional Waste Management Plans in 
2003, there was a move in the implementation compliance of the principles of waste 
management and treatment contained in the European Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives. This progress was strongly influenced by external – EU – assistance which, 
through twinning and capacity-building projects, improved knowledge of the EU 
requirements and the municipal waste infrastructure for the treatment of municipal waste. 
Unlike the mere provision of technical information and exchange of best-practices from 
external actors assumed by the transnational communication hypothesis, the external 
assistance to Hungarian stakeholders has been characterised by the establishment of 
assistance alliances and a good relationship between external and domestic actors as shown 
by the case of the OVAM twinning. Furthermore, cooperative strategies pursued by foreign 
and municipal firms facilitated the establishment of joint-ventures and PPPs in the 
organisation of the regional waste management. Moreover, as demonstrated by the PHARE 
Survey, foreign firms did not lower their standards but, as explained by the market incentives 
hypothesis, recognised the profitable aspect of EU compliance and established and/or 
modernised existing waste treatment facilities following costly but EU-conforming 
technology and standards. These strategies further improved the overall conformity of the 
Hungarian waste treatment facilities and system of municipal waste collection.  
 
3.1.3 From 2003 to 2009: moving from municipal waste implementation compliance to 
its sustainability 
 
 
By 2003, Hungary had implemented the principles of regional organisation and integration of 
municipal waste management within the National and Regional Waste Management Plans. 
Soon after the implementation of National and Regional Waste management Plans, 
cooperative strategies between foreign and municipal firms - which enhanced the 
establishment of assistance alliances in the implementation of EU-funded projects - and 
market incentives influenced an improvement in the municipal waste implementation 
compliance of Hungary towards full conformity in 2009. These mechanisms also enhanced 
the sustainable compliance of Hungary.   
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 The case of remediation of old and obsolete disposal sites offers a clear example of 
the combination between cooperative strategies and market incentives. The National Waste 
Management Plan and the National Environmental Remediation Program (established with 
the Government Regulation No. 33/2000) recognised the recultivation of old and obsolete 
sites as a priority, to be achieved by 2009 (National Waste Management Plan, 2002; interview 
9). Recultivation was however considered a very costly operation (interview 31; 16). On the 
one hand, municipalities applied for EU funding. Many of the approved ISPA projects, in 
fact, contained a reference to remediation of old disposal sites, but considering the costs of 
this operation, municipalities tended to “put out” this phase from the EU projects (interview 
31). Furthermore, between 2004 and 2006, the EU approved two projects for the development 
of separate waste collection and composting facilities in Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg county and 
in the Üröm-Csókavár landfill (No. 2004/HU/16/C/PE/004 and No. 2006/HU/16/C/PE/001), 
but these were not considered sufficient to cover the costs of the required technology (HOE, 
2011; interview 19, interview 27; interview 16). Hence, in many cases the projects were re-
submitted for financing by the Cohesion Fund in the period 2007-2013 (interview 31). 
On the other hand, recognising that the Hungarian legislation would soon have 
required the recultivation of old disposal sites but also the high costs of such operations, 
municipal firms established PPPs with foreign firms. These partnerships have however been 
limited in number and successful only in the areas around Budapest, where a higher number 
of inhabitants and foreign firms investing in this technology to cover the costs could be found 
(interview 16). Foreign firms, in fact, considering the profitability of EU compliance, since 
the beginning exported EU compliant technologies and modernised non-conforming 
facilities. Furthermore, they provided knowledge of EU standards and requirements for their 
partners in joint-ventures. As highlighted by Eszter Sarosi, in particular, the bulk of 
knowledge of the EU requirements in Hungary has come, in fact, from foreign companies 
which, in establishing their own business in Hungary, exported the EU-conforming 
requirements (interview 19), thus enhancing a regulatory “race to the top”.   
 Some problems persisted in the enforcement of the regionalisation principles during 
the selection of the location for the disposal sites, resulting in protests by the local population, 
and over-capacity of facilities. Although limited to few regions (interview 16), these 
problems were linked to initial lack of cooperation between firms with already existing and 
operating concessions within a region (State Audit Report, 2004; Meyer, 2006; Dax et al., 
2001; interview 32). The lack of cooperative strategies pursued by the various existing and 
new regional projects was also highlighted in the OKT common opinion released on 11 
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September 2003, in which OKT members specifically called for a closer cooperation among 
parties in the share of information and data to achieve full conformity with EU requirements. 
An example of non-cooperation occurred during the construction of the ISPA-funded 
North Balaton regional municipal solid waste management system (No. 
2002/HU/16/P/PE/017). In this case, the lack of cooperation between private companies 
already operating in the area and municipalities applying to ISPA influenced local protests 
and delayed the construction of the EU-funded project. These protests were framed within the 
NIMBY71 syndrome, but soon it became clear that they had been manipulated by the existing 
private economic interests in the region which feared a loss in their market share (interview 
28; interview 32). Additionally, the lack of cooperation between foreign and municipal firms 
influenced an over-capacity in the number of disposal sites operating in the surroundings of 
Budapest. For many years, this city had been served by the landfill of Gyál, but the situation 
changed when the site was acquired and modernised by A.S.A. Hungary (Dax et al., 2001). A 
municipal decree then established that only the Budapest's service provider FKF or FKF's 
authorised companies could manage the municipal waste produced by the city of Budapest 
with the result that neither FKF nor A.S.A agreed to cooperation or to a joint management of 
the landfill of Gyál (Dax et al., 2001). Thus, while two new landfills were built by FKF in the 
municipalities of Dunakeszi and Pusztazámor, the use of the landfill of Gyál owned by AS.A. 
was “relegated to the local market of Gyál and [the] surrounding small settlements” (Dax et 
al., 2001, p. 67).  
 
In the period between 2003 and 2009, Hungary fully implemented the EU municipal waste 
requirements achieving the level of sustainable compliance. The progress in the compliance 
of Hungary with the municipal waste dimension was influenced by EU external assistance 
through ISPA and Cohesion funding. Nevertheless, unlike the transnational communication 
hypothesis that postulated a mere exchange of information and best-practices between 
external and domestic actors, the successful implementation of external assistance projects, 
aimed at the construction and modernisation of treatment facilities, had been influenced by 
the establishment of cooperative strategies between foreign and municipal firms. In fact, the 
problems that characterised the implementation of some ISPA projects, such as the NIMBY 
syndrome and over-capacity, generally arose when there was a lack of cooperation between 
                                                 
71 The Collins English Dictionary online defines as “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome a situation in 
which a person objects the occurrence of something if it will affect him or her or take place in his or her 
locality. These protests generally concern projects intended for the benefit of the public, such as a school or 
landfill, being sited near one's residence. For more details, see http://www.thefreedictionary.com/NIMBY.  
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stakeholders and coordination among operating facilities. Where cooperative strategies were 
established in the form of public-private-partnerships, the sustainable compliance 
implementation of the ISPA projects and the regionalisation of the waste management were 
very effective. Nevertheless, as the case of the recultivation of old disposal sites has shown, 
there was also a link between market incentives and cooperative strategies. In fact, in the 
establishment of PPPs to share the costs of the recultivation technology, the profitability of 
EU-conforming standards recognised by foreign firms impacted also the municipal partners 
which gained in terms of knowledge of EU standards, foreign investments and technology. 
 
 
3.2 The Hungarian process of implementation compliance with the packaging waste 
dimension 
 
 
The second dimension considered in this dissertation concerns the management and treatment 
of packaging waste. Management of this type of waste at the European level was the 
responsibility of packaging producers and fillers in line with the European principle of 
“polluter pays” established in Article 174 of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the Packaging 
and Packaging Waste Directive specified the adoption of measures to improve the reuse, the 
separate collection and the recovery and recycling of packaging goods. In particular, to 
measure the implementation compliance with the European legislation, the transposition of 
the Packaging Directive into the Hungarian legislation as well as the setting up of return, 
collection and recovery systems for packaging and the establishment of economic measures 
to encourage these systems were taken into consideration. As in the case of the municipal 
waste dimension, compliance with selected packaging requirements is analysed following a 
chronological division in three phases (each with its distinct intermediate goal as in the case 
of the municipal waste management dimension), over which Hungary improved from a non-
compliance level (stage 2) in 1999 to sustainable compliance (sustainable compliance, stage 
5) in 2009. 
 Also similarly to the municipal waste dimension, the three phases of analysis cover 
the periods from the status quo to the transposition, from transposition to implementation and 
the sustainability of compliance. The first phase covers the years from the late 1980s until 
2002, when the Governmental Decree 94/2002 transposed the European legislation on 
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packaging waste in the Hungarian legislation. In this phase we see the mechanism of market 
incentives highly influencing the transposition on the books of the EU Directive on 
packaging waste as well as the establishment of cooperative strategies among domestic state 
actors and stakeholders. The second phase covered the years between 2002 and 2003 and 
culminated in the implementation of the packaging requirements contained in the Hungarian 
legislation transposing the EU packaging requirements. In this phase, the interrelation 
between market incentives and cooperative strategies among stakeholders influenced the 
progress towards the achievement of sustainable compliance. The third phase covered the 
years from 2003 to 2009; in its course, Hungary achieved sustainable compliance with the 
EU packaging requirements. In this phase the mechanisms of market incentives and 
cooperative strategies as well as the interrelation between market incentives and assistance 
alliances played a substantial role in making sustainable the implementation compliance of 
Hungary in the packaging waste dimension. 
 
 
3.2.1 From the late 1980s to 2002: the passage from the packaging status quo to the law 
“on the books” 
 
 
At the end of the 1980s, a system of collection and treatment of packaging materials did not 
exist in Hungary, and the state subsidised the collection of only certain types of packaging. 
The Communist system of packaging collection and treatment entitled a few selective 
collection schemes funded directly by the Communist government for paper in schools and 
return schemes for glass in the shops (interview 27; interview 13). Specific reuse schemes for 
beer glass bottles, refilling of plastic bottles and deposit refund systems were also established, 
and their rates depended on voluntary negotiations between industry, retailers and traders72 
(interview 13). Moreover, with the exception of a law of 1981 on hazardous waste, Hungary 
had also not defined any detailed legislation concerning the management of any type of 
waste, including packaging (interview 8).  
 The first impulse for the adoption of legislation on packaging waste came from the 
                                                 
72 According to a document elaborated by the United Nations, in Hungary the most common types of bottles 
(wine, beer, soft drinks) always had about a 70-80% return rate but since 1991, the return rates decreased 
(except for beer bottles) to about 50% (estimates) and the trend was that the system worked only for those 
types of bottle for which refilling was economical. In 1998, the deposit rates (with % of deposit in products 
market price) were as follows: 0.75 l wine bottles made of glass: 5 US Cents/bottle (< 3%); 0.5 l beer bottles 
made of glass: 5 US Cents/bottle (6-8%); 1.5-2 l soft drink bottle made of plastic: 15-35 US Cents/bottle 
(30-40%).  
 106 
application of Hungary to the OECD and the EU. Soon after the change of regime and in 
parallel to the debate on the various drafts of the HEPA, in fact, Hungary applied to the 
OECD (interview 8). In order to become a member, however, Hungary had to implement all 
the OECD decisions concerning environmental issues (interview 8) among which there were 
a number of important decisions concerning the management of packaging waste 73 . 
Moreover, on 4 April 1994, Hungary signed the Association Agreements with the EU. It then 
became clear to the government but also to the domestic packaging stakeholders that they had 
to adopt and comply with the European requirements on packaging (interview 17; interview 
7). That same year, in fact, the EU adopted the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 
(No. 94/62/EC) which introduced the “producer responsibility” principle in the European 
legislation. 
Between 1993 and 1994, broad discussions were conducted between the government 
and various packaging stakeholders on how to set up a system that made producers of 
specific goods responsible for their after-use phase (interview 34). The stakeholders involved 
were industrial organisations such as the Confederation of Hungarian Employers and 
Industrialists (hereafter, MGYOSZ), HUMUSZ and packaging associations74 (interview 34). 
Hence, broad discussions among government and stakeholders contributed to the 
establishment of cooperative strategies for the adoption a preliminary agreement on a 
packaging draft law. This agreement then led, in June 1995, to the adoption of the Product 
Charge Act (No. LVI) by the Hungarian Parliament. This Act was among the first Hungarian 
laws to rule over specific waste-related matters, and it was designed to comply with the 
OECD Recommendation on the Reuse and Recycling of Beverage Containers before the 
formal accession of Hungary to the OECD in May 1996.  
                                                 
73  In specific, by the early 1990s, the OECD had already adopted one Recommendation on waste paper (i.e. 
Recommendation C(79)218/FINAL on Waste Paper Recovery); one Recommendation on beverage 
containers (i.e. Recommendation C(78)8/FINAL on the Re-Use and Recycling of Beverage Containers); one 
Recommendation on the waste management policy (i.e. Recommendation C(76)155/FINAL on a 
Comprehensive Waste Management Policy); and four Decisions on the transboundary movement and export 
of hazardous waste (i.e. Decision C(90)178/FINAL on the reduction of transfrontier movements of wastes, 
Decision C(88)90/FINAL on transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes, Decision C(86)64/FINAL on 
exports of hazardous wastes from the OECD area and Decision C(83)180/FINAL on the transfrontier 
movement of hazardous waste). For further details, see http://webnet.oecd.org/OECD 
ACTS/Instruments/ListBySubjectView.aspx.  
74 In 1990, more than seventy manufacturers, distributors and enterprises in the fields of packaging and 
materials handling established the Association of Packaging and Material Handling (in Hungarian: 
Csomagolási és Anyagmozgatási Országos Szövetség, hereafter also CSAOSZ) to represent their interest in 
the domestic discussions on the packaging legislation and to provide information on the existing systems and 
the best practices. Moreover, since 1992, packaging producers and fillers have been members of the 
Association of Environmental Enterprises (in Hungarian: Környezetvédelmi Szolgáltatók és Gyártók 
Szövetsége, hereafter KSZGYSZ), and of business associations such as the Beverage Carton Environmental 
Services Association (in Hungarian: Italos Karton Környezetvédelmi Szolgáltató Egyesülés, hereafter IKSZ).  
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The 1995 Act established economic instruments to encourage the recycling, recovery 
and reuse of packaging waste and aimed at providing sources of funding for the prevention 
and reduction of damages from production and distribution of certain products (interview 8; 
Faolex web site). The major novelty of the Act was, however, the establishment of a charge 
that all producers of certain products (i.e. packaging, electric and electronic equipment, 
specific petroleum products, batteries, commercial printing paper and tyres) had to pay to the 
Ministry of the Environment a charge for every product put on the market. The level 
depended on specificities of the product 75 . It also recognised the KAC 76  as the body 
responsible for the collection and redistribution of this charge (interview 10; interview 35; 
interview 11). In particular, the KAC Inter-ministerial Committee decided on the allocation of 
sixty/seventy percent of the product charge (interview 10; interview 14; interview 9), part of 
which was allocated to the producers to cover their fixed costs resulting from waste 
operations and to the government to support waste management companies in the 
organisation of the collection of waste, in developing new capacities for the recovery of waste 
and in establishing selective collection and recycling of waste (interview 10; interview 8; 
interview 34).  
 The 1995 Product Charge Act, however, only partially transposed the EU 
requirements contained in the European Packaging and Packaging waste directive. First, 
unlike the European legislation which governed the whole range of packaging (i.e. bottle, 
closure and label), it governed only over the packaging bottle (interview 26). Second, unlike 
the “producer responsibility” principle defined in the European Packaging directive, the 
system introduced with the 1995 Product Charge Act did not require producers to fulfil any 
obligation on the recovery and recycling of packaging waste (interview 26). Third, the system 
of product charge collection was considered by Hungarian business and NGO stakeholders as 
not transparent (interview 34; interview 14) and “complicated” (interview 26). According to 
Laszlo Szylagyi, former leader of HUMUSZ, in fact, the product charge was spent mostly on 
waste-water and sewage projects instead of being directed to waste management firms or 
other waste management purposes (interview 14). Moreover, not all the money was clearly 
                                                 
75 In particular, for the packaging producers and fillers the level of the charge to be paid depended on the 
material of the packaging (interview 26). 
76 The Environmental Protection Act established the Central Environmental Protection Fund (KAC) as “a 
special budget line in the annual budget of the Ministry of Environment” and this was “directly subject to the 
relevant regulations in the State Budget Act” (REC, 2001). Its main financial sources came from the central 
budget and the product charges (i.e. transport fuel, tyres, batteries, packaging) and, in an only limited way, 
from natural resource fees (interview 8). In the late 1990s, however, the KAC was cancelled without any 
notification (interview 11) and the product charge collected by the Ministry of Environment went directly 
into the central budget. 
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labelled, and the firms did not exactly know how the product charge had been spent 
(interview 36). These stakeholders then soon became aware that such a system would not 
have worked under the EU conditions because, in practice, only selected companies received 
the money (interview 34; interview 14). Such awareness was confirmed by the fact that, with 
the opening of the negotiations for accession in Hungary, the EU negotiators considered this 
system as a state-aid to specific environmental and waste firms, thus countering the EU 
acquis (interview 36), they requested that the Hungarian government change it (interview 
10). This issue was also discussed within the OKT in March 1998 in a plenary session. The 
common position approved on this occasion emphasised the need for a gradual introduction 
of legislation on product charges and the need to consider as models those European systems 
that best resembled the Hungarian situation.  
Despite a partial transposition of the European Packaging and Packaging Waste 
Directive with the 1995 Act, the European legislation on packaging was not lost on the 
Hungarian industry. Recognising the compliance with the EU packaging legislation as the 
only way to make profits, György Viszkei - at that time general director of CSAOSZ – 
promoted the organisation of a system for packaging recovery and recycling as assumed by 
the market incentive hypothesis. Viszkei's expertise and organisational know-how helped him 
to win “the favour of the Hungarian professional public opinion” (Öko-Pannon web site) and 
to rapidly convince the Hungarian packaging firms “to put aside their economic interests and 
work together to facilitate a combined effort to achieve the goals of environmental 
protection” (Öko-Pannon web site). Viszkei was also able to convince the packaging 
producers and fillers to pay for the establishment of a system of recovery and recycling of 
packaging waste based on a long-term perspective for the fulfilment of the European 
packaging targets (interview 34). In other words, he was able to convince thirty-five among 
the biggest Hungarian and international packaging companies on the profitability of the 
compliance with the European requirements. At the end of 1996, he then received the 
financial support of these firms for the foundation of Öko-Pannon as the first public utility 
company responsible for the coordination of the collection and recovery of packaging waste, 
in compliance with the European regulations (Öko-Pannon Annual Report, 2010).  
The 1995 Act did also not define a clear system for the collection and treatment of 
packaging waste. However, recognising profit in the compliance with the EU packaging 
requirements in this case as well the Hungarian packaging industry played an important role. 
Öko-Pannon, in particular, played a leading role in the development of a EU-conforming 
system thanks to fact that it had the biggest packaging producers and fillers among its 
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founding members and had contracts with waste collectors and recyclers. Hence, establishing 
“a good balance” between the packaging industry and the collectors and recyclers and having 
direct contacts with both producers and collectors, Öko-Pannon was able to convince them to 
take a broad perspective and organise the system for the collection, recovery and recycling of 
packaging waste (interview 34). Then, between 1997 and 1998, György Viszkei studied the 
European systems, trying to find the one that best fit the Hungarian case (interview 34). 
Considering that the industry generally wanted to pay “as little as possible”, it soon became 
clear that a system based on the German model77  would be too expensive for Hungary 
(interview 34). In the same period, discussions also took place between experts in the 
Ministry of Environment, environmental organisations and companies on the definition of the 
“producer responsibility” principle in the Hungarian legislation (interview 26). Moreover, 
being a member of the OKT since 1996, György Viszkei managed to discuss, modifications 
and improvements on the Product Charge Act of 1995 in the Permanent Working Group on 
Waste and in plenary sessions. Nevertheless, these discussions did not produce plenary 
consensus (interview 23).   
After participating in study tours throughout Europe, Viszkei designed a system based 
on the French and Portuguese models which could fit the Hungarian reality and which would 
allow a gradual establishment at domestic level (interview 34). This licence system was based 
on the European accession requirements to transfer the responsibility of recovery and 
recycling from the state to the companies, and specifically established the creation of 
recovery organisations (hereafter also ROs) representatives of the producers which would 
manage the collection and recovery of packaging waste. These ROs were to be financed by 
licence fees which would cover the costs of organising the separate collection and recovery of 
packaging and would be paid by the packaging producers and fillers. Moreover, companies 
participating in such a scheme would have been partially exempted from the payment of the 
product fee if they reached the packaging recovery and recycling rates set by the law 
(interview 34; interview 35). Additionally, this system was analysed and positively evaluated 
by EU officials in their monitoring exercise on the Hungarian approximation to the European 
legislation. In particular, they recognised that this system “set something already in use in the 
                                                 
77 According to the system established in Germany, packaging fillers and producers were obliged to take-back 
free of charge used packaging from households, offices and commercial entities and forward it for recycling 
to specialised companies. An alternative solution to these obligations for household packaging is the creation 
of a private system of collection and recycling (DSD) in collaboration with the private and public recovery 
companies. For further details, see http://grossbritannien.ahk.de/fileadmin/ahk_grossbritannien 
/Dokumente/Formulare/Environment/Packaging_Recycling_in_Germany.pdf and also http://www.pro-
e.org/Legal_Basis_germany.html.  
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EU Member States” and that, thus, “it was going in the right direction” in terms of 
requirements contained in the European packaging directive (interview 34).  
Since the drafting of the licence fee system by Viszkei, Öko-Pannon introduced pilot 
projects based on this system which were financed by its members on a voluntary basis 
(interview 26). The aims of these projects were to provide a gradual establishment of the 
licence fee system in Hungary and to enable Öko-Pannon to be in full operation in the late 
1990s (interview 34). Moreover, by establishing these pilot projects, Öko-Pannon gained 
experience and allowed Öko-Pannon to start a wide range of packaging selection recovery 
and recycling projects (interview 26). The designing of the system was then influenced by 
market incentives, in the figure of Viszkei and the pilot projects enforced by Öko-Pannon, 
which postulated a regulatory “race to the top” when domestic firms recognised a competitive 
advantage in adopting the EU legislation. 
Parallel to the development of the licence fee draft and the Öko-Pannon pilot projects, 
in 2000, the Hungarian Parliament adopted the Act on Waste Management which for the first 
time recognised the “polluter pays” principle in the Hungarian legal system (interview 26). In 
particular, the Act established that “on the basis of the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the producer 
or holder of waste or the manufacturer of the product that became waste shall pay the waste 
treatment costs or dispose of the waste; the polluter shall be responsible for the abatement of 
environmental pollution caused by the waste, for the restoration of the state of the 
environment and the reimbursement of damages including costs of restoration” (Chapter 1, 
Section 4 g). Despite the adoption of this new Act, however, the key legislation on packaging 
management remained the Product Charge Act of 1995 (interview 17).  
The co-existence of the Acts of 1995 and of 2000 established two parallel systems of 
responsibility on the management of packaging products (interview 26). On the one hand, 
according to the 1995 Act, producers and fillers of packaging had to pay a product fee to the 
KAC for each product put on the market. On the other hand, according to the 2000 Act and 
the “polluter pays” principle, producers were responsible for the management and treatment 
of the waste from the packaging products they put on the market. This legislation did not 
properly harmonise the European packaging legislation but, rather, made it harder to 
implement the system (interview 36). In fact, while Hungary wished meet the requirements of 
the European waste legislation by adopting framework legislation in the form of the Act on 
Waste Management of 2000 (interview 36), the Product Charge Act of 1995 created 
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confusion for the producers regarding obligations78. Both Acts contained tables for a step-by-
step and year-by-year introduction of recycling and recovery targets and product fees to be 
paid. Nevertheless, the products considered were different and the calculations for the targets 
and fees were confusing, as they could be equally based on the performance of the previous 
year or on the expected performance for the coming year (interview 36).      
It became clear to the government and the packaging stakeholders that the co-
existence of these systems created confusion, and in some aspects they were also not properly 
harmonised with the European legislation (interview 36; interview 34). Moreover, during the 
negotiations for the accession, the EU informed Hungary that the system ran counter to the 
European requirements (interview 26). Following discussions with the packaging 
stakeholders, on 5th May 2002, the government adopted the Governmental Decree on 
Packaging and Packaging Waste (No. 94/2002) which imposed obligations on the whole 
packaging goods (interview 26), contained requisites and standards regarding the production 
and making of packaging materials (art. 3-5) and established rules on the treatment of 
packaging material wastes in terms of recycling and reuse (art. 6 and 7). Furthermore, the 
Decree acknowledged the system drawn up in the Öko-Pannon’s pilot projects by recognising 
that producers and traders could “create a coordinating organism that fulfilled their 
obligations regarding the treatment of packaging material wastes against payment of a fee on 
contractual terms” (art. 10-11).  
 
In the period from the end of the 1980s until 2002, there was a shift in the performance of 
Hungary with the transposition of the European requirements on packaging in the Hungarian 
legislation. This achievement was influenced by the broad discussions between the 
government and the packaging stakeholders which led to the establishment of cooperative 
strategies which allowed the parties to strike a preliminary agreement, which later led to the 
approval of the Product Charge Act in 1995. Thanks to cooperative strategies between 
packaging business actors, NGOs and the government, the involved parties soon recognised 
shortcomings of the 1995 Act, thus inducing further discussions on the topic. Nevertheless, 
the definition and first implementation of the packaging system in Hungary were driven by 
the mechanism of market incentives and specifically by György Viszkei and Öko-Pannon. 
                                                 
78 According to the two Acts, the packaging producers had four obligations to fulfil: a) based on the 
performance and the kilograms put on the market of packaging, the producers had to collect back and recycle 
a certain percentage; b) producers had to pay to the government a tax for their products put on market; c) 
producers have to give a guarantee  on the amount of packaging collected back; d) producers had to prepare 
reports to submit to the government that changed every year based on the product fee (interview 36).   
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Recognising the compliance with the EU packaging requirements as profitable for the 
Hungarian packaging industry, Viszkei was able to convince the other packaging firms to put 
aside the “fierce competition with each other” (as described on the Öko-Pannon web site). 
This meant rejecting the race to individually achieving highest possible profits in the market 
as assumed by the cost/benefit ratio hypothesis. Thus, Viszkei laid down the foundations “for 
the setting up of a system […] which would transfer responsibility from the state to the 
manufacturers” (Öko-Pannon web site). Moreover, by maintaining good relations with the 
industry, Viszkei convinced the heads of it to establish Öko-Pannon, as the vehicle for 
fulfilment of the European packaging recovery and recycling targets. Using the existing EU 
systems as a springboard, Viszkei elaborated a proposal, which was then implemented in the 
form of pilot projects for the Öko-Pannon’s members. Indeed, Öko-Pannon and its pilot 
projects were singled out as exemplars in the Governmental Decree on Packaging of 2002 
which fully transposed the EU packaging legislation in Hungary. No role was played in this 
period by any form of external assistance. 
 
 
3.2.2 From 2002 to 2003: moving from the packaging law “on the books” to its 
implementation compliance 
 
 
The 2002 Governmental Decree on packaging harmonised the Hungarian packaging 
legislation with the European one. The major novelty of the Decree was to have changed the 
product charge to a penalty (interview 34). In fact, the product charge was now considered as 
a “virtual tax” because it was to be paid only in the event that producers and fillers did not 
fulfil the requirements of collection, recovery and recycling of packaging (interview 34). This 
Decree also changed the system of responsibilities of the producers and fillers by adding to 
the direct payment of a product fee the possibility of fulfilling the packaging obligations by 
delegating the obligations to recovery organisations which would organise the collection and 
recovery of packaging upon the payment of a licence fee (interview 26; interview 10). Figure 
4 outlines the system of management and treatment of packaging waste defined in the 
Governmental Decree on Packaging and Packaging Waste of 2002. 
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Figure 4: The Hungarian packaging waste management system  
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waste such as packaging, tyres, accumulators, batteries, waste from electric and electronic 
equipment (hereafter also WEEE) and oils (interview 26). The number of recovery 
organisations varied according to the waste fraction: in some cases they were one or two per 
waste fraction, but some fractions had between five and eight coordinating bodies (interview 
10). Specifically, there were nine ROs for packaging waste, four ROs for WEEE, four ROs 
for accumulators, two ROs for tyres and one RO for vehicle wreck.  
 In the establishment of recovery organisations, the cost/benefit ratio and specifically 
the pursuit of bigger profits on the market have been relevant, especially at first. Recovery 
organisations could obtain a licence for one waste stream only, they then competed on the 
market (interview 34), and after some years the system “became chaotic” (interview 16). The 
main idea behind the establishment of these ROs was that “whatever happens in practice, this 
should not affect the competition” (interview 36). The market, in fact, started “as an anarchy” 
between private companies and ROs, and it was characterised by “big competition” between 
ROs asking for lower levels of licence fees to fulfil their obligations (interview 10; interview 
12; interview 9). Moreover, the establishment of the recovery organisations was considered as 
an “easy” task following only minimum requirements and “almost anyone” could establish 
them, including the recycling companies, the collecting companies and the packaging 
producers and fillers (interview 9; interview 12). 
 However, state actors and firms recognised that the system of delegation to recovery 
organisations could be set up following a different logic. This could be the creation of a 
“collective” system in which the state only needed to deal with a limited number of actors, 
and producers could understand the system (interview 36). Hence, when producers contracted 
ROs they did not have to juggle with waste collection and treatment operations; rather, they 
kept only the take-away obligations. This “collective” system was established in the 
packaging waste fraction where Öko-Pannon, created already in 1996, was also the first to 
officially register as waste recovery organisation in December 2002 and to start its operations 
on 1st January 2003. Soon after the Governmental Decree on Packaging of 2002 came into 
force, Öko-Pannon established itself as a monopolist in the packaging waste fraction 
(interview 34; interview 35; Öko-Pannon Annual Report, 2010). The monopoly of Öko-
Pannon can be explained by two elements: first, the members of Öko-Pannon had already 
voluntarily implemented the pilot projects on which was based on the licence fee system 
established in the 2002 Governmental Decree, which allowed Öko-Pannon members to adapt 
rapidly to the system defined in the Decree. Second, the packaging firms believed that the 
monopoly of a single company was enough for the development of the packaging recovery 
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and recycling system but this company had to be controlled by the biggest packaging fillers, 
who would finance the system and, as shareholders, would also control the charges and 
possible market distortions (interview 34). Although Öko-Pannon was founded indeed by the 
industry and composed of industries, this was balanced by the fact that each of the founders 
had the same number of shares that the statute specified that every member had to be equal 
and that Öko-Pannon could not be dominated by any single industry (interview 34). 
 
In the period between 2002 and 2003, Hungary moved from transposition to implementation 
of the packaging legislation “on the ground”. Having previously participated in voluntary 
pilot projects involving putting EU packaging requirements into practice, Öko-Pannon 
members could enjoy a competitive advantage once the requirements were transposed into 
national legislation. This also strongly influenced the definition of a functioning “collective” 
system and cooperative strategies among packaging firms to attain the European packaging 
recovery and recycling targets. Öko-Pannon then established itself as a monopoly on the 
packaging waste fraction in which the different parties involved in the production, collection 
and recycling of packaging pursued cooperative strategies for the fulfilment of the EU 
packaging requirements. In contrast, firms in other waste fractions still pursued their own 
profits with the consequence of creating chaotic and competitive recovery systems not always 
attaining the EU targets. As demonstrated, also in this second phase, any form of external 
assistance hardly played a role. 
 
 
3.2.3 From 2003 to 2009: transforming the packaging implementation into sustainable 
compliance 
 
 
Soon after the implementation of the Governmental Decree on Packaging with the 
establishment of recovery organisations in 2003, cooperative strategies between government, 
packaging stakeholders and societal actors as well as market incentives interlinked to 
assistance alliances influenced a further improvement in the packaging implementation 
compliance of Hungary which, in 2004, achieved full conformity. These mechanisms also 
enhanced the sustainable compliance of Hungary.  
 The discussions between packaging stakeholders, societal actors and government on 
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the product charge exemptions offer a first clear example of cooperative strategies. According 
to the 2002 Governmental Decree, the system of delegation to recovery organisations was to 
be financed through licensing fees, while the packaging producers who had not attained the 
targets were to pay the product charge (interview 11; interview 9; interview 34; interview 35). 
Moreover, considering that the licence fees was one-tenth (1/10) lower than the product fee, 
when producers contracted ROs they were also obliged to the payment of a percentage of the 
product fee to the government (interview 36; interview 35). This “double payment” deeply 
concerned the business stakeholders, who discussed the topic in the OKT. Discussions within 
the OKT were a way for the government and the Parliament “to check consensus among the 
different fields of the OKT” (interview 23), but also to signal problems. The discussions that 
occurred on the fees to be paid by packaging producers are an example of disagreement 
between the OKT representatives but still of cooperative strategies pursued within this 
advisory body.  
 In September 2003, the establishment of exemptions to the payment of the product 
charge by the producers was firstly “informally” discussed in the Permanent Waste 
Committee and then in the following plenary session (interview 23). During the plenary 
session, a majority of OKT members agreed to change the product charge from a charge to a 
penalty to be paid in the event that specific recovery and recycling targets were not attained, 
and in accordance with the European principle of “polluter pays”. In addition to the majority 
opinion, the OKT approved a minority position in which OKT members from the business 
side expressed their concern about the existence of a dual system of payment for those 
producers delegating obligations to the recovery organisations. These members feared that 
this system would reduce the fulfilment of the European recovery and recycling targets 
because, according to György Viszkei, “under the double system, companies could conclude 
that it is no longer cheaper to join a licence fee system” (BBJ, 2003) and thus prefer to pay 
directly the product fee to the government without fulfilling their packaging recovery 
obligations. These discussions influenced the adoption of the Product Fee Exemption Decree 
(Act No. LXXXIX of 2003), which clarified conditions and limits on the application of the 
product fee to producers delegating their obligations to recovery organisations79. 
                                                 
79 According to this Decree, when producers agreed to the licence fee system they could be individually 
exempted or pay a reduced product fee if they collected and recovered the waste of their products (OECD, 
2008; Öko-Pannon website). In particular, producers within the licence fee system paid the licence fee to the 
ROs and they were exempted from paying eighty-five percent of the product fee but paid instead only 
twenty-five percent of the product fee to the government). If they did not reach the targets, however, they 
had to pay the full amount of the fee and also a penalty (interview 35; PRO-Europe newsletter, 2006). In the 
specific packaging waste fractions, over the years there were also full exemptions for specific items when 
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 Moreover, the cooperative strategies established between producers and the 
government thanks to the mediation of recovery organisations (interviews 34; 36) played also 
a major role in enhancing the implementation compliance of Hungary. In one interviewee’s 
description, ROs “lived together with the producers” (interview 36), but they also directly 
controlled the reports that firms had to annually send to the Ministry of Environment and the 
statistical office on the amount of packaging put on the market (interview 36; interview 34; 
interview 9). Furthermore, when making policy, the government and the Ministry of 
Environment often listened to the proposals of the ROs on ways to further clarify the system 
established in 2002. They typically took seriously the ROs' comments which, representing the 
positions of both the producers and the recycling industry, were considered to improve the 
system from a “practical” point of view (interview 36; interview 34).  
As regards the role played by market incentives, the initial lack of clarification on the 
double system of fees could have had influenced the market incentives that Öko-Pannon 
recognised in fulfilling the EU packaging requirements. In fact, following cost/benefit 
calculations, Öko-Pannon could have lowered its standards for the fear of profit loss. 
However, this did not come to fruition. On the contrary, Öko-Pannon still considered the 
compliance with the European requirements as profitable and continued to enforce the EU 
standards. To fulfil the recycling and recovery targets set in the legislation80, Öko-Pannon 
minimally raised its licence fee each year to cover the costs of the operation, but also 
informed its members of the raises in a timely fashion. The members then considered these 
annual increases as planned costs (interview 34). Moreover, it also favoured cooperation 
between collectors and recyclers by establishing long-term contracts between them which, in 
turn enhanced the possibility of loans from the banks (interview 10). Furthermore, the 
professionalism of Öko-Pannon in organising the packaging system and achieving the targets 
allayed the initial mistrust of the environmental NGOs about the possibility of fulfilling 
packaging recycling and recovery targets through delegation to ROs (interview 34). 
Environmental NGOs such as HUMUSZ began to establish cooperative strategies with Öko-
Pannon and came to recognise that the system established by this RO was the best option for 
achieving the European packaging recovery and recycling targets (interview 34).   
                                                                                                                                                        
producers joined Öko-Pannon (Öko-Pannon Annual Report, 2009). 
80 The targets on reuse and recycling set in the Governmental Decree 94/2002 were amended several times 
with the Government Decree No. 195/2002 (IX. 6.) which established that the reuse and recovery of 60% of 
packaging waste must be reached by 2012. This required the involvement of nearly 60% of the population 
into the selective waste collection systems by 2008 following also the Parliamentary Resolution No. 
110/2002 on the National Waste Environment and Energy Operational Programme (Environment and Energy 
Operational Programme of Hungary for 2007-2013, 2007, p. 127). 
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 Considering its long experience in the packaging waste fraction Öko-Pannon then 
established itself as model for the other packaging firms and in this period was able to further 
increase its shares of the packaging market segment. Since April 2003, it signed contracts 
with one hundred and ninety (190) producers and, at the beginning of 2004, was responsible 
for forty-five percent (45%) of the overall Hungarian packaging waste and financed system 
(PRO-Europe booklet, 2006). These figures further increased to fifty-four percent (54%) in 
2005 and sixty-eight percent (68%) in 2006 (PRO-Europe booklet, 2006). Moreover, the 
number of members among the packaging producers and fillers rose from one hundred sixty-
five (165) on 1st January 2003 to two thousand five hundred and six (2506) on 1st January 
2009 (Öko-Pannon Annual Report, 2009). Furthermore, thanks to the prominence of its 
members, Öko-Pannon was able to establish a stable system of contracts between producers 
and recycling companies and thus achieve good results in the collection, recovery and 
recycling of packaging waste. In fact, already in 2006 it had achieved the packaging recovery 
target of fifty-eight percent (58%) of the packaging waste generated by its members81 (PRO-
Europe booklet, 2006) while in 2009 it “over-performed its objectives and organised the 
selective collection and recovery of more than 325 thousand tons of the 568 thousand tons 
emitted in 2009” in Hungary (Öko-Pannon Annual Report, 2009, p. 3).  
The dominant position of Öko-Pannon in the Hungarian packaging market influenced 
the establishment of assistance alliances with European packaging lobbies which recognised 
it as the main Hungarian target of their initiatives. According to the National Waste 
Management Plan adopted in December 2002, “waste management developments in the 
private sector, including those of the producers [...] are usually financed from preferential 
loans, internal funds or credit” (National Waste Management Plan, 2003). Packaging 
producers and recovery organisations such as Öko-Pannon were involved in knowledge-
based events and initiatives organised by Brussels-based stakeholders’ organisations 
(interview 10). Since its establishment as a recovery organisation, Öko-Pannon has been a 
member of PRO-EUROPE82 , the major international umbrella organisation of thirty-one 
national producer responsibility systems and recovery organisations throughout Europe (and 
Canada).  
Öko-Pannon has exclusively benefitted from the PRO-EUROPE initiatives, 
participating in conferences and workshops in which advice and best practices in the 
                                                 
81 According to the European Directive 2005/20/EC amending Directive 94/62/EC and setting derogations for 
those Members States which signed the accession Treaty in April 2003, Hungary had to recover or incinerate 
with energy recovery 60% as a minimum by weight of packaging waste by 31 December 2012. 
82  For more details on the PRO-EUROPE, see http://www.pro-e.org/.   
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management of packaging waste were exchanged (interview 37). As a member of PRO-
EUROPE, Öko-Pannon was involved in a five-year project consisting in fifty seminars and 
workshops in the Accessing countries on ways to implement the European Packaging 
Directive into national law. NGOs, local authorities and business representatives of all the 
CEE candidates have also been involved in this organisation (interview 3). Moreover, PRO-
EUROPE “stood in close contact with its industry members” to provide them with 
experience, data and know-how and close contacts were also kept through the exchange of 
letters and calls and through further visits to these countries by PRO-EUROPE members 
(interview 3). Unlike what postulated by the transnational communication hypothesis in 
which the sole exchange of information and best-practices between external and domestic 
actors influenced an increase in the implementation compliance, the information exchange 
with Öko-Pannon has resulted as particularly effective thanks to its dominant position on the 
Hungarian market (at first boosted by market incentives) and the cooperative strategies 
enforced in its system between producers, collectors and recyclers.   
 A second example of the role of cooperative strategies established among industry, 
NGOs and government is offered with the analysis of the discussions within the OKT 
concerning exemptions to the payment of the product fee. Following the adoption of the 
Product Fee Exemption Decree in 2003, an on-going dialogue was engaged between business 
representatives and the government on the topic (interview 34; interview 35). Over the years, 
indeed, the business associations were particularly effective in lobbying directly the Ministry 
of Environment on draft legislation 83  (interview 8; interview 13). However, while the 
Ministry of Environment could be lobbied directly by business actors in the legislative draft-
making, it also strongly relied on the broad discussions (and common opinions) between 
private and societal representatives occurring during the plenary sessions of the OKT 
(interview 26). In particular, in the common opinion adopted on 15 January 2004, the OKT 
representatives proposed to cancel the percentage of product fee to be paid by producers 
delegating to ROs because, in their view, this did not oblige the producers to pay for the 
neutralization of packaging waste, and thus it had to be considered as “against the EU 
legislation”. For the OKT members, this system ran counter to the European environmental 
principle of “polluter pays”, but was also considered as “irrational” from an economic point 
of view. Following these discussions, in 2006, Ministerial Decree No. 91 further harmonised 
the Hungarian packaging legislation to the European one by setting the amount of product fee 
                                                 
83 For example, CSAOSZ and IKSZ provided substantive comments and modifications on Hungarian 
packaging legislation (interview 26; interview 35). 
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that producers had to pay annually (interview 26) and clarifying the exceptions on the 
payment of the fee for those producers joining the recovery organisations (interview 13; 
interview 35). 
 
In the period between 2003 and 2009, with the creation of recovery organisations, Hungary 
moved from the implementation of the packaging legislation to defining a system which 
allowed for full compliance performance to be sustained over time. The presence of strong 
business actors recognising a competitive advantage in achieving EU compliance such as 
Öko-Pannon was highly instrumental in this process. Despite the shortcomings in the 
Hungarian packaging legislation, which possibly affected the choice of packaging producers 
to delegate their obligations to recovery organisations, Öko-Pannon reassured all involved 
parties about the costs of recovery and recycling packaging waste and achieved a dominant 
position in the Hungarian packaging market. Furthermore, thanks to its position on the 
packaging waste fraction, Öko-Pannon was the main recipient of external assistance and 
therefore established assistance alliances with international packaging stakeholders such as 
PRO-EUROPE. In this period, the presence of cooperative strategies played also a substantial 
role in the sustainability of compliance. In particular, the cooperative discussions between 
business representatives, NGOs and the government in the OKT strongly impacted 
amendments in the Hungarian packaging legislation, which fully aligned this country with the 
EU packaging legislation and requirements. 
 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
 
 
Beginning in 1999 with a non-compliant performance, Hungary adopted on a gradual basis 
the requirements set out in the European Waste Framework, Landfill and Packaging Waste 
Directives. This culminated in 2009 in the achievement of full conformity and the level of 
sustainable compliance. The process of implementation compliance of the selected municipal 
and packaging waste requirements comprised three phases: from the status quo to the 
transposition into national law; from the transposition to the implementation “on the ground”; 
and sustainability of municipal and packaging waste measures of implementation 
compliance. The transposition of the European municipal waste requirements contained in the 
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European Waste Framework and Landfill Directives into the Hungarian legislation was 
deeply influenced by two mechanisms. On the one hand, the role played by the market 
incentives mechanism involving market penetration by foreign firms strongly impacted the 
definition of a compliant municipal waste management and treatment system in 1995. Taking 
into consideration Caves (1974) and Blomstrom and Kokko (2003), the market incentive 
hypothesis elaborated in the theoretical chapter suggested that more developed foreign firms 
entering less-regulated markets could shape these markets by providing technology transfers 
and regulatory knowledge to their affiliates when recognising profit in exporting their high 
standards. In the case of Hungary, the multinationals entering the market recognised profit in 
providing compliance of their technology and services with EU standards and, since the early 
1990s, they modernised and invested in EU-compliant landfill disposal sites and maintained 
EU standards when providing waste collection services. On the other hand, the role played by 
the cooperative strategies mechanism influenced the definition of stricter and clearer 
principles in Hungarian legislation on municipal waste. Researchers of Europeanisation and 
policy implementation have, in fact, underscored how cooperative and consensual policy-
making positively influenced the development of strategies of cost-sharing, making the 
adoption and implementation of policies more likely (Richardson et al., 1982; Lundqvist, 
1980; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Börzel, 2002; Jordan and Liefferink, 2004). In this period, 
cooperative strategies were particularly established within the National Council on 
Environment, an advisory body to the Ministry of Environment, which brought together 
representatives from academia, business and the civil society organisations.   
 Implementation of the Act on Waste Management which, in 2000, transposed the 
European requirements of the municipal waste dimension was achieved thanks to three 
mechanisms. First, the presence of market incentives where foreign firms recognised a 
competitive advantage in exporting costlier but EU-compliant municipal waste treatment 
technology and machinery instead of lowering their standards upon penetrating the 
Hungarian waste market. Second, the cooperative strategies established between private and 
municipal companies with the creation of joint-ventures and partnerships for the management 
of regional municipal waste facilities. And, third, the role of assistance alliances between 
domestic and external actors in the adoption of PHARE-funded twinning projects and ISPA 
projects on the modernisation and construction of treatment disposal facilities. In the 
theoretical chapter, I referred to the work of Stark, Vedres, Bruszt and Jacoby who analysed 
the quality of assistance in fostering compliance at the domestic level and specifically “the 
capacity of external actors to generate alliances with domestic actors” (Jacoby, 2008; (Stark, 
 122 
Vedres and Bruszt, 2006; Stark and Vedres, 2006; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013). In this phase, 
however, these three mechanisms have not worked distinctively. The market incentives which 
influenced the strategies of foreign companies in exporting EU-conforming standards 
enhanced the sharing of EU-conforming technology and standards when cooperative 
strategies between municipal and foreign firms were established in joint-ventures for the 
collection and treatment of municipal waste. Furthermore, cooperative strategies between 
domestic and external actors have enhanced the establishment of assistance alliances in the 
development of EU-funded knowledge-based and capacity building projects.  
 Full-conformity and sustainability of implementation compliance related to the 
municipal waste dimension were achieved in the period between 2003 and 2009. The 
achievement of sustainable compliance was strongly influenced by the interrelation between 
market incentives, cooperative strategies and assistance alliances. In the 2003-2009 period, 
cooperation was established between stakeholders through the institution of public-private-
partnerships (PPPs) made for efficacious management of joint-disposal facilities, including 
those EU projects funded by ISPA and the Cohesion Fund in Post-Accession. Moreover, the 
sustainability of compliance was also influenced by the fact that foreign firms recognised 
gains in exporting and investing in EU-conforming technology which was then adopted in the 
management of compliant treatment facilities and the re-cultivation of old and obsolete 
landfill disposal sites.     
 As in the case of municipal waste, the Hungarian process of compliance with the 
packaging waste management dimension went through three phases of evolution, with market 
incentives and cooperative strategies playing a major role in all of them. The transposition of 
the European packaging waste requirements, in particular, was influenced by broad 
discussions between the government, various stakeholders from business circles and 
environmental NGOs. These discussions led to an agreement between the parties which was 
then formalised as the 1995 Product Fee Act, the first Hungarian regulation partially 
transposing the EU packaging requirements. From this agreement followed also the 
development of cooperative strategies pursued within the OKT which influenced the adoption 
by the Hungarian packaging legislation of stricter requirements and principles in line with the 
EU Packaging directive through the adoption of the 2002 Governmental Degree on 
Packaging. 
 Furthermore, market incentives were particularly relevant in this transposition phase; 
particularly, in the definition of the Hungarian packaging management and treatment system. 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Vogel (1995) and Vogel and Kagan (2004) refer to 
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the model known as “the California Effect” which proposed that domestic firms, having 
access to better regulated markets, adapted to these stricter requirements and asked their 
governments to enforce them at the domestic level (on this point, see also Bradford, 2012). 
Following the adoption of the Product Fee Act, packaging producers and practitioners 
established Öko-Pannon as the first public utility company in charge of recovering and 
recycling packaging. Moreover, recognising the compliance with the EU packaging 
requirements as profitable, György Viszkei started to explore models found in other European 
Member States that would suit the Hungarian reality, and elaborated one that had producers 
delegating to recovery organisations the recovery and recycling of packaging waste in 
exchange for payment of a licence fee. In 1998, the system elaborated by Viszkei was 
adopted by Öko-Pannon through voluntary pilot projects for its members.  
The 2002 Governmental Decree on Packaging did not refer to specific implementing 
measures but set out the principles for the management and treatment of packaging waste. 
Implementation of European packaging requirements was then measured with the 
establishment of a system to manage and treat packaging waste. The Decree recognised two 
different options that packaging entrepreneurs could follow: payment of a penalty to the 
government or payment of a licence fee to recovery organisations; only in the latter case the 
European recycling and recovery obligations could be fulfilled. In the establishment of a 
packaging recovery and recycling system through recovery organisations the mechanism of 
market incentives played a substantial role. Unlike other waste fractions in which firms 
lowered their standards to be competitive and gain larger profits, packaging firms recognised 
profitability of conformity with EU requirements thanks to early adoption of EU 
requirements through the Öko-Pannon voluntary pilot projects. As a result, Öko-Pannon 
established itself as the largest recovery organisation for packaging and acquired a dominant 
position in the Hungarian packaging market. Furthermore, the system of packaging recovery 
and recycling established in Öko-Pannon was based on cooperative strategies between 
packaging producers and fillers, packaging waste collectors and recyclers for the fulfilment 
of EU packaging requirements.  
After 2003 and establishment of the recovery organisations, Hungary was in full 
compliance with the packaging waste management dimension. The sustainability of the 
compliance has been related to market incentives which made Öko-Pannon recognise profit it 
the compliance with the EU packaging requirements. Acting as facilitator between the 
packaging producers and the contracted collectors and recyclers and enhancing the pursuit of 
cooperative strategies among these actors, Öko-Pannon encouraged producers to fulfil, and 
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sometimes over-fulfil, the EU packaging targets with the reduced payment of a licence fee. 
Considering its dominant position on the packaging market, Öko-Pannon was also the main 
target of initiatives organised by external actors such as PRO-EUROPE with which it 
established assistance alliances for improvement of the Hungarian packaging system. 
Furthermore, the presence of cooperative strategies between business representatives, NGOs 
and the government in the OKT strongly influenced modifications in the Hungarian 
packaging legislation, which further and fully aligned Hungary with the EU packaging 
requirements. 
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Chapter 4 
Poland 
 
 
Poland rapidly followed Hungary in establishing formal relations with the European 
Community, then the European Union. In 1989, Poland joined Hungary in the European 
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and was recognised together with Hungary as a 
beneficiary of the PHARE aid programme. In 1991, Poland signed the European Agreements, 
and on 5th April 1994, a few weeks after Hungary, it formally applied to become member of 
the European Union. According to Professor Balazs, who at that time was the Hungarian 
Ambassador in Copenhagen, after the application to the EU, Hungary and Poland started to 
jointly organise press conferences on the EU accession, while Polish and Hungarian 
Ambassadors specifically got “the same instructions from their capitals of presenting in joint 
initiatives their willingness to become Members of the European Union” (interview 7). In 
1994, Hungary and Poland elaborated what Professor Balazs has termed a “naïve” timetable 
for accession by assuming that the procedure of accession would take only a couple of years, 
starting in 1996 and concluding with their membership in 1998 (interview 7). Nevertheless, 
as Professor Balazs has further noted, Poland and Hungary rapidly realised that the EU 
strategy for the accession of the CEE countries “was not to enlarge to a small group of 
countries from the region but to take together as many countries as possible” which meant 
that “practically Hungary and Poland waited for the rest of the CEE countries to be ready for 
accession” (interview 7).  
 Sharing the leading position with Hungary in relations with the EU, Poland’s 
compliance performance with the European legislation was also marked by similar teething 
problems and delays. In the sector of waste management, and specifically in the 
implementation of the European Waste Framework, Landfill and Packaging and Packaging 
Waste directives, the first Commission Annual Reports documented a weak compliance 
performance that initially was similar for both countries, but with differences growing over 
time. As in the Hungarian chapter, Polish progress in the dimensions of municipal and 
packaging waste management is presented through a chronological analysis over three 
phases, namely from the status quo to law “on the books”, the implementation of the national 
legislation and, lastly, sustainability. Unlike the Hungarian case, however, the Polish 
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performance in the two dimensions does not achieve the condition of “full compliance” and 
thus, in the decade under consideration, it develops only to the phase of transposition of the 
EU requirements in domestic legislation without full implementation.   
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section focuses on the municipal waste 
management dimension. After a revision of the elements of the European Waste Framework 
and Landfill directives that had to be transposed and implemented at the national level, this 
section analyses the two phases which characterised the development of the Polish 
performance: from the status quo to the transposition of the European requirements in the 
Polish legislation, and implementation of national transposing legislation. The second section 
deals with the packaging waste management dimension. After review of the European 
requirements to measure compliance with European packaging legislation, the developments 
occurring in the performance of Poland that saw this country improve from a situation of 
status quo to the transposition and partial implementation of the European packaging 
requirements are pointed out. In the final and concluding section, I summarise the key 
findings that emerged from tracing the process of compliance of Poland in the municipal and 
packaging dimensions which, as in the Hungarian case, will be analysed in detail in the 
concluding chapter of the dissertation. 
 
 
4.1. The Polish process of implementation compliance with the municipal waste 
dimension 
 
 
The municipal waste management dimension considered in this thesis concerns principles 
and requirements defined by the European Union on the management and treatment of 
municipal waste. The key requirement taken into consideration in this dimension deals with 
the concept of “proximity” of disposal of waste from the source of generation of the 
environmental damage. This principle was firstly defined in the Treaty of Rome in article 
174, and further specified in the Waste Framework Directive, in which it was established that 
the disposal of waste was to occur at the nearest and appropriate network of installations (Art. 
5, Directive No. 91/156/EEC and Art. 16 of Directive 2008/98/EC). Moreover, the Landfill 
Directive set standards for the new landfills, those in operation and the ones that had to be 
closed down because old or obsolete. The performance of Poland in this dimension, however, 
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was characterised by few – but still non-compliant – improvements allowing a shift from 
stage 1 in 1999 to stage 2 in 2009.    
 Polish compliance progress in the municipal dimension is analysed following a 
chronological division of its achievements. The first phase covers the period from the 1980s 
until 2001, when the Act on Waste transposing the two European directives was approved by 
the Polish government. This first phase was characterised by limited cooperation between the 
government and Parliament and the stakeholders in the environmental policy-making. An 
exchange of knowledge between Polish policymakers and British experts led to the Act on 
Waste of 2001 which transposed the EU municipal waste requirements in the Polish 'books'. 
Moreover, despite the establishment of consultative environmental bodies, policy-makers and 
the stakeholders preferred more direct, informal and bilateral systems of consultation through 
ad hoc meetings in the Ministry or in the Parliament, where only a limited number of experts 
and interests’ representatives were involved. The lack of cooperation in the policy-making 
process also affected external knowledge-based assistance from European experts who were 
not capable of establishing assistance alliances with domestic stakeholders with the 
consequence that many of the EU-funded projects were delayed. Furthermore, after the 
change from a Communist regime to a market economy, municipal firms and Polish family 
businesses appeared on Polish municipal waste market while foreign firms penetrated the 
market. However, neither the foreign firms nor the Polish family businesses saw profit in 
exporting or adopting the EU higher and costlier standards. Municipal, foreign and Polish 
private firms then followed cost/benefit calculations and adopted low (or lowered) standards 
to be competitive in the market and make bigger profits.  
 The second phase starts from the adoption of the Waste Act in 2001 and the 
subsequent discussions on the National and Regional Waste Management Plans in which 
measures to implement the Act had to be specified. In spite of the approval of the 2001 Act 
and of the National and Regional Plans in 2003 and 2004, the implementation of the 
legislation transposing the EU requirements was only partially completed by the end of the 
period under consideration, i.e. in 2009. In this phase, rational cost/benefit calculations rather 
than market incentives are followed by Polish family businesses, municipal firms and private 
foreign firms resulting in a fragmented market and a fierce competition for bigger shares of 
profit. Moreover, the lack of cooperation among stakeholders in the policy-making process 
further consolidated the development of direct and bilateral contacts with clerks in the 
Ministry of Environment or Members of the Parliament. This lack of cooperation also 
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negatively impacted the establishment of assistance alliances between external and domestic 
actors in carrying out EU knowledge-based and capacity-building projects.   
 
 
4.1.1 From the 1980s to 2001: moving from the municipal waste status quo to the law 
“on the books” 
 
 
During the Communist era, the principles and obligations connected to the municipal waste 
management and treatment had been defined in two legislative measures adopted in 1980. 
The Polish Environmental Protection Act (hereafter also PEPA), adopted in January 1980 by 
the Sejm, the lower Chamber of the Polish Parliament, was the first to rule in a systematic 
way on the protection of the environment and the management of waste84 (Cole, 1995).  
Moreover, the Executive Order on the Protection of the Environment against Waste and 
Maintaining Cleanliness and Order in Towns and Villages, adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in 1980, obliged the owner or operator of a waste disposal site to keep a record of 
the amount and type of waste to be disposed, and it entrusted such owner or operator for the 
after-care of the deposit site (REC, 1996).  
The PEPA and the Executive Order of 1980 recognised the ownership of the 
municipal waste to the Communist state meaning that the management and treatment of this 
waste were responsibility of the state (interview 39). The system of collection and treatment 
during the Communist era was characterised by state waste-collecting companies, managed 
by municipalities, and by the state-ownership of disposal facilities in the vicinity of each 
municipality (interview 39; interview 40). The waste collecting companies were called 
“Municipal Cleansing Companies” (in Polish: Miejskie Przedsiębiorstwo Oczyszczenia, 
hereafter MPOs). Some MPOs had emerged already at the beginning of the century in a 
number of Polish cities (for example, in Cracow in 1906 and in Warsaw in 192785) where 
                                                 
84 Title III recognised the duty of ensuring the protection of the environment that devolved upon economic 
enterprises and persons involved in economic activities. Moreover, in case they polluted, they could be 
subject to economic penalties, sanctions from the penal code as well as administrative fines and fees. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 8, this Act obliged local authorities to ensure the disposal and collection of 
household waste (Cole, 1995) and it also required that waste-generating facilities and individuals took 
measures to reduce waste (Cole, 1995) and to recycle it (REC, 1996). In addition, according to this Act, 
waste that could not be re-used or recycled had to be destroyed or rendered harmless for the environment by 
collecting and removing it in designated disposal sites compliant with environmental protection requirements 
(Cole, 1995). 
85 For further details on the history of the MPOs in the cities of Warsaw and Cracow, see  
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they offered sanitation and cleaning services. Then, they expanded to waste collecting 
services, operating mostly in cities because, at that time, regulations and collecting systems 
had not yet been established in the countryside and small villages (interview 39).  
After the Round Table Talks of April 1989 and the subsequent transition from the 
Communist regime, the management of waste that had been established during Communist 
times changed. The process that brought to the establishment of a system for the management 
and treatment of municipal waste has been characterised by the emerging of a plurality of 
waste-collecting firms which, operating in the same cities, adopted or lowered their standards  
to remain competitive and make higher profits. Following the adoption of the Territorial Self-
government Act in March 1990, which introduced the principle of local self-government, the 
Communist state-owned system of municipal waste collection and treatment rapidly became 
the responsibility and property of municipalities (interview 42). The waste-collecting MPOs 
became municipally-owned, as did the majority of the state-owned landfill sites, while a 
smaller number of sites were privatised into Polish or international ownership (interview 40; 
interview 42).  
In some cases, Polish cities established joint-ventures with private firms. It has been 
pointed out that the phenomenon of joint-ventures in Poland “happened to a lesser extent in 
comparison to the Czech Republic or Hungary” but it involved a number of Polish cities 
(interview 42). The logic followed in the establishment of such partnerships has been 
twofold: in some cases, municipal firms wanted to “attract to the company an active investor” 
who would not only increase the capital of the company but also modernise it, provide know-
how and improve the standards of waste management services (interview 42). In other cases, 
the municipal authorities opted for privatising the municipal companies “as a matter of 
principle” in order to secure adequate standards and capital for the MPOs. In contrast, a 
number of municipalities firmly opposed the selling of buyouts of the MPOs, such as in the 
case of the cities of Warsaw and Cracow. In general, however, the view of the individual local 
authorities prevailed on such decisions, and in many cases these decisions were linked to 
political and economic considerations and cost/benefit calculations (interview 42). 
This period was also characterised by a process of privatization of municipal waste. 
The liberalization and transformation into a market economy, in fact, enabled Polish 
individuals and groups of people to start new businesses including waste management 
endeavours (interview 42). Hence, in the early 1990s, “several hundred” private Polish-
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.mpo.com.pl/o_firmie/historia/ and http://www.mpo.krakow.pl/firma/historia-firmy (available in 
Polish). 
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owned waste collecting companies and family business which started to operate from a very 
small scale emerged (e.g. the ownership of only one truck to collect waste) by offering their 
services in the Polish cities (interview 42). Among these family businesses, BYŚ 86  and 
Lekaro 87  were the most important ones (interview 42; interview 43). As well, foreign 
investors appeared in the Polish market and started to invest in the Polish waste collection. 
Some of these firms started their operations from scratch by setting up their own subsidiaries 
and thus “creating structures to assure them further growth on the market” (interview 42). 
Others acquired buyouts, partial shares or total buyouts of existing municipal waste 
management companies and later set up companies parallel to existing ones. In some cases 
they established joint-ventures with municipal firms. These companies were to a large extent 
from Germany and France, and to a lesser extent, from the Netherlands and Belgium 
(interview 42). The first foreign company to enter the Polish market was the German 
REMONDIS88 which, in 1992 bought partial buyouts of the MPO from the city of Poznan 
and established the joint-venture REMONDIS-Sanitech89. REMONDIS was soon followed 
by the French companies Sita 90  and Veolia 91  (interview 44), which created their own 
                                                 
86 This company was created already in 1976 as a family transportation business and in 1980 it signed the first 
agreement for the transportation of waste with the Central Directorate of the State Rail and purchased the 
first specialized trucks for the collection of waste. In 1993, the family business was acquired by Wojciech 
Byśkiniewicza, and since then the company began its operations under the name of "BYŚ". In 1998 new 
agreements were signed and specialized trucks and machinery to handle waste were bought. Furthermore, in 
2000, in the light of the negotiations for the Waste Act of 2001, BYŚ started to offer the collection and 
export of industrial waste and introduced additional services in the field of waste segregation combined with 
selective collection of waste paper, glass, scrap metal, plastic and wood. For further details on the company, 
see http://www.bys.com.pl/portal/menu/50/historia_firmy.html (in Polish). 
87 Lekaro at the beginning focused on large institutional clients, and in 1992 it introduced a range of services 
for individual clients. Between 1996 and 1999, Lekaro expanded its activities in different areas of Warsaw 
and since 2003, it has collected secondary waste as well. Moreover, in 2007 it created the first plant for 
segregation of waste and in 2009 it purchased specialised machinery which allowed to improve the process 
of classification of recycling materials and gave ability to recovery of a minor faction of waste. The use of 
newly purchased chipper as last element of segregation process resulted in a reduction of the volume of 
residual fractions. For further information on Lekaro, see http://www.lekaro.pl/o-firmie/tradycja-i-rozwoj/ 
(in Polish). 
88 The German company REMONDIS was formed in 2005 when Rethmann AG took over RWE and became a 
large privately-owned German waste management and logistics multinational (PSIRU, 2006). The company 
that later became REMONDIS began running its operations in Poland in 1992. It currently has branches in 
forty-three cities across Poland providing “comprehensive services in the area of collection and 
transportation of all kinds of waste, development, waste sorting, cleaning of streets, roads, and water and 
wastewater” (REMONDIS Polska web page). It also claims to be the market leader in the waste management 
in Poland (PSIRU, 2006). For further information on REMONDIS, see http://www.REMONDIS.pl/rmpl/o-
firmie/remondis-w-polsce/ (in Polish). 
89 The REMONDIS-Sanitech joint venture in Poznan has been the first public-private waste management 
company created in Poland. In 1994, it opened the first modern sorting and recycling plant and in 1998 it 
extended its services to industrial non-hazardous waste collection and treatment. For further details on the 
Remondis-Sanitech joint venture, see http://www.remondis-sanitech.pl/remondis-sanitech-pl/o-
firmie/historia/ (in Polish).   
90 Sita is the waste management division of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, the French water management company 
(PSIRU, 2000). It entered the Polish waste management market in 1992, at the beginning as ASMA, then 
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subsidiaries Sita Polska in 1992 and Veolia Poland in 1994. Moreover, in 1995, Sita Polska 
established a joint-venture with the MPO of the city of Szczecin92 (interview 42).  
Considering a lack of clear recommendations from the government and of a detailed 
legislation, the system established for the management of municipal waste was characterising 
by rising competition between a plurality of waste-collecting companies within a specific 
municipality or city (interview 42). The reasons for the establishment of such a “liberal” and 
competitive system are partially rooted in a fascination for the market economy held by the 
Polish post-Communist political elite (interview 42) but also, from a more practical point of 
view, to the fact that the local governments were entrusted with many responsibilities and, 
despite their initial satisfaction with the empowered local level, they considered the 
management of municipal waste as “just an additional task” (interview 42). However, an 
important motivation stemmed from the strategies pursued by the foreign firms which 
realised that they would gain more from keeping to the status quo “than being regulated from 
the very beginning” (interview 42). In other words, considering the compliance with the EU 
requirements as not profitable but simply following the pursuit of higher profits at lower 
costs, foreign firms lowered their standards when setting up their subsidiaries or when 
establishing joint-ventures to remain competitive and adapt to the less-regulated Polish 
market (interview 44).  
Parallel to the establishment of a competitive system for the collection and treatment 
of municipal waste, Polish government applied to the EU on 8 April 1994. Consequently, the 
Polish government started to amend legislation and define new environmental legislation in 
line with the European acquis. However, the legislative changes introduced in this period did 
not influence a change in the established system. On the contrary, they strengthened the 
competition with the consequence of a further regulatory “race to the bottom” of the 
collecting firms “to remain in the business” (interview 44).  
The first legislative changes affected the Executive Order of 1980 which, in 1996, 
was replaced by a new Act on Maintaining Cleanliness and Order in the Municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                        
with the logo of the ASMABEL company and provided services in the field of maintaining order and 
greenery in towns and communes. Since 2000, SITA has heavily invested in activities related to the 
management of industrial waste. It currently operates in over twenty major cities in Poland, owns fourteen 
waste processing plants, four sorting lines, five landfills and one composting plant. For further details on Sita 
Polska, see http://www.sitapolska.pl/historia.html (in Polish). 
91 Veolia is a French company providing services in the water, energy and waste management sectors. It 
entered the Polish market in 1994. Since then it has operated through its Polish affiliates managing different 
waste streams as well as municipal and industrial pollution problems. For further details on Veolia, see 
http://www.veolia.pl/o-nas/o-nas/veolia-w-polsce/odpady (in Polish). 
92 For details on the joint-venture in Szczecin, see http://mpo.szczecin.pl/?act=ofirmie (available only in 
Polish). 
 132 
(Official Journal of Laws, No. 132, item 622). In this new Act, the municipalities were now 
responsible for the collection of waste by setting up their own waste collecting companies, 
i.e. the MPOs (Jurasz, 1998). However, this new Act also officially recognised the role of 
private foreign and Polish entrepreneurs operating in the waste sector (interview 39). 
According to this Act, in fact, municipalities were now obliged to share the collection, 
transport and treatment of municipal waste with private organisations (interview 39). The 
only requirement was that foreign and Polish-owned companies had to obtain a permit from 
the municipality for their services (interview 39), but it was considered “quite easy” to obtain 
such permits: companies had to fulfil only very broad minimum requirements, and 
municipalities never refused these companies permits (interview 38).  
 Furthermore, the 1996 Act recognised the ownership of waste to citizens and 
households (Jurasz, 1998). Hence, the selection of the waste collecting company was made 
directly by the households, who were obliged to sign a contract with a company and pay 
directly to it the waste collecting service fee, also known as the recycling fee. The contracted 
waste collecting company was then entrusted with taking care of the removal of the waste 
produced by these households and it was also obliged to send information on the contracts 
concluded and submit reports on the management of municipal waste to the municipalities 
(Deloitte, 2011). The collecting companies could establish their own prices for their services 
and, generally, private households selected the waste-collecting companies on the basis of the 
amount of recycling fee to be paid. The removal of waste from households based on 
contractual terms was generally established in the cities while, due to the lack of detailed 
regulations for areas outside the cities, households living in the countryside were not obliged 
to sign any contract, and they commonly dumped their wastes in the forests, roadside areas or 
inland waters (interview 39; Ariaratnam et al., 1996).   
 The selection in private contractual terms deeply affected the system of municipal 
waste management and the strategies of private firms, with the consequence of further 
lowering the waste collection and treatment standards established in Poland (interview 38; 
interview 44).  According to the 1996 Act, municipalities were obliged to organise the system 
of municipal waste collection through MPOs only if in a given municipality other companies 
were not collecting waste from households, but this happened only in few cases (interview 
39). The most common situation, was the emergence of a plurality of waste collection 
companies operating in a single municipality which, considering the direct selection on the 
basis of the recycling fee, now could even compete for the collection of waste in a single 
street (interviews 38; interview 45). Unlike MPOs which, in the late 1990s, were already well 
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established entities with a fifty per cent share of the overall municipal waste collection 
market (interview 42; interview 46; interview 39), private companies had to share the 
remaining part of the market. On the one hand, the strategy pursued by Polish family 
businesses such as BYŚ and Lekaro was to increase their profits and, thus, they focused their 
efforts mainly on trying to attract the highest number of customers within Poland, on 
acquiring bigger shares of the market and on becoming viable competitors. On the other 
hand, foreign waste-collecting companies adapted to the less-regulated Polish system to make 
bigger profits.  
 However, it must be pointed out that at first the foreign firms were against the system 
of direct contracts between households and waste-collecting companies. They were in fact 
“used to the Western Europe systems” based on the public tender procedure in which 
municipalities provided to the infrastructure while private companies “just signed a contract 
with municipalities for the collection of waste” (interview 39). However, after several years, 
they realised they could make more profits with this less-regulated system, “they were 
happy” of it and struggled “to keep the status quo as long as possible” (interview 39). In light 
of the bigger profits that these companies could make by adapting to the existing - non-
compliant – provisions, foreign firms did not recognise profit in the compliance with the EU 
waste requirements. Hence, they did not seek to provide technology transfers or knowledge 
of the EU rules to their subsidiaries (interview 42) but they also lowered the prices of their 
services to remain competitive (interview 44; interview 38). The strategy of pursuit of own 
profits was also influenced by the fact that foreign firms never achieved a dominant position 
on the market to become a sufficient banded group and impose the adoption of specific 
standards (interview 39; interview 42). Rough estimates from the mid- and late-1990s, in fact, 
show that foreign companies had only less than thirty percent (30%) of the Polish waste 
collection market (interview 42) by that time.  
Competition and adoption of low standards also characterised the system of municipal 
waste treatment. The 1996 Act recognised municipalities as responsible bodies of the separate 
collection facilities as well as of the waste disposal sites (Jurasz, 1998; MOS, 2005).  
Furthermore, in 1997, the Act on Waste93  (OJ No. 96 item 592), adopted by the Polish 
                                                 
93 This Act specifically considered the safe disposal of waste into landfill sites by establishing restrictions on 
investments for those infrastructures that did not fulfil sanitary and health requirements, obliging the pre-
sorting of waste and recognising the principle of “proximity” in the disposal of waste (MOS, 2000; 
Luniewski, 2000; Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001). Furthermore, it “opened new opportunities for reduce the 
harmful effects on people and the environment associated with waste generation and landfilling” by creating 
fiscal solutions which could enhance the ability of producers to recycle or re-use the generated waste 
(Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001, p. 92).  
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Parliament to transpose the Basel Convention on the transboundary movement of waste, 
specified that the entity delivering the waste had to pay a landfill tax94 to the disposal site in 
order to discourage the disposal of waste into landfills (MOS, 2000; interview 45). This Act, 
however, did not stipulate whether or not the collected waste in a given municipality had to 
be disposed in specific facilities, nor did it oblige waste collecting companies to dispose of 
the collected waste in the site nearest to the source of waste generation. The Polish legislation 
created an obligation for municipalities to provide facilities for the disposal of waste; as a 
result the majority of the facilities were of municipal ownership (interview 40). However, few 
facilities were also constructed by private firms (interview 38; interview 42). 
As a result of weak regulations on the establishment of a regional system to treat 
municipal waste, municipal and private companies adopted strategies linked to a cost/benefit 
ratio. On the one hand, pursuing highest profits at the lowest costs, private firms selected the 
landfill facility according to their on-site landfill tax (interview 38; interview 40). Generally, 
the nearest facilities were of municipal ownership but farther private facilities generally had 
lower prices and “waste could then be transported for a hundred or two-hundred kilometres to 
the facility offering lower financial conditions” (interview 38). On the other hand, 
municipalities (and municipal firms) with profits in the nearest facilities attempted to impose 
the selection of the nearest disposal site to the waste collecting companies, but several 
Constitutional Court cases ruled against these municipalities. Specifically, the Court stated 
that forcing companies to send waste to certain facilities had to be considered as a distortion 
of the competition among the different disposal sites (interview 38). As a consequence, the 
strategies pursued by municipal firms but also private and foreign companies were 
discouraged from investing in the construction of new and the modernisation of existing 
facilities, as there was no way to oversee the amount of waste treated within each facility, nor 
to estimate the possible profits from its operation (interviews 38; interview 45). 
In spite the attempts to harmonise the Polish waste legislation with the European 
requirements, by the end of the 1990s, the European Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives were not yet transposed in the Polish “books”. It was recognised that the definition 
of “waste” contained in the Act on Waste of 1997 was still very different from the European 
definition (interview 39). Moreover, despite the adoption of other Acts on specific waste95 
                                                 
94 The 1997 Act followed dispositions already defined in the PEPA of 1980 and the Act establishing the 
Ministry of Environment of 1989 on the payment of a fee for the dumping of waste materials (Biernat and 
Wasilewski, 2011). 
95 In particular, the Polish Parliament adopted two Acts on the establishment of a waste classification (OJ No. 
162 item 1135 of 24 November 1997) and the definition of competencies of the public administration in the 
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contained in the two European directives, the Polish legislation was not considered precise in 
transposing the European definitions and requirements (MOS, 2000) and remained 
inconsistent with the European one (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001).  
Impetus for the transposition of the European directives on municipal waste 
management and treatment in the Polish legislation came from two initiatives in which 
mostly state actors had been involved. The Polish government took the initiative by deciding 
on “updating the 1997 Act” with the precise aim of fully transposing the EU waste acquis 
communautaire (interview 39). In 1999, a small group of people from the Environmental 
Protection and the legal and administrative Departments of the Ministry of Environment was 
appointed with this objective. After few weeks of work, however, the group recognised that 
“all the provisions of the Act had to be changed” (interview 39). Parallel to the “upgrading” 
operation within the Polish Ministry of Environment, a twinning project with the British 
Ministry of Environment and particularly the Department of Waste Management (hereafter, 
DEFRA) was formulated. This aimed at strengthening the Polish Ministry’s capacity to 
implement the European waste legislation (project No. PL9806.01). The majority of the 
activities, however, were focused only on the literal transposition of the European definition 
of “waste” contained in the European Waste Framework directive into the Polish legislation 
(interview 39; interview 47; interview 48; interview 42). Thanks to collaboration with British 
experts, the group within the Ministry in charge of “upgrading” the Polish legislation realised 
that it was easier and quicker to define a new Act to transpose the European waste 
requirements, concepts and principles. In 1999 this group started to draft a new Act which 
was sent for comment to research institutes, business representatives, NGOs and other 
ministries in early 2000 (interview 39). The draft was then positively evaluated by the 
Commission for European Integration for its compliance with the European provisions 
(Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001) and submitted to the government and then to the Parliament for 
discussions (interview 39). 
In April 2001, the Act on Waste (OJ No. 62 item 628 of 27 April 2001) was adopted 
by the Parliament and entered into force in October of the same year (interview 39). The Act 
set out the main waste management rules, the definition of waste and waste operations and 
the rules for the treatment of waste such as waste incineration and disposal into landfills. 
Additionally, it established the principles of governing waste management in order to protect 
human health and the environment, and it required that waste whose generation that could not 
                                                                                                                                                        
management of non-hazardous waste (OJ No. 106 item 668 of 24 February 1998).  
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be avoided be recovered or recycled, neutralised and landfilled. It also required the selection 
of the option of disposal into landfills only for wastes which could not be disposed of in any 
other way (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001). Moreover, it set the division of competencies between 
national and local authorities, the obligations for the waste holders and waste carriers, the 
penal provisions in case of bad management of waste and the fines and permits systems 
(Czepieł, 2013).  
This Act, however, did not change the system of municipal waste management and 
treatment. Within this process of legislative harmonisation, the Polish government attempted 
to change the competitive model of municipal waste collection and treatment that had been 
established in the early 1990s. For the Polish government it was in fact clear that the 
extremely liberal market had to be changed in light of the EU accession, and a group of 
experts within the Waste Management department of the Ministry elaborated a draft 
(interview 39). This draft was blocked, however, by various private Polish and foreign firms 
who, fearing profit loss and higher costs, lobbied the government and successfully achieved 
the maintenance of the existing competitive and less EU-conforming system (interview 39). 
Figure 5 summarises the system established by the 1996 Act on Maintaining Cleanliness and 
Order in the Municipalities, the 1997 Act on Waste and the new Act on Waste adopted in 
2001 as well as the actors that operated within a single municipality. 
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Figure 5: The Polish municipal waste management system  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key: 
 
            Fees (waste collection and landfill facility)                                             Municipal waste flow 
            Permits 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
The transposition of the European Waste Framework and Landfill directives with the new Act 
on Waste of 2001 was strongly influenced by the discussions that had taken place between the 
Ministry's experts as well as by the twinning with DEFRA. In achieving transposition, 
however, neither assistance alliances between external and domestic stakeholders nor 
cooperative strategies among state actors and various stakeholders occurred. Instead, the 
 
Local governments 
 
Polish owned collecting firm  
(e.g. BYŚ) 
 
MPO 
 
Foreign waste collecting firm 
e.g. Sita Polska, Remondis 
 
Municipal sorting plants and  
Waste disposal sites 
Private sorting plants and  
Waste disposal sites  
e.g. Remondis, BYŚ 
 
 
Private households; offices 
 138 
DEFRA knowledge transfer and exchange of best-practices was provided only at a peer-
ministerial level while discussions in the Ministry involved only a limited number of experts. 
Nevertheless, since the early 1980s Poland had established environmental consultative bodies 
in which more broad discussions and cooperative strategies between stakeholders could have 
occurred. In fact, following the creation of the Solidarity movement and of independent 
ecological groups such as the Polish Ecological Club96 (in Polish: Polski Klub Ekologiczny, 
hereafter also PKE), in 1981, the Communist government established the State Council for 
Environmental Protection (PROS).  
 Characteristics of PROS may explain weak cooperative strategies in the Polish 
environmental policy-making. First, the appointment of PROS' members. PROS was initially 
created as an advisory body to the prime minister, who directly selected and appointed the 
members among the representatives from the regional administrations and the academics and 
scientists dealing with different sectorial environmental issues (interview 41). In 1990, PROS 
became an advisory council to the Minister of Environment, and this implied that the 
Minister of Environment had to consult this body before any decision, but he/she was also 
directly in charge of the members’ selection97 and required them to prepare positions and 
opinions only upon his/her direct request (interview 41). Second, the effectiveness of PROS 
activity in the Polish environmental policy-making. The official goal of the PROS was to 
handle all crucial environmental issues, and for this task it was established that the Ministry 
of Environment strictly cooperated with the Prime Minister. On the ground, however, it was 
perceived as a “political move” and thus constituted “political propaganda” of the regime 
(interview 41). Throughout the years of PROS, the Environmental Ministers used this body 
as a way “to have some social support to unpopular decisions” (interview 41). The real reason 
for such a body, in fact, was to “substitute and feign social consulting of environmental law 
and action” (interview 41), meaning that the advice and comments provided by PROS rarely 
had a strong impact on the Polish legislation98.  
                                                 
96 Additionally to the Polish Ecological Club, there were also the Ecological Movement of Saint Francis (Ruch 
Ekologiczny Świętego Franciszka z Asyżu) created by the Catholic clergy with the aim of developing the 
environmental information (Hicks, 1996), the group “I prefer to be” (Wolę Być) which organised ecological 
camps for young people and the group Liberty and Freedom (Wolność i Pokój) characterised as a pacifist and 
anti-military movement. The Communist regime attempted to channel the environmental movement through 
the creation of the Patriotic Movement for the National Rebirth in 1982 and, within this, the Social 
Ecological Movement in 1986. 
97 It happened, for example, that the Deputy Chairperson of PROS, Professor Tomasz Winnicki suggested to 
the Minister of Environment around twenty names, twelve of whom were appointed, the rest directly 
selected by the Minister accordingly to political motivations (interview 41). 
98 For example, in the 1990s, there were Parliamentary discussions on the construction of the first atomic 
power plant in Poland. PROS was involved in these discussions and advised to continue the investments for 
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 In addition to consultations at the ministerial level, there existed the possibility of 
consulting different non-state actors and experts at the parliamentary level99. During first 
reading100 of a draft law, individuals invited by the MPs and stakeholders could participate in 
the parliamentary committee discussions101 (interviews 49; 43; 50). Within the parliamentary 
committees, the Committee on the Environment Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry 
in the Sejm (OSZ) and the Environmental Committee of the Senat have particularly dealt with 
issues related to waste management as well as with the control of the compliance with the 
requirements of environmental protection and monitoring. Different stakeholders 102  could 
participate to the public hearings of the OSZ and of the Environmental Committee, or send a 
letter stating their positions which would have been read and discussed in these Committees 
                                                                                                                                                        
the construction of such plant. Nevertheless, the Minister and the government did not take into account its 
opinion and the plant was not constructed (interview 41). On other occasions, PROS provided some critical 
advice on small scale legislation concerning, for example, investments potentially in conflict with the 
environmental protection and it has been successful in promoting the construction of the water dam in 
Czorsztyn which prevented a big flood in 2001 (interview 41). 
99 The internal regulation of the Sejm of 1992 recognised the importance of public consultation in terms of 
discussion and information and exchange of different opinions (Art. 31, par. 3, Resolution of the Sejm of the 
Republic of Poland, 1992). These provisions were also underlined by the revised version of the Sejm internal 
regulation of 1998, according to which, any draft legislation had to be accompanied with a justification 
which should have resulted from these consultations (Art. 27, Decree of the Marshall of the Sejm, 1998 and 
the Decree of the Marshall of the Sejm, 2002). Further, in 2005, it was defined a specific regulation on the 
act of lobbying in the Ministries and the Parliament which, for the first time, set specific rules to the 
lobbying activity in Poland. For more details on the lobbying system established in Poland and on the Law 
adopted in 2005, see http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/przeglad.nsf/xWgRokuAng/2010/$File/ps4_2010_eng.pdf. 
100 The first reading usually took place at a plenary sitting of the Sejm or at a sitting of a committee having 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proposed bill. This first reading included justification of the bill by 
its sponsor, a debate on the general principles of the bill, questions of the deputies and response of the 
sponsor. Following this phase, there is the second reading at a Sejm sitting and included the presentation of 
the committee report on the bill to the Sejm and, subsequently, carrying out a debate during which other 
motions and amendments may be submitted. Moreover, there is also a third reading of a bill which took 
place at a Sejm sitting. The deputy-rapporteur could present an additional report of the committee or, if the 
bill has not been referred to the committee, the amendments submitted during the second reading. 
Subsequently, the deputies voted in a certain order on the submitted amendments and motions, either passing 
or rejecting them. For details, see http://opis.sejm.gov.pl/en/procesustawodawczy.php. 
101 These committees were auxiliary bodies of the Sejm which dealt with “the examination and preparation of 
matters falling within the remit of the Sejm’s work” (Sejm web page). The composition of each Committee 
was established at the beginning of the Sejm's term and the distribution of seats between MPs was defined on 
the basis of their political affiliation and accordingly to “the principle of representation of all deputies’ 
clubs” in proportion to their political size in the Parliament. Parliamentarians belonging to the same political 
group created their parliamentary "clubs" within the Sejm and the Senate. These “clubs” played an important 
role in the legislative system because most of the bills and the legislative amendments were brought to the 
Parliament through these clubs. For further details, see http://en.polska.pl/The,Legislative, 
Authority,387.html.  
102  The Sejm internal regulation recognised the possibility for experts and stakeholders to participate and seek 
opinions during the Committees sessions’ (Art. 42). Moreover, the Senate’s internal regulation recognised 
the possibility to the chairmen of the committees to request the preparation of opinions and to invite experts, 
representatives of groups and organisations interested in the subject of a committee's work (Art. 60). 
However, there existed a distinction among the stakeholders invited to the Parliament: the non-registered 
stakeholders who could participate in the Committees sessions without an invitation were entities such as the 
Chambers of Commerce (e.g. KIGO, PIGO, KIG and OIGR in the waste sector); the registered lobbyists 
were, instead, experts and representatives from business associations and also private people and members of 
NGOs who had to be invited by the MPs (interview 50).  
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(interview 50).  
Despite the existence of arenas of policy-making discussions, the number of 
stakeholders participating in these years in the Polish environmental policy-making on draft 
laws was small and this discouraged the establishment of cooperative strategies between 
environmental stakeholders and the state actors. On the contrary, because changes in the 
legislation generally occurred when direct contacts and bilateral meetings were established, 
stakeholders preferred to lobby directly the Ministry of Environment and the MPs to achieve 
preferred policy options. An example is the strict relationship established during the 1990s 
between the pro-environment NGOs and ministries’ clerks or MPs which culminated in the 
participation of representatives of the environmental NGOs 103  in the drafting of the 
Environmental Protection Law adopted on 27 April 2001 (interview 51). In this period, a 
specific unit within the Ministry of Environment was established that was responsible for 
cooperation with environmental NGOs (Jendrośka, 1998), but this unit was managed on a 
personal level, and information was given mostly when direct contacts between employees 
from the Ministry and NGOs were established (Jendrośka, 1998). For example, the PKE was 
invited often and collaborated with the Ministry of Environment and the Parliamentary 
Committees on environmental issues. This is so because of personal relations between 
members of the PKE and clerks from the Ministry of Environment or Members of the 
Parliament (interview 53; interviews 51; interview 77; interview 52). Likewise, the group 
Green Mazovia from the Mazovia Region was involved in bilateral discussions on specific 
requirements in the municipal waste system and promoted campaigns and initiatives in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Environment (interviews 44; interview 54; interview 39).  
 
In the period from the 1980s until 2001, Poland pursued the transposition of the European 
requirements concerning the management and treatment of municipal waste. This objective 
was accomplished only because of bilateral and peer-cooperation between experts in the 
Polish Ministry of Environment and the British DEFRA. The lack of broad cooperative 
strategies between state actors and stakeholders in the Polish environmental policy-making 
                                                 
103 The Polish Environmental Law Association (or PELA) participated to the discussions on the Environmental 
Protection Law as representative of the Polish environmental movement (interview 51). A report by the 
Regional Environmental Center defined PELA “as the first independent organization of environmental 
lawyers in Central and Eastern Europe” (REC, 1996, p. 21) established since 1987. The PELA served “as a 
center for information, education, research and publishing in the fields of environmental law and policy” 
(REC, 1996, 1996, p. 21). Moreover, the PELA's Environmental Law Information Service, provided “free 
legal counselling to NGOs and the public” and “established itself as an important part of the ecological 
movement in Poland” (REC, 1996, p. 21). 
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influenced the establishment of bilateral and direct contacts in the process of consultation of 
draft legislation, which was preferred by stakeholders to the existing wider consultative 
bodies at the ministerial and parliamentary levels for discussing draft versions of 
environmental legislation. Moreover, the establishment of a system of municipal waste 
management and treatment was highly influenced by cost/benefit ratio in the achievement of 
higher profits at the lowest costs. On the one hand, private foreign firms did not recognise a 
competitive advantage in exporting costly EU-conforming standards when setting up 
subsidiaries or establishing joint-ventures with municipal firms, but adapted to existing lower 
standards. On the other hand, Polish family businesses strived to become viable competitors 
on the Polish market and, as such, did not recognise a competitive advantage in adopting 
costly EU-standards and lobby for their adoption at domestic level. Finally, also municipal 
companies (MPOs) pursued profit-oriented strategies. Owning most of the nearest landfill 
disposal sites managed by MPOs, municipalities lobbied the government to force waste-
collecting companies to use only their disposal sites. However, they were not successful 
because of strong opposition from private firms.   
 
 
4.1.2 From 2001 to 2009: the difficult implementation compliance of the Polish 
municipal waste law  
 
 
The 2001 Act on Waste contained measures for its implementation. First, it introduced the 
concept of regionalisation of waste management and required the preparation of regional 
waste management plans every four years. Second, it required the creation of “an integrated 
and sufficient network of installations and equipment for recovery and disposal of waste” 
(Art. 14, par. 1). The accomplishment of these measures and the overall implementation of 
the Act, however, have been characterised by problems and delays. As a consequence, in 
2009, the implementation compliance of Poland was still not-compliant and the two 
implementing measures not fully adopted. 
 In article 14, the 2001 Act established the development of waste management plans 
with the aim of achieving “the objectives determined in the state ecological policy” and 
implementing the European directives on waste in preparation for the EU membership 
(National Waste Management Plan, 2002). By 2002, the National Waste Management Plan 
 142 
was adopted by the Polish Parliament 104  and focused on the achievement of “the tasks 
necessary to ensure integrated waste management in the country” (Grzesik, 2005, p. 705). 
However, the 2001 Act on Waste also specifically referred to the definition of regional and 
local waste management plans, which had to be prepared by the regional and local authorities 
(interview 52; interview 55). These plans had to monitor the situation of waste management 
and treatment at the regional and local levels. Hence, the localization proposals of new waste 
treatment facilities and modernisation of old facilities had to conform to these plans (Grzesik, 
2005). However, while the Polish legislation set the deadline for the adoption of regional 
plans for the end of June 2003, by that time only three of the existing sixteen regions had 
defined the plans; the rest were adopted only by April 2004 (Grzesik, 2005).  
 The delayed regionalisation of waste management through the adoption of regional 
waste management plans was partly connected to the “immense undertaking” of the public 
administration reform of the late 1990s, which concerned administrative, political and fiscal 
decentralisation and territorial reorganisation. Since the end of the 1990s, Poland had been in 
the process of reforming its administrative structure. The Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland of 2 April 1997, together with a number of Acts105, reduced the number of regions 
from forty-nine to sixteen and created the level of counties. These new administrative levels 
were entrusted with duties previously under the responsibility of the central government. 
New responsibilities were then delegated to the regions, which now became responsible for 
the definition and enforcement of the environmental law at the regional level, and the 
counties which were now in charge of the implementation of the environmental law at the 
county level. Moreover, these new administrative structures had to ensure the implementation 
“of those aspects of the acquis” which fell within their competencies (Fact sheet of project 
No. 2000/IB/OT03), among which there was the adoption and implementation of regional 
and local waste management plans. At the beginning of the 2000s, the initial outcomes of the 
administrative reform resulted in many ways as “unmet goals and unintended 
                                                 
104 The need for a rapid definition and implementation of a national waste management plan was specified in 
the Act No. 100 item 1085 of July 2001 (Act on the Adoption of the Environmental Act, of the Act on Waste 
and Amending Certain Acts adopted at the end) which, at article 31 set the date for the adoption of the 
National Waste Management Plan to 31 October 2002.  
105 In particular, the Counties Self-government Act of 5 June 1998 (Official Journal of Laws No. 91 item 578), 
the Regions Self-government Act of 5 June 1998 (Official Journal of Laws No. 91 item 576), the 
Government Administration Sectors Act of 4 September 1997 in its uniformed text of 1999 (Official Journal 
of Laws No. 82 item 928), the Act establishing a three tier territorial division of the country of 24 July 1998 
(official Journal of Laws, No. 96 item 603) and the government administration in Voivodeship Act of 5 June 
1998 (Official Journal of Laws No. 62 item 627).  
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consequences106” (Kerlin, 2002, p. 2).  
 To upgrade the capacity and capabilities of these new administrative structures, in 
2000, the European Union adopted a technical assistance twinning funded by PHARE with 
the aim of strengthening the acquis implementation at the regional level (project No. 
PL2000/IB/OT03). However, the lack of alliances established between domestic and external 
actors hampered its effectiveness. In particular, the twinning had the precise objective of 
developing the skills of the authorities at the county and municipal levels in the 
implementation of the EU acquis as well as of ensuring “the sustainability of these efforts” 
(Fact sheet of project No. 2000/IB/OT03, p. 2). Nevertheless, a Polish report on the ex-post 
results of the technical assistance financed by PHARE in the years 2002-2004 documented 
problems in the outcomes of this project. Specifically, this Report highlighted the irregular 
and non-systematic knowledge of the projects by the Polish managing authorities, and noted 
that only a small number of actors were engaged in specialised workshops and seminars 
promoted by the EU.  
 Following the 2000 twinning project, in 2001 the EU Commission approved a new 
project aimed at strengthening local administrative capacity in the environmental sector with 
particular reference to the definition of local and regional waste management plans (project 
No. PL 01/05/07). The EU recognised that the Polish local environmental authorities were 
small units, generally under-staffed and with limited resources. They feared that they would 
not been able to develop waste management plans without external assistance (project fiche 
No. PL 01/05/07). Furthermore, the EU underscored “a lack of adequate training and 
practical experience” as well as a lack of guidelines and models to be followed (project fiche 
No. PL 01/05/07, p. 2). Hence, according to the plan of the project, the twinning would firstly 
include a period of technical assistance and training of personnel from cities and rural 
counties and staff from the Marshall and Regional Offices. Secondly, these trained staff and 
personnel would transfer their knowledge to municipalities by organising seminars and 
workshops with the aim of developing three waste management plans at provincial level, nine 
waste management plans at municipal level and one waste management manual (Financing 
Memorandum, 2001).  
 European reports clarified that while properly designed, the 2001 twinning was 
                                                 
106 According to Janelle Kerlin, in fact, the process of decentralisation occurring with the administrative reform 
was not completely enforced and “a number of functions […] remained centralized limiting the scope of new 
sub-national governments”. Moreover, the poor funding at these levels did not improve the services, with the 
unintended consequence of an “increased disparity in services across urban and rural areas” (Kerlin, 2002, p. 
2). 
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riddled with problems and failed to achieve its objectives (EC, 2005; EMS, 2004). The lack 
of assistance alliances between domestic and external actors has particularly influenced the 
lack of a clear identification with the project by the local authorities, which did not get 
sufficiently involved in the management of the programme (EC, 2005). In other words, the 
efficiency of this twinning was limited by inadequate cooperation between external and 
domestic actors in the phases of programming, planning and implementation, and also to the 
insufficient exchange of information between the domestic actors at central, regional and 
local levels (EMS, 2004). Furthermore, while beneficiaries at the central and regional levels 
“were usually well prepared for the absorption of the EU funded assistance”, the beneficiaries 
at the local level were “often not prepared to cooperate with the EU structures” (EMS, 2004, 
p. 7). European interviewees particularly emphasised the lack of “chemistry” established 
between the European and the local actors in the development of the projects, with the result 
that local authorities did not sufficiently cooperate with the European partners for the 
development of the twinning (interview 56). Moreover, the lack of a “long-standing 
cooperation” between Polish authorities and European experts hampered the sustainability of 
the twinning also with respect to “securing twinning partnership” (EMS, 2004).  
 The second objective for the implementation of the Act on Waste of 2001 was the 
creation of “an integrated and sufficient network of installations and equipment for recovery 
and disposal of waste” (Art. 14, par. 1). As in the case of the regional and local plans, external 
assistance from the EU played a crucial role in addressing this second aspect, and between 
2000 and 2004 the EU Commission approved eight projects funded by ISPA on the 
modernisation and construction of municipal waste sorting and treatment plants107. From the 
beginning, however, these projects were marked by problems and delays. Some projects 
contained errors in the projects submitted to the EU Commission for approval 108 . For 
example, the first project proposal submitted to the Commission to receive ISPA funding 
from the city of Cracow (No. 2000/PL/16/P/PE/005) contained out-dated data on the 
circumstances and scope of the project. Errors such as this pushed the project start date to 
2007 (interview 57; MRR, 2007), and continued to riddle the planning phase of ISPA 
                                                 
107 The first Polish cities to submit projects to the European Commission were Cracow, Wrocław and Dolina 
Redy i Chylonki near Gdynia in 2000. Furthermore, in 2001 and 2002, the cities of Łódz, Radom and Kalisz 
also submitted three projects to modernise their solid waste treatment plants. Moreover, in 2004, the cities of 
Leszno and Toruń submitted to the Commission projects on the realisation of municipal waste management 
plants. 
108 According to the EU funding procedure, in fact, the beneficiaries of ISPA had to submit their projects to the 
Commission to be approved and, at the end of the funding period, they had to have achieved all the declared 
objectives, otherwise the Commission could block the last instalment or, in the worst case scenario, could 
ask back all the EU funding of that project (interview 55).  
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projects109.  
 Delays in other EU-funded projects were linked to financial aspects such as the co-
financing of the European projects which uncovered a more broad problem linked to the 
pursuit of higher profits. Given the availability of the EU pre-Accession funds, many Polish 
municipalities prepared a large number of project proposals to submit to the Commission. 
Nevertheless, the local authorities and municipalities had financial difficulties and generally 
could not contribute entirely to the co-financing (interview 57). Many of the approved 
projects were then “frozen”, to be implemented after the accession with the anticipated 
availability of the Cohesion and Structural funds (interview 58). In other cases, Polish 
municipalities established a network of beneficiaries of ISPA funds and created a number of 
associations of municipalities 110  to cover the costs of co-financing and manage EU-
conforming joint treatment facilities111. The rationale for the selection of the joint-facility was 
linked to a cost/benefit ratio. Municipalities and municipal firms, in fact, generally selected 
the joint-facility location in areas where, among the various waste-collecting companies, 
municipal firms had the biggest shares of the market and made bigger profits. In this way, 
they guaranteed that the joint-facility would receive enough waste to cover its construction 
costs (interview 59). In many cases, however, the competition in the number of existing 
treatment facilities (interview 38) and the common practice of illegal dumping of municipal 
waste by households (Tojo, 2008) did not allow to the EU-conforming joint-facilities to 
receive enough waste to cover the costs of operation. As a result, municipalities which could 
have had invested in new and EU-compliant facilities through ISPA were discouraged from 
applying for EU funds because of the uncertainties in making profits that would allow the 
covering of the costs of constructing EU-conforming facilities (interviews 45, 59, 58).  
                                                 
109 For example, projects proposed by the cities of Kalisz, Leszno and Toruń between 2002 and 2004 
(respectively No. 2002/PL/16/P/PE/030, No. 2004/PL/16/C/PE/035 and No. 2004/PL/16/C/PE/023) 
contained errors in the application procedure and had to be changed (interview 56). These projects were 
prepared correctly according to Polish legislation, but when the European auditors went on-site and checked 
the projects, they found systemic errors linked to the tender procedure documents for selecting the 
contractors. These were not ready when the project was submitted to the Commission for review (interview 
55). In the case of Kalisz, in particular, as a consequence of the weak tender evaluating system, there were 
problems in obtaining building permits and the selected contractor had to be changed (EMS, 2004; MRR 
Report, 2007).    
110 These associations included the Union of the Polish Metropolis, the Union of the Rural Municipalities and 
the Union of the Cities (interview 39; interview 77; interview 57).  
111 For example, in the implementation of the ISPA project in Doliny Redy i Chylonki near Gdynia (No. 
2000/PL/16/P/PE/002), soon after the approval by the Commission, the municipality realised that did not 
have enough investments for co-financing and the project was blocked. Then, in 2005, the association of 
municipalities “Eko-Dolina” took over the construction of sorting waste facilities and green waste 
composting and the ISPA project was finally implemented. For further details on Eko-Dolina, see 
http://ekodolina.pl/text_pages/historia-zakladu,49.html (in Polish). 
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Parallel to the establishment of associations of municipalities, the European 
Commission has favoured the development of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) between 
municipal and private waste-collecting companies to overcome the problems of co-financing 
the modernisation and construction of EU-conforming waste treatment facilities (interview 
56). Nevertheless, Poland has been “running late” in the development of PPPs for the 
management of joint waste treatment facilities 112  (interview 60). Reasons for the scarce 
development of PPPs in Poland113 were partly linked to a lack of management expertise of the 
Polish municipalities at the local level (interview 73). However, the main reason was a lack 
of trust in the private counterparts of the PPPs. Municipalities were, in fact, generally not 
willing to establish PPPs with private firms because they feared that their partners could be 
involved in corruption cases (interview 61), or because they feared that private firms could 
find ways to profit more from the partnership114 (interview 73). 
In many cases, however, delays in the establishment of EU-compliant waste disposal 
facilities in Poland were influenced by the lack of market incentives in the extremely 
competitive system of municipal waste collection and treatment (interview 59; interview 58). 
For example, in 2002, the Commission approved an ISPA project to be developed in Radom 
concerning the development of recycling and education activities (No. 
2002/PL/16/P/PE/034). The project aimed at establishing a system for the collection of 
batteries in the schools, and it was based on the idea of creating a similar collection system in 
different parts of the city (interview 57). The success in the outcome of the project was then 
linked to the cooperation between different collecting companies in the adoption of higher 
EU standards. However, the lack of market incentives and specifically the recognition of 
profit in the compliance with the EU requirements did not allow for any harmonisation of the 
system, and the project was implemented only with delay (interview 57). Similarly, the lack 
of cooperation among waste-collecting companies created an overcapacity of treatment 
                                                 
112 Only one attempt has been made in the water management sector by the city of Poznan (interview 57). This 
project was submitted and approved by the Commission and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development for the grant in 2000. Shortly before the municipal elections of 2001 and the official signing of 
the contract, however, the project fell apart because, according to interviewees, it was probably “too 
politically ambitious for that time” (interview 57) 
113  Since 2011, there was another attempt to create a PPP in Poznan in the waste sector but even if the contract 
had been signed, there were many delays in starting the project (interview 44; interview 74; interview 62). 
For further details on the recent PPP for the waste-to-energy project in Poznan, see 
http://www.eib.org/epec/resources/poznan_case_study_eu_funds_in_ppps_public.pdf.  
114 It has been recognised by the EU Commission that the definition of such PPPs in the CEE countries could be 
a difficult task or, at least, not always straightforward (interview 56). As a matter of fact, before and 
immediately after the EU accession, in many CEE countries had been common that many private 
multinational companies signed contracts with small municipalities to create partnerships but such contracts 
were defined only to favour the private partners and increase their profits (interview 56). 
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facilities in some regions (interview 42). For example, in the 1990s, the city of Bydgoszcz in 
the region of Kujawsko-Pomorski sold its municipal company to a foreign firm, which built 
its own sorting plant. After several years, however, a new local administration decided to re-
establish the municipal waste-collecting company and applied for EU funding for the 
construction of a treatment facility in the same area of the already existing private one 
(interview 42). The existence of an overcapacity and of weak Polish regional waste planning 
did not influence the recognition of profitability in the compliance with the EU requirements 
but rather discouraged many international firms from investing in the construction or 
modernisation of treatment facilities compliant with the EU requirements (interview 44; 
interview 50).  
In the early 2000s, the government realised that with the EU accession Poland would 
not be able to fulfil the EU objectives and would have to pay fines to the Commission and the 
ECJ (interview 42). The primary problems concerned the fulfilment of the Landfill Directive 
requirements on the disposal facilities. The majority of the disposal installations were 
municipally owned but over the years foreign companies had established their own facilities 
as a result of total buyouts of MPOs or, in a few cases, because they constructed new 
facilities. Moreover, mindful of the fact that the Polish waste market would grow with the EU 
accession, in the early 2000s foreign companies intensified their presence in Poland and 
increased their shares of the waste collection and treatment market (interview 42). At the 
same time, these companies strongly lobbied the Polish government to keep the competitive 
system “intact”, assuring the government that they would provide enough capital to build 
sufficient compliant disposal installations to enable Poland to reach the EU disposal targets 
(interview 42). Nevertheless, this “did not come true” and the government soon saw that the 
foreign private sector was “not performing on its own premises” (interview 42). In fact, 
foreign firms generally did not recognise the compliance with the EU requirements as 
profitable and only few invested in compliant waste treatment facilities, the rest lowered their 
standards in the construction and modernisation of waste treatment facilities or selected 
landfills with a lower landfill tax and lower standards (interview 38). 
In 2003, realising the need to change the competitive system of municipal waste 
collection in light of the EU accession, the Polish government proposed an amendment to the 
Waste Act of 2001 which would have favoured municipalities (interview 42). However, this 
attempt was blocked during the third voting in the Parliament by the strong lobby of private 
waste collecting companies. Shortly after the adoption of the Waste Act of 2001, in fact, 
associations of waste collecting companies were created to lobby on the implementation of 
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the Act. Foreign firms had been “wise enough to not separate from the few local private 
companies” in this lobbying effort (interview 42) and created associations together with 
Polish family businesses. At the same time, municipal waste collecting companies, favouring 
the establishment of a system based on public procurement and the tendering procedure (for 
the selection of collecting companies and treatment facilities within a municipality), started to 
organise themselves in lobbying associations (interview 42). In 2003 two chambers of 
commerce were established, which operated as lobbies: the Polish Chamber for Waste 
Management (Polska Izba Gospodarki Odpadami, hereafter PIGO) and the National 
Chamber for Waste Management (Krajowa Izba Gospodarki Odpadami, hereafter KIGO). 
PIGO was established with the assistance of Dutch and German waste collecting companies 
operating in the country (interview 4) and was composed of one hundred forty-five 
companies of international or Polish private ownership115. In the same year, municipally 
owned waste-collecting companies established KIGO which grouped one hundred thirty-five 
municipally owned enterprises116. The effective lobbying of these two Chambers representing 
the two edges of discussion did not encourage the development of cooperative strategies in 
the development of a compliant system of municipal waste collection and treatment. 
Contrariwise, due to this lobbying the preference for market liberalisation and competition in 
the waste collection system prevailed until recently (interview 39; interview 42). 
Despite efforts to establish a regional planning and management of municipal waste, 
at the eve of the EU Accession, in early 2004, Poland still had not approved regional waste 
management plans and provided to the construction of regional integrated networks of 
disposal installations. The Polish government, in particular, was concerned with the situation 
of the non-compliant landfill disposal sites (interview 42). To resolve this problem, after the 
EU accession, Polish municipalities applied for Cohesion and the Structural funds, and the 
number of EU-funded projects concerning waste management increased from eight to forty-
six (interview 62; interview 55). In parallel to the ISPA projects, which continued to be 
implemented117, municipalities resubmitted many of the “frozen” pre-Accession projects to 
receive funding from the Cohesion Fund118 (interview 58; interview 55) which now mostly 
                                                 
115  For further information on PIGO, see http://www.pigo.org.pl/index.php?p=111.  
116  For further details on KIGO, see http://www.kigo.pl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article 
&id=99:o-nas&catid=44:o-nas&Itemid=85 (but available only in Polish). 
117 According to the Annual Report on the Cohesion Fund for the year 2009, Poland had not yet closed any of 
the eight ISPA projects on waste in 2009. For more information, see Table 4 at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0589&from=EN.   
118  For further detail on the projects approved and financed by the Cohesion Fund, see 
http://www.pois.gov.pl/WstepDoFunduszyEuropejskich/Documents/LPI_POIS_VIII_10_eng.pdf.  
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focused on the establishment of Regional Municipal Waste Treatment Installations (in Polish, 
Regionalna Instalacja Przetwarzania Odpadów Komunalnych, hereafter RIPOK). The 
RIPOKs included the construction of new composting and mechanical and biological 
treatment facilities as well as the modernization, closure and after-care of old landfill disposal 
sites (interview 63; interview 62; interview 74). 
Existing associations of municipalities and new associations were established with the 
specific goal of managing a number of RIPOKs, generally owned by the Council of 
municipalities that grouped the different associations of municipalities (interview 42; 
interview 55). These associations, however, were obliged to guarantee a constant amount of 
waste to be treated and disposed in each RIPOK, so as to cover the costs (interview 42). 
Nevertheless, as in the case of the joint-facilities in the pre-Accession period, municipalities 
which could have invested in new and EU-compliant facilities were not encouraged to 
construct of a large number of RIPOKs because of their inability to secure the streamline of 
waste into a specific facility and make profits to cover the costs (interview 59).  
A second obstacle to the successful establishment of integrated systems for the 
management of municipal waste was linked to an overcapacity of waste treatment facilities. 
In a number of Polish regions, in fact, RIPOKs or alternative sorting plants built and 
managed by municipal firms co-existed with private landfill and composting installations 
(interview 42). The lack of cooperative strategies between waste-collecting companies and 
individual firms' cost/benefit calculations in the regional planning and management of 
municipal waste had two implications: first, a number of RIPOKs lacked sufficient volume of 
waste to cover their costs and operate efficiently. This problem occurred in different Polish 
regions such as in Małopolskie in the south, in Warmińsko-Mazurskie in the north and in 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie in the centre (interview 42). Second, in the regions in which RIPOKs 
were not established, municipalities invested in sorting facilities by constructing alternative 
plants (interview 61). Nevertheless, the small size of these plants did not allow them to 
become “regional” infrastructures and receive EU funding (interview 61). Neither they 
received investments from private firms. Private firms, in fact, did not recognise profit in 
investing in costly EU-compliant technology considering the cheap disposal of waste into 
landfills. Therefore, they did not invest in these small sorting and recycling facilities which, 
in recent years, have been struggling to stay open (interview 42; 61).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 The problematic compliance with the European waste requirements was influenced 
too by the lack of cooperative strategies in the environmental policy-making discussions. 
Polish stakeholders, in fact, preferred bilateral contacts in the consultations on waste 
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legislation. While the environmental NGOs were gradually less consulted at the ministerial 
level and they started to direct their activities on the implementation of EU waste 
requirements to the local level 119 , the channel of unofficial consultations has been 
increasingly used by representatives from local authorities, associations of municipalities and 
representatives of the business sector. Representatives of the local authorities have 
established direct channels with politicians and have been able to effectively lobby120 the 
Minister of Environment and, in some cases even the Prime Minister or the President of the 
Republic who could ultimately veto the legislation adopted by the Parliament (interview 39). 
The business sector has also participated in these unofficial consultations in which members 
from KIGO and PIGO were individually invited and consulted in the Ministry of 
Environment (interview 49).   
The preference for direct contacts also characterised the discussions on waste 
legislation at the parliamentary level. In particular, before the discussions in the 
parliamentary committees and between the first and the second reading in the Parliament, it 
was common practice for many stakeholders and experts to be invited to unofficial meetings 
around the Sejm121  or in the “Clubs” in which Polish Members of the Parliament from 
specific political parties discussed the draft law or changes in the legislation  
(interview 43; interview 64). The associations of municipalities have been very active at the  
parliamentary level122, especially by participating in the discussions within the committees 
and subcommittees in the Senate and the Sejm. However, as in the case of the ministerial 
consultations, in recent years, business representatives have become the main interlocutors of 
the Parliament in comparison to the academic environmental experts (interview 43) or the 
environmental NGOs (interview 51). This can be attributed to the common practice of 
business stakeholders of lobbying at the parliamentary level by directly approaching the MPs 
                                                 
119 For example, PKE members advanced campaigns on the modernisation or closure of old landfill sites and 
against the construction of incinerator treatment plants (interview 52). Moreover, the Mazovian Branch of 
the PKE lobbied the local authorities for integration into the regional and local waste management plans the 
concepts of reduction, neutralization and recycling of waste, including the reduction of biodegradable waste 
sent into landfills. These plans have been adopted by the majority of the Polish regions from 2007 and the 
PKE has participated in the implementation of these plans offering also educational programmes to citizens 
and local authorities (interview 52).   
120 For example, municipalities and associations of municipalities have been particularly effective in lobbying 
for the provision of European funds (mainly Structural Funds) and, afterwards, for the construction of 
treatment facilities such as sorting or incineration waste-to-energy plants in different cities in Poland 
(interview 42; interview 77).  
121 Interviewees have generally referred to these meetings by calling them as the “Wiejska meetings” which took 
place in a building situated in Wiejska Street, next to the entrance of the Sejm.  
122 Self-governments and municipalities were often invited to parliamentary discussions because, as elected 
bodies, they could claim the political support of the people (interview 49; interview 39; interview 50; 
interview 44).  
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(interview 49; interview 50). Many lobbyists from the business sector or representatives from 
KIGO and PIGO have, in fact, gone directly to the MPs to discuss draft legislation, preferring 
this informal type of consultation to the public consultations in the Ministry of Environment 
or in the Committees in the Parliament (interview 50). As a result of this informal but 
common practice, many cases of political corruption in the Sejm involving MPs and different 
business stakeholders were identified and prosecuted over the years123.  
Considering the lack of cooperative strategies given the stakeholders' preference for 
direct contacts, the environmental advisory body PROS has played only a marginal role in the 
Polish environmental policy-making. On some occasions, PROS provided critical advice to 
the Minister on small-scale legislation concerning investments potentially in conflict with the 
environmental protection124 (interview 41). Moreover, members of PROS were often invited 
by MPs to present their opinion as experts on different environmental issues in the OSZ and 
the Environmental Committee in the Senate (interview 41). However, the Minister of 
Environment left only a small role in the decision-making process to PROS. As a 
consequence, PROS then started to promote its own initiatives and statements on 
environmental issues, which, however rarely concerned the advancement of waste legislation 
towards the EU requirements125 (interview 41). A rare example took place in March 2009 
when PROS members supported the efforts of Minister of Environment Maciej Nowicki to 
improve the Polish implementation compliance of the European waste legislation. In this 
case, the Minister and PROS cooperated in the discussion for a change in the Polish waste 
legislation 126 . Nevertheless, lacking a broader cooperative strategy in the environmental 
policy-making and broad discussions on environmental policy drafts, PROS was not able to 
influence any substantial modification of the system of municipal waste management, nor did 
 
                                                 
123 For more details on the corruption cases in the Sejm, see 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy%20activity%20interface2006/143%20
_2006_-if-rep%20jasie.pdf and also 
http://www.againstcorruption.eu/uploads/rapoarte_finale_PDF/Poland.pdf.   
124 During the years between 2001 and 2006, in particular, PROS was engaged in the adaptation of the Polish 
environmental legislation to the European one. 
125 For an overview of the agendas of the discussions on municipal waste, see for example http://ekorozwoj.pol. 
lublin.pl/no8/n.pdf and http://ekorozwoj.pol.lublin.pl/no7/n.pdf.  
126 By that time, PROS expressed the need for a clear division of competencies between the government 
departments as regards waste management issues, with predominance given to the Minister of Environment. 
Moreover, it also recommended the adoption of essential “EU organisational and logistical principles” in the 
management of municipal waste in Poland through better regulation of the ownership of waste, the 
responsibilities of local authorities as well as the mechanisms for an efficient management such as the 
introduction of higher fees for the disposal of waste. PROS then emphasised the need for the removal of 
these systemic obstacles in order to introduce the remaining elements which would bring Poland into full 
compliance with the European municipal waste legislation (PROS, 2009). 
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it play a substantial role in effectively upgrading the Polish implementation compliance with 
the EU requirements (interview 39; interview 41).  
 
In the period between 2001 and 2009, Poland undertook the delayed and never completed 
implementation of the 2001 Act on Waste. As we have seen, external assistance to Poland 
through knowledge-based and capacity-building projects had been promoted by the 
Commission since the early-2000s. However, the extremely competitive system for waste 
collection and selection of municipal waste disposal sites deeply affected the outcomes of this 
assistance, as well as the strategies of municipal and private companies involved. On the one 
hand, not recognising a competitive advantage in achieving conformity with EU requirements 
(market incentives) and focusing solely on the pursuit of immediate profits, private 
companies were disincentivised from investing in compliant technology, exporting EU 
standards and building compliant or modernising existing disposal infrastructures. On the 
other hand, the lack of cooperative strategies and specifically the distrust between municipal 
and private companies negatively affected the creation of PPPs for financing the construction 
of regional joint-facilities, creating an over-capacity of infrastructures in many Polish regions. 
The existence of weak cooperative strategies between stakeholders was further influenced by 
the establishment of direct contacts at the ministerial and parliamentary levels, which were 
preferred to broader discussions in the existing consultative bodies and committees. As a 
matter of fact, policy-making consultations and discussions have only bilaterally involved 
some stakeholders, to the exclusion of others. It follows that the lack of cooperative strategies 
negatively affected the establishment of assistance alliances in the adoption of EU-funded 
assistance projects. Moreover, the lack of cooperative strategies and of market incentives 
further exacerbated the permanence of a competitive waste collection and treatment system 
which did not allow Poland to effectively implement and comply with the European 
municipal waste requirements by 2009. 
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4.2 The Polish process of implementation compliance with the packaging waste 
dimension 
 
 
The packaging waste dimension focuses on the key concept of “polluter pays” and 
specifically on the principle according to which producers of specific goods are responsible 
for the after-care of these products. As mentioned in the explanandum chapter, the “polluter 
pays” principle was first defined in Article 174 of the Treaty of Rome, and then in Article 15 
of the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive. Moreover, this Directive regulated the 
setting up of systems for the collection, return and reuse of packaging waste as well as 
establishment of economic measures to encourage the fulfilment of the prescribed targets. 
The performance of Poland was characterised, though, by delays and shortcomings in the 
decade 1999-2009. As in the municipal waste management dimension, the little progress 
achieved by Poland did not allow it to rise above the sustainable compliance threshold, 
moving from stage 0 in 1999 only to stage 2 by 2009.   
 The dubious achievements of Poland in the process of implementation compliance 
with the packaging waste dimension were measured using a chronological three-phase 
analysis. However, similarly to the municipal waste dimension, in the 1999-2009 decade, 
Poland only achieved transposition of the EU packaging requirements on the Polish “books” 
but failed miserably in their implementation. The first phase covers the period from the 1980s 
to the adoption of the Acts on Packaging and on Duties of Entrepreneurs in 2001, which 
transposed the European packaging requirements in the Polish legislation. In this phase, 
discussions between the government and business representatives in the form of direct 
contacts through lobbies or within the EPR advisory body to the Ministry of Environment, 
influenced the elaboration of a draft of legislation, which was finally adopted by the Polish 
government in May 2001. However, the strategies pursued by packaging firms in the 
legislative discussions follow own cost/benefit calculations, that is, to adopt a legislation on 
packaging waste that would allow high profits at the lowest costs, thus, with low standards.  
 The second phase covers the period from the definition of the national legislation on 
packaging to its implementation compliance which, however, was still incomplete by 2009. 
This phase comprised the establishment of a system that recognised the possibility for 
packaging producers and fillers to fulfil recovery and recycling requirements individually, by 
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paying a product fee or by delegating the obligation to recovery organisations. However, the 
preference for direct contacts between stakeholders and ministry officials or Members of 
Parliament adversely affected strengthening of cooperative strategies. Moreover, the lack of 
market incentives or recognition of profit in the compliance with the EU requirements 
influenced the creation of a wide number of recovery organisations, which competed for 
shares of the packaging collection and treatment market at the lowest cost. The competition 
among recovery organisations encouraged the growth of a number of entities that operated 
only “virtual” recovery and recycling of packaging waste to avoid costs, thus fulfilling only 
“on paper” the implementation compliance with the European packaging requirements.  
 
 
4.2.1 From the 1980s to 2001: the transition from the status quo to the packaging law 
“on the books” 
 
 
The problem of packaging recovery and recycling emerged in Poland after the end of the 
Communist regime (interview 39). Until then, packaging and plastic containers were not 
commonly used (interview 39). Nevertheless, the PEPA of 1980 recognised the European 
“polluter pays” principle in a form that obliged the polluting person or organisation to keep 
pollution within the limits set up by law, made the polluter responsible for the damage caused 
and obliged the polluter to pay charges for the use and fines for the illegal use of the 
environment (REC, 1996). In particular, the PEPA obliged the polluter to pay environmental 
charges for the deposit of waste and fines for its illegal deposit. The fees and fines paid by 
polluters were then gathered into the accounts of the National Fund for the Environmental 
Protection and Water Management (Narodowy Fundusz Ochony Srodowiska i Gospodarka 
Wodnej, hereafter NFOSiGW) and the regional and local branches of this Fund127 (REC, 
                                                 
127 In 1989, the NFOSiGW was established as a result of the merging of two existing funds (i.e. the 
Environmental Protection and the Water Management funds). The NFOSiGW was conceived as an 
institution which had structural independence but the Ministry of Environment had supremacy over the 
selection of the Fund's Supervisory Board composed by representatives from the Ministry of Environment, 
other Ministries and representatives from the academics and the business sector. The NFOSiGW, however, 
collaborated with other ministries such as those of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Economic Relations 
and Privatisation, but the cooperation was less formalised than in the case of the Ministry of Environment 
(REC, 1994). This Fund was established as earmarked fund and it was later followed by the establishment of 
funds at the regional level i.e. the Regional Fund for the Environmental Protection and the Water 
Management (in Polish: Wojewody Fundusze Ochrony Srodowiska I Gospodarka Wodnej, hereafter 
WFOSiGW) and at the municipal level i.e. the Municipal Fund for the Environmental Protection and the 
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1996). Despite the recognition in the PEPA, however, this principle was “ill-suited” and 
“meaningless” in a command economy such as existed in Poland at that time, in which the 
main entity responsible for environmental pollution was the same Communist government 
that owned the polluting infrastructures and defined the legislation (Cole, 1995).  
 In the 1980s some elements of selective collection such as deposit and bring-back 
systems for packaging waste and bottles organised at the local level and in small scale were 
also established. There were specifically glass and paper collection systems which were 
financed through the mechanism of bring-back, and the people received basic goods at the 
moment of bringing back the waste to the collection point (interview 42). After the change in 
the regime, however, the selective collection of packaging waste was characterised by a 
“gap” (interview 42). The bring-back systems defined during the Communist era collapsed 
“immediately” after the introduction of a market economy and the withdrawal of the 
Communist subsidies (interview 42). Moreover, until the mid-1990s, Poland did not establish 
any selective systems for the collection of packaging.  These were only introduced at the end 
of the 1990s in the form of recycling stations and recycling programmes in several Polish 
cities for plastics, paper, glass and metal (GIOS, 1998).  
 Furthermore, until the late 1990s, the definition of a specific packaging legislation 
was not discussed. Packaging was then regulated within the general legislation on 
environmental protection (Zakowska, 2008), and packaging waste was considered as a 
component of municipal waste (Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 2004). Also, the lack of 
“processing technologies and the poorly developed selective segregation system” 
(Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 2004, p. 212) and “the lack of organizational and legal system that 
would define sources of financing the selective collection” (Zakowska, 2003, p. 3), meant 
that over eighty percent of packaging waste was disposed into landfill sites. The only 
exceptions were the packages made of hazardous substances which were ruled by a specific 
law on hazardous waste (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001).  
The official preparatory work for the definition of the EPR system in the Polish 
legislation took place between the mid-1990s and the year 2000 (interview 42; interview 65). 
During these years, discussions occurred at two levels both characterised by the 
establishment of only limited cooperative strategies. On the first level, the packaging fillers 
                                                                                                                                                        
Water Management. These funds were modelled on the NFOSiGW and, as the National Fund, received 
revenues from pollution charges (air emission, waste water, water use, waste disposal), penalties for non-
compliance with the environmental legislation and natural resource use fees (REC, 1994) as well as re-
payments of soft loans and allocations from foreign/international institutions (EU questionnaire replies, 
1996).  
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and producers started to discuss the establishment of a system for the collection, recovery and 
recycling of packaging (interview 42). Realizing that the system of packaging waste could 
develop in Poland as in the rest of the EU members, packaging producers and fillers started to 
organise themselves into lobby structures (interview 42) which, establishing direct contacts 
with the government, would be more effective in influencing the upcoming legislation and 
system based on the principle of EPR128. Among these lobbies, a substantive role was played 
by the Polish Industrial Coalition Association for Environmentally Friendly Packaging129 
(hereafter, EKO-PAK) which has taken part in the discussions on the creation of a system for 
the management of used packaging (interview 42; interview 65). The lobbying strategy of 
EKO-PAK regarding the definition of the Polish packaging collection and treatment system 
was influenced by the external assistance received from the Brussels-based association PRO-
EUROPE. Thanks to cooperation between EKO-PAK and PRO-EUROPE in the form of joint 
study trips and conferences, the packaging producers and fillers evaluated models already 
established in Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and the UK and were “quite effective” 
in introducing the knowledge of the EU systems at the national level (interview 42).  
Thanks to the knowledge transfer from PRO-EUROPE but being “anxious” for 
possible outcomes of the designed packaging system, EKO-PAK strongly lobbied the 
government in the definition of the packaging waste management and treatment system 
(Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001; interview 42). At that time, the Polish government was 
evaluating different system established in the EU, including the German system. This system 
forecast a dual system for packaging in which the separate collection system for packaging 
would be entirely financed by the industry. By adopting this system, the packaging producers 
and fillers operating in Poland would have had to entirely finance the collection and treatment 
services for packaging waste (interview 42). However, fearing that its introduction would 
impair the competitiveness of the packaging industry and raise costs, EKO-PAK successfully 
lobbied the Polish government and prevented the introduction of this model in Poland 
(interview 42).  
                                                 
128 In its web site the OECD defines Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) as “an environmental policy 
approach in which a producer’s responsibility for a product is extended to the post-consumer stage of a 
product’s life cycle”. Therefore, the system of EPR is characterised by: (1) the shifting of responsibility 
upstream toward the producer and away from municipalities; and (2) the provision of incentives to producers 
to take into account environmental considerations when designing their products. For further details on the 
EPR definition, see http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/extendedproducerresponsibility.htm.  
129 EKO-PAK was created in 1995 and since then had represented and lobbied for Polish and international 
packaging producers and fillers (interview 50).  
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On the second level, discussions on packaging waste legislation occurred in an 
advisory board. At the beginning of the 2000s, an advisory body to the Minister of 
Environment also known as the EPR Advisory Group was established (interview 42). The 
aim of this body was to get advice and expertise on the EPR system and on how to implement 
the European legislation on the topic in Poland. This Advisory Group was established through 
a Ministerial decree and brought together different actors such as academics from technical 
universities, managers from the recovery organisations and managers from PIGO and KIGO 
(interview 42). Within this body, members were invited to give their opinions on the system 
and advise the government on ways to implement the legal provisions linked to the EPR 
system. However, the EPR Advisory Group proved to have too-large membership, its 
organisation and its discussions quite unstructured. It was based on occasional meetings with 
a large number of participants - usually between forty and fifty people - with different 
interests and promoting competing compliance schemes without any attempt to achieve a 
consensus (interview 42). Furthermore, the government was not officially committed to 
taking into consideration such advices for ministerial decisions (interview 66).  
The strategies pursued by the stakeholders involved in these two levels of discussion 
on EPR legislation aimed at establishing a legislation on the topic at the lowest costs and 
without profit loss. The lobbying by EKO-PAK, in fact, prevented the establishment of a 
system in which the packaging recovery and recycling costs were entirely borne by 
producers. Furthermore, while the goal of the EPR advisory group was to analyse the EPR 
systems already existing in Europe and discuss the best option to be established in Poland, 
this body was instead used as “another platform where to promote each of the members’ 
interests” (interview 42).  
 Nevertheless, influenced by these discussions the Polish government elaborated a 
draft legislation which was voted on May 2001 and entered into force in January 2002 
(interview 42). This legislation consisted of two Acts, one on Packaging and Packaging Waste 
(OJ No. 63 item 638 of 11 May 2001) and the other on Duties of Entrepreneurs concerning 
waste management, product fees and deposit fees (OJ No. 63 item 639 of 11 May 2001). The 
Packaging Act determined the obligations regarding the prevention of packaging waste 
creation and the minimising of its impact (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001); it also established 
specific requirements for the packages and ways of dealing with packaging waste. In fact, it 
obliged entrepreneur manufacturers or importers of packaging to attain recovery and 
recycling targets set in the European Packaging Waste Directive; if they failed to attain these 
levels they were subject to the payment of a product fee. The Act on Duties specifically 
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established the duties of entrepreneurs concerning the introduction of products in packages 
and establishing systems for the collection of the product fee (Zakowska, 2003; Zakowska, 
2008). 
 
In the period between the 1980s and 2001 there was a move ahead in the transposition of the 
European packaging requirements in the Polish legislation. The two parallel levels of 
discussion at the ministerial level influenced such improvements. In fact, the direct lobbying 
of EKO-PAK and the wider but less-structured discussions within the EPR Advisory Group 
provided information on the existing European models. In both cases, the discussions with 
the government (and the Ministry of Environment) involved only representatives from the 
business side. Hence, the transposition of the European packaging requirements was the 
consequence of discussions between government and business representatives which pursued 
cost/benefit calculations and limited assistance alliances provided to EKO-PAK by PRO-
EUROPE in the form of exchange of information and best-practices (transnational 
communication). Contrariwise, we have not seen any specific role played by market 
incentives or by cooperative strategies among stakeholders. 
 
 
4.2.2. From 2001 to 2009: the “virtual” implementation compliance of the Polish 
packaging law  
 
 
The Act on Packaging, adopted in 2001, required the achievement of specific recovery and 
recycling targets for packaging producers and fillers. Moreover, the Act on Duties set charges 
linked to the collection of used packaging. The recovery and recycling targets for packaging 
waste set in these two Acts were subject to changes over the years, and they also allowed 
entrepreneurs latitude in selecting the methods to achieve these targets (interview 42). In 
particular, entrepreneurs could choose among three options: firstly, entrepreneurs could 
achieve the recycling and recovery targets by directly collecting and sending the packaging 
waste to the recycling and recovery plants without paying any fee (interview 65). Secondly, 
they could pay to the Marshall Office an annual product fee as a penalty for not achieving the 
obligations and in this case they were not required to attain the recovery and recycling 
targets. The Marshall Office would then transfer the amount of the fee to the National Fund 
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for Environmental Protection and Water Management (NFOSiGW), then to the Provincial 
Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (WFOSiGW) and finally to the 
municipalities. Thirdly, they could pay a recycling fee to recovery organisations (ROs) in 
charge of the collection and recycling of such waste. These Acts allowed for the delegation of 
the entrepreneurs’ duty to recovery organisations, which would organise on their behalf the 
recycling and recovery of packaging. The recycling fee, paid by the entrepreneurs to the 
recovery organisations would cover the costs for organising the waste collection by financing 
municipalities (and MPOs) or foreign and Polish private waste collecting companies 
(Zakowska, 2003). Moreover, the recycling fee had to cover the ROs' overhead expenses as 
well as subsidise the operations necessary to organise the recycling and recovery of 
packaging (Zakowska, 2008). Its amount was set independently and varied among ROs in 
accordance with the weight of packaging, the level of recycling set for specific groups of 
materials and the recycling rates achieved (Zakowska, 2008). Nevertheless, if entrepreneurs 
individually or through ROs failed to attain the recovery and recycling targets, they were 
subject to payment of the product fee based on the difference between the required and the 
achieved level of recovery and recycling of packaging (Kulczycka et al., 2011). Figure 6 
summarises the key actors and the organisation of the packaging waste management system 
emerged after the two Acts of 2001. 
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Figure 6: The Polish packaging waste management system  
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Source: adapted from Zakowska, 2003, p. 6; Zakowska, 2008, p. 86. 
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The packaging management and recovery system introduced with these Acts was based on 
the UK Packaging Recovery Note (hereafter also PRN) model130 but, according to experts, it 
also significantly differed from it because of the strong competition for the packaging waste 
collection which characterised the Polish system (interviews 42; interview 67; interview 3). 
Furthermore, interviewees concur that the Polish system for packaging recovery and 
recycling was established with the sole initial objective of fulfilling, at the least possible cost, 
the obligations arising from the Packaging Act adopted in 2001 by the Polish Parliament 
(interviews 42; interview 66). Moreover, these Acts had to be amended several times to be in 
compliance with EU legislation, because considered as “not precise” and needed “additional 
interpretation or even correction” (Zakowska, 2003, p. 5). In fact, despite the adoption of the 
Acts at the beginning of 2002, the Polish packaging legislation was still associated with the 
general rules concerning the environmental protection i.e. the Act on Environmental 
Protection of 2001, and concerning the waste management i.e. the Act on Waste of 2001 and 
the Act on Maintaining Tidiness in Cities and Communes of 1996 (Zakowska, 2008). 
Amendments on the packaging law were then adopted in December 2002 (OJ No. 7 item 78 
of 19 December 2002) and further revised in the amending Act of 2003131 (OJ No. 11 item 97 
of 18 December 2003).  
 Soon after the 2001 Acts went into force, problems occurred in the establishment of 
mechanisms to increase the recovery and recycling of packaging (Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 
2004) because of difficulties in the establishment of a system of collection of recyclable 
materials (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001; Kulczycka et al., 2011). The collection and recycling of 
packaging waste developed through two parallel systems: on the one hand, the collection 
system from households for all types of waste considered responsibility of the municipalities; 
on the other hand, the collection of packaging waste from commercial sources considered 
responsibility of the packaging producers and fillers (Kulczycka et al., 2011). Hence, while 
single entrepreneurs and compliance schemes concentrated mainly on commercial packaging 
                                                 
130 The EPR system established in Poland was based on British Packaging Recovery Note (hereafter also PNR) 
approach with, however, a strong focus on competition and the cheapest possible implementation (interview 
3). The PRN is a document that provides evidence that packaging waste material has been recycled and, 
according to the British regulation, “producers of packaging waste are obligated to purchase a number of 
PRNs every year based on the type of their business and the amount of packaging waste they handle”. For 
detailed information on this system, see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/871/contents/made and 
http://www.t2e.co.uk/packaging-recovery-note.html.  
131 These Acts obliged producers, importers and entrepreneurs to collect from salesmen on their own cost the 
packaging of multiple use and packaging wastes of these products. It also obliged salesmen to collect from 
customers packaging of multiple use and packaging wastes of hazardous products and deliver them to 
producers and importers.  
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waste from the shops (interview 3), municipalities collected the packaging waste from 
households but not always did they “proper[ly] divide municipal waste from packaging 
waste” (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 86).  
 The major problems arose for the development of systems of packaging waste 
collection at the municipal level, where low profits and high costs discouraged municipalities 
in investing in them. Municipalities had the responsibility of “keeping their region clean” 
(Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 80) and this implied that they had to finance the selective 
collection of packaging waste through local budget sources. However, the establishment of 
selective collection systems in the municipalities and their costs were “fully dependent on 
market conditions which [were] changeable” (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 82). In general, these 
costs were considered as too high and with low profits for municipalities 132  and most 
communes rapidly concluded that the separate packaging collection “is not […] profitable” to 
invest in it (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 82). Furthermore, considering that the collection of 
waste in municipalities was organised in private contractual terms, local authorities had no 
real responsibility to collect packaging waste from households (interview 3). Moreover, the 
“low prices offered by retail collection facilities for scrap paper or cullet and for returnable 
bottles […] do not make it easy for companies dealing with waste or encourage users to 
reclaim packaging paper and glass” (Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001, p. 95).  
 Therefore, in spite of a recognised “high capacity of recycling companies” 
(Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 89), the “poorly organised systems of recyclables collection in 
individual municipalities, residents’ reluctance to segregate waste and insufficient funds” did 
not encourage the recycling industry to “make the effort” to establish recycling systems 
(Grodzinska-Jurczak, 2001, p. 95). The recycling industry was then “unable to bear the high 
costs of the selective collection” with the result that there was no general interest in investing 
in new EU-compliant recycling technologies (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 95). In other words, 
the Polish recycling industry did not recognise the compliance with the EU requirements as 
sufficiently profitable to invest in costly technology. As a result, the selective municipal 
collection of packaging accounted for only 3% of the total amount of waste collected in 2004, 
and this amount increased to only 8% in 2011 (Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 2004; Kulczycka et 
al., 2011).  
Contrariwise, Poland supposedly fulfilled the recycling levels for packaging when this 
                                                 
132  According to calculations made by Kulczycka et al. for the period between 2004 and 2006, municipalities 
would have received only 1 Polish złoty after having spent 4 Polish złoty for the operation of separate 
collection (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 82).   
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operation was performed “by large institutions using grouped and transport packaging for that 
matter” (Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 2004, p. 212), that is, by packaging recovery 
organisations. The Act on Packaging of 2001, in fact, recognised the establishment of 
recovery organisations to which packaging producers and fillers could delegate their 
obligations of separate collection, recovery and recycling of packaging waste. The first RO 
set up in Poland for the fulfilment of packaging requirements was Rekopol133, founded in 
2001 and in full operation since 2002. Following Rekopol, many other ROs were established 
in Poland such as EKO-Punkt, Polski System Recyklingu, Recal and ISOO Stolica 
(Zakowska, 2008). Differently from the other European systems, the only requirement for the 
establishment of the ROs in Poland was based on the disposition of sufficient initial capital 
by the shareholders (Zakowska, 2003; Zakowska, 2008) and no other practical regulation was 
introduced (interview 42). Moreover, each RO established its own recycling fee which 
corresponded to the main source of profit for the ROs, considering that Poland had only low 
levels of investments for the business sectors (interview 68).  
The system established in Poland was characterised by extreme competition between 
a multitude of recovery organisations, selected by producers on the basis of their recycling 
fee (interview 42). Following own cost/benefit calculations and not recognising the 
profitability in adopting the EU requirements, in the first years ROs strongly competed in 
offering their services at the lowest prices, often disregarding the purpose of environmental 
protection (interview 64; interview 49; interview 65, interview 42). This also resulted in an 
overcapacity of these ROs which dramatically increased from twenty-six (26) in 2004 to 
forty-one (41) in 2007 for the sole packaging waste fraction (interview 71; Grodzinska-
Jurczak et al., 2004; Kosc, 2007). Hence, the system established in Poland was characterised 
by a “competitive liberal market” in which the many recovery organisations competed for 
bigger shares of the market (interview 66; interview 42). According to Andrzej Grzymala, 
Project Manager at Rekopol between 2008 and 2013, the breakdown of the packaging market 
in 2011 shows that Rekopol had a slight majority, with 34% of the market share while the rest 
of the packaging recovery organizations had a market share of between 10% and 15% each 
(interview 67).  
The establishment of a competitive and uncoordinated system for the management 
and treatment of packaging waste from commercial sources was also strongly influenced by 
the lack of cooperative strategies in the phase of policy-making for the Polish packaging 
                                                 
133 For further information on Rekopol, see http://rekopol.pl/english_summary/about_us. 
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legislation. The EPR Advisory Group to the Minister of Environment, itself characterised by 
competition, has not proven to be “effective” in the Polish environmental policy-making. 
Among the members of the group, there were a number of managers of the newly established 
and competing ROs (at that time, only for packaging) who used this forum to promote 
themselves and their interests. Mr Korkozowicz, former member of this body, while 
considering the failure of this group, he primarily pointed to elements linked to an inefficient 
organisation of the meetings and to the lack “of genuine interest from the policy-makers and 
the people in command at governmental and ministerial levels” (interview 42). The policy-
makers from the government, did not instruct the members of the group on the policies they 
intended to pursue, nor did they consider “the implications of putting together different 
interests and positions without providing any kind of coordination” (interview 42). Hence, 
even if policy-makers established such a group as a forum of discussion on EPR, “they did 
not probably think what they could get from it” (interview 42). This advisory body was then 
used as “another platform where to promote each of the members’ interests” (interview 42). 
The EPR Advisory Group was then dissolved without a formal decision in 2003. After the 
Minister of Environment left office134, in fact, the new Minister of Environment “simply 
forgot that this advisory body existed” and the members stopped to be invited (interview 42). 
 The EPR advisory body was soon replaced by direct and bilateral discussions between 
clerks in the Waste Management Department of the Ministry of Environment and the waste 
collecting companies, individual Chambers and packaging associations. In fact, the majority 
of the business packaging stakeholders believed they would “get more” from the policy-
makers if they would “go by themselves and seek their own institutional and associations’ 
interests” (interview 42). Among the industry associations, in particular, EKO-PAK has 
played an important role in promoting the positions of the recovering organisations and the 
producers of packaging and packaged goods (interview 40; interview 69; interview 70). 
Additionally, discussions on waste became very specific, involving single actors representing 
each type of waste which, ultimately, resulted in non-transparent and non-monitored 
discussions between policy-makers and the thousands of producers registered in Poland135 
                                                 
134 During the government of Leszek Miller from the Democratic Left Alliance party which lasted from 19 
October 2001 to 2 May 2004, the appointed Minister of Environment had changed. Stanislaw Zelichowski 
was Minister from 19 October 2001 to 3 March 2003 and he was replaced by Czeslaw Sleziak which was in 
office until 2 May 2004. 
135 The establishment of direct contacts in policy-making also reduced the possibility of a horizontal approach 
for discussion in the development of the legislation connected with the EPR, which covers different products 
such as packaging, tyres, oils and WEEE (interview 42). This has concretely resulted in less transparent and 
comprehensible legislation on the issue, but also in a lack of monitoring by the government. The 
government, in fact, has been reluctant to introduce measures that would impose a strict control over the 
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(interview 42).  
In 2009, the implementation compliance performance of Poland was not compliant 
with European packaging requirements. It has been noted that, when the collection, recovery 
and recycling of packaging waste was operated by the ROs, the required levels of recycling 
for all types of material were considered “not only achieved, but, in a number of years […] 
even significantly exceed[ed]” (Kulczycka et al., 2011, p. 84). However, it has also been 
mentioned that the Polish system has been characterised by terrific competition among the 
existing ROs. To remain competitive with high profits at the lowest costs (and lowest 
standards), several ROs began to operate in dishonest ways (Arcadis, 2008; Kosc, 2007). 
According to a report elaborated by Arcadis (2008), some recovery organisations “have 
offered their services for extremely low prices without taking into consideration the full costs 
of their activities” (Arcadis, 2008). As a consequence of offering services at “rock-bottom 
prices” (Kosc, 2007, p. 1), many ROs enabled the recycling and recovery of packaging “on 
paper only” (Grudzinska-Jurczak et al., 2004). It was common for ROs to sell “virtual 
receipts” which contained false data on the annual amount of packaging waste recycled and 
recovered without real recycling and recovery of packaging (interview 67). The compliance 
reported to the EU on the achievement of the recycling and recovery targets by the ROs was 
then only “virtual” because the economic instruments which would have allowed a real 
compliance were considered “too painful” for the industry (interview 42). Then, while some 
of the ROs tried to do “what[ever] possible to avoid the payment of those charges” (interview 
42), the ROs that followed the rules had difficulty in surviving on the market and covering 
the costs and eventually had to exit from the business (interview 68; interview 44).  
 
In the years between 2001 and 2009, Poland only partially implemented the national 
packaging legislation and did not achieve the sustainable compliance with the requirements 
of the European packaging directive. A lack of market incentives and of cooperative 
strategies among stakeholders strongly and negatively impacted the Polish performance. The 
establishment of a system for the collection and treatment of packaging waste from 
households was considered too costly and unprofitable for both municipalities and private 
companies. As a result, Poland achieved very low levels of recycling and recovery for 
                                                                                                                                                        
recovery organisations (interview 42). An example of such lack of monitoring is that, with the exception of 
Rekopol, which had as members leading Polish and international entrepreneurs and packaging fillers such as 
Coca Cola and Tetra-Pack, many other ROs had as shareholders other entities such as recyclers or physical 
people. In the view of Professor Zakowska, this did not encourage the development of the packaging 
recovery and recycling system in Poland (interview 65).  
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packaging from municipal sources. Moreover, despite the fact that reports have emphasised 
the Polish fulfilment of the EU packaging recycling targets when packaging waste was 
collected and treated through recovery organisations, this system was characterised by 
extreme competition and ROs overcapacity. Consequently, ROs found ways to remain 
competitive working at lowest possible cost and selling “virtual” receipts for the recovery and 
recycling of packaging waste. The establishment of a competitive system among the ROs was 
influenced as well by the lack of cooperation among stakeholders in the process of policy-
making. In spite of the existence of the EPR Advisory Group to implement the EPR system in 
Poland, discussions at the ministerial level mostly occurred through direct contacts between 
packaging lobbies and the government. Hence, cost/benefit ratio calculations by packaging 
stakeholders, the absence of market incentives and cooperative strategies negatively affected 
the Polish achievement of sustainable compliance and full-conformity in the packaging waste 
management dimension by 2009. These factors also negatively impacted the external 
assistance which, as we have seen, did not play any role in this period.  
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4.3 Conclusions  
 
 
Poland implemented only partially the European legislation on the treatment and 
management of municipal and packaging wastes. The little progress achieved from stage 1 in 
1999 to stage 2 in 2009 in the municipal waste dimension and from stage 0 in 1999 to stage 2 
in 2009 in the packaging waste dimension were below the sustainable compliance threshold. 
As in the Hungarian case, the analysis of the progress of Poland in the implementation 
compliance along these two dimensions has been analysed chronologically in three phases. 
However, despite the transposition of the European municipal and packaging requirements 
(by means of the Act on Waste of 2001 for municipal waste and the Acts on Packaging and on 
the Duties of Entrepreneurs of 2001 for the packaging waste), Poland experienced difficulty 
in properly implementing these Acts by the end of the period considered. Hence, Poland did 
not achieve full conformity with the European municipal and packaging requirements as well 
as sustainable compliance.  
 In the first phase of the municipal waste management dimension Poland progressed 
from a Communist state-led system in the late 1980s to the transposition of the European 
Waste Framework and Landfill directive in the Act on Waste of 2001. The achievement of 
this objective was influenced by limited assistance alliances and transnational 
communication. In 1999, the government appointed a small group of experts within the 
Ministry of Environment to revise the Polish waste legislation with the aim of harmonising it 
with the EU requirements. Parallel to this process, the EU Commission approved a twinning 
carried out by DEFRA. Nevertheless, these legislative discussions and exchange of 
knowledge took place only at the ministerial level, limiting the consultation to ministry 
experts and, when involving external actors, peer-experts. Moreover, despite the fact that the 
process of privatisation of the early 1990s enabled the advent of Polish family businesses 
while foreign companies entered the Polish market, neither the domestic nor the foreign firms 
pursued market incentives strategies which recognised profit in the adoption or export of 
costly EU standards. On the contrary, the strategies of these private firms were rooted in the 
cost/benefit ratio and a pursuit of maximisation of profits at the lowest cost, resulting in a 
regulatory “race to the bottom”. Exactly as postulated by researchers of the regulatory 
approach (Rechtschaffen, 1998; Winter and May, 2001) and of enforcement (Olson, 1965; 
Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane; 1986; Yarbrough and Yarbrough, 1992; Bayard and 
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Elliot, 1994; Downs, Roche and Barsoom, 1996; Dorn and Fulton, 1997; Maniokas, 2009; 
Trauner, 2009; Leiber, 2007), stakeholders would act “to maximise profits” and, wherever the 
costs outweighed the benefits, that is, when stakeholders feared profit loss, they would 
always strive to avoid the costly compliance. 
 The second phase of the Polish process of implementation compliance with the 
municipal waste management dimension focused on the implementation of the Act on Waste 
of 2001. Still, delays occurred during this phase and, by 2009, Poland had not yet fully 
implemented this Act. On the one hand, the problems revolved around the development of 
regional waste management plans through two EU-funded twinning projects. As postulated 
by the approaches adopting a constructivist perspective and analysing the circumstances for 
policy transfer (Haas, 1990; Rose, 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Levy, 1994; 
Börzel and Risse, 2000; Holzinger and Knill, 2005; Knill and Lenschow, 2005; Börzel and 
Risse, 2012), referred to in this thesis as transnational communication hypothesis, 
information exchange and mutual learning would have positively impacted a policy change 
(or policy compliance). However, EU ex-post reports highlight that these twinning projects 
were characterised by delays mainly resulting from a lack of assistance alliances between 
external actors and domestic stakeholders which would have ensured the achievement of the 
projects' objectives. On the other hand, the establishment of a network of regional waste 
disposal installations was delayed due to strategies following a cost/benefit ratio and to a lack 
of cooperative strategies which resulted in extreme competition between municipal waste 
stakeholders. In particular, private companies strongly lobbied for the maintenance of the 
existing non-compliant system in which they believed they could make more profits. 
Moreover, the preference towards direct lobbying in the decision-making at the ministerial 
and parliamentary levels and at the expenses of the PROS strongly impacted on the 
perdurance of only partial compliance with EU legislation by the end of the decade under 
examination. 
 Similar to the municipal waste dimension, the Polish implementation compliance with 
the packaging waste management dimension was characterised by problems in the 
implementation of the Acts transposing the EU packaging requirements. In the first phase, 
Poland progressed from weak and locally based systems of packaging selective collection in 
the Communist times to the transposition of the European packaging legislation in the Act on 
Packaging and the Act on Duties of the Entrepreneurs, both adopted in May 2001. The 
achievement of transposition was mostly influenced by cost/benefit ratio and transnational 
communication. Legislative discussions on packaging occurred directly in the Ministry of 
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Environment and the Parliament with the establishment of EKO-PAK, and with the creation 
in the early 2000s of the EPR Advisory Group within the Ministry of Environment. These 
discussions, however, followed the logic of cost/benefit calculations and were limited to the 
business representatives’ members of EKO-PAK and of the EPR Advisory Group. Moreover, 
limited assistance has been provided in the form of knowledge transfer by PRO-EUROPE to 
EKO-PAK which used this knowledge to lobby directly the government.   
The second phase then began with an analysis of the mechanisms which would have 
allowed the implementation of the two Acts adopted in 2001. However, in 2009, Poland had 
not yet fully implemented the 2001 Acts. On the one hand, the lack of market incentives and 
the presence of a logic following cost/benefit ratio hampered the establishment of a 
packaging collection and recovery system in the municipalities for the packaging waste from 
households. On the other hand, cost/benefit ratio pursued by packaging recovery organisation 
influenced the establishment of a competitive system for the collection and recovery of 
packaging from commercial sources. To remain competitive within this system, a broad 
number of recovery organisations began selling only “virtual” receipts to entrepreneurs 
indicating the amount of recycled and recovered packaging waste for the current and the 
following years, while those that followed the rules hardly covered the costs of the recovery 
and recycling operations. Hence, the reported fulfilment of EU targets for packaging waste 
collected and treated by ROs indicated a “virtual” implementation compliance with EU 
packaging requirements. The problematic implementation of the 2001 Acts and the 
competitive system of ROs were also linked to a lack of cooperative strategies in the policy-
making due to the strengthening of direct contacts. The EPR Advisory Group was dismantled 
without a formal decision in 2003. Moreover, the direct lobbying of business representatives 
forestalled horizontal discussions on EPR legislation with other packaging stakeholders. 
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Chapter 5 
Reflections on compliance and its sustainability 
 
 
This dissertation has examined the variation in the implementation compliance of the 
European legislation and in its sustainability in two similarly rule-taking countries, namely, 
Hungary and Poland. Focusing on the implementation of three European directives in the 
sector of waste management, this dissertation sought to explain the observed variation in the 
respective performances of Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, the dissertation has taken 
some distance from the existing studies on compliance with EU legislation and 
implementation “on the ground”. In the explanandum chapter, in fact, the concept of 
implementation compliance was introduced and operationalised. This term was coined by 
merging the word implementation, used by scholars to refer to the phase of concrete adoption 
“on the ground” of the EU directives' requirements at the national and local levels, and the 
word compliance which referred to conformity with a given legislation. In spite of the fact 
that both concepts had been used – and according to Hartlapp and Falkner (2009), also 
misused – in the existing literature, they still remain under-explored. Most of the literature on 
the implementation of EU legislation has analysed the phase of legal transposition of 
European directives and regulations in domestic legislation rather than their actual adoption 
in the Member States. Moreover, to measure the transposition of EU legislation in its Member 
States, scholars have used the ECJ Infringement Database, which contains information on 
“lack of compliance” with specific EU requirements, thus detecting non-compliance rather 
than compliance itself. Hence, by adopting implementation compliance as a key concept, this 
dissertation has aimed at switching the issue of interest from “non-compliance” to 
“compliance” in order to better account for variations over time in the adoption of EU 
legislation. Furthermore, it has attempted to move the study from the stage of “transposition 
in the books” to the one of “implementation on the ground”, contributing to this still under-
explored field of research.  
 Additionally, while attempting to explain the performances of Hungary and Poland in 
the decade that saw them advance from candidates to Members of the EU, this dissertation 
has explored the mechanisms that made the implementation compliance performance of 
Hungary, as compared to that of Poland, sustainable over time. In doing so, this dissertation 
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has gone beyond the analysis of the CEE countries which distinguished between a pre- and a 
post- accession compliance performance. On the one hand, scholars of conditionality have 
honed in on the existence of an incentive structure, which influenced the process of 
approximation with the EU legislation of the CEE candidate countries. On the other hand, 
post-Accession scholars explored the mechanisms “whereby the EU continues to exert an 
influence on the new members 'after conditionality'” (Pollack, 2009, p. 251). The extension of 
the time-frame of analysis has then permitted to explore the mechanisms which not only 
favoured the achievement of compliance with EU legislation, but also those which enhanced 
sustainability in the implementation compliance performance regardless of the EU accession 
incentive. Hence, this extension has allowed the analysis on CEE countries to shift the gaze 
from the mechanisms to achieve EU membership to the mechanisms to achieve (and 
maintain) compliance with the EU legislation, introducing in the study the concept of 
“sustainability of compliance”. 
 The aforementioned consideration of the “sustainability of compliance” after 
accession had important implications for the definition of the explanatory factors developed 
in this dissertation. Building upon Sedelmeier's (2012) concept of institutional lock-in, this 
dissertation has explored the mechanisms that led compliance to be sustainable. The supply-
side prism pointed to state actors supplying compliance, that is, with capacity to transpose 
and monitor compliance. As we have seen in the theoretical chapter, however, supply-side 
mechanisms related to pre-existing capacities and European incentives and threats to 
compliance do not explain variation in the performances of Hungary and Poland which have 
instead been characterised by similar capacities and administrative traditions and similar 
European threats and incentives despite changes in the incentive and treat structure with the 
EU Accession. Nevertheless, supply-side approaches have also considered explanations 
linked to the existence of mechanisms of transnational communication and stakeholders' 
cost/benefit calculations. As such, preliminary studies and empirical data suggest the 
existence of a difference in how these mechanisms operated in the CEE countries which may 
have impacted also the variation in sustainable compliance of Hungary and Poland.  
 Focusing on the sustainability of compliance, the dissertation has also explored 
demand-side approaches which analysed situations in which stakeholders, with capacity to 
hinder or support the supply of compliance, might instead demand actions towards a 
strengthening of compliance. The analysis of stakeholders in the policy making process had 
been already included by George Tsebelis and Europeanisation researchers who, defining 
them as “veto players” implied a negative connotation of these players and a negative 
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correlation between the number of domestic veto players and policy compliance. 
Nevertheless, few works have highlighted the role played by domestic stakeholders in 
“pulling-in” and shaping domestic compliance (Vachudova, 2005; Innes, 2002; Westney, 
1987; Jacoby, 2000). Building upon these studies which challenged the negative implications 
linked to the veto players, in this dissertation I elaborated three hypotheses where 
stakeholders with the capacity to influence incumbents and operating in the implementation 
'on the ground' phase may have been, or may have become supporters of rule-taking.   
 Firstly, I considered the existence of market incentives which could boost the 
adoption of EU requirements in less-regulated markets. I then hypothesised that 
implementation compliance was more likely to occur where private actors recognised a 
competitive advantage, that is, a profit in adopting or exporting stricter EU regulatory 
standards. Secondly, I considered the policy-making process and the relation among 
stakeholders and between stakeholders and incumbents. I then hypothesised that 
implementation compliance was more likely if stakeholders were reassured on the sharing of 
the compliance costs through cooperative strategies. Thirdly, I considered the influence of 
external assistance through European/international knowledge-based and capacity-building 
projects in the domestic implementation compliance. I then hypothesised that the 
implementation compliance was more likely if were created assistance alliances between 
external and the domestic actors. 
 The theoretical chapter features five testable hypotheses to explain the observed 
variation in the implementation compliance and in its sustainability in Hungary and Poland. 
To summarise, these concern: a) transnational communication; b) stakeholders’ cost/benefit 
ratio; c) market incentives; d) cooperative strategies; e) assistance alliances. These five 
hypotheses have then been tested through process-tracing methodology in the two empirical 
chapters on Hungary and Poland. Data has been analysed chronologically in three phases: 1) 
from the status quo to the domestic transposition of the European municipal and packaging 
waste requirements; 2) from the transposition to the implementation of the acts transposing 
the EU legislation; 3) the sustainability of compliance. Tables 3 and 4 summarise the 
improvements and mechanisms that influenced progress from one stage to the other in 
Hungary and Poland in the municipal and packaging waste management dimensions. 
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Table 3: Mechanisms enhancing implementation compliance in the municipal waste 
management dimension 
 
Municipal waste management dimension 
 Hungary Poland 
T
ra
n
sp
o
sitio
n
 
Transnational communication Absent Present 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Present 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Absent Present 
 Transposition outcome Present Present 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
tio
n
 
Transnational communication Absent Present 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Present 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Present Absent 
 Implementation outcome Present Absent 
S
u
sta
in
a
b
ility
 
Transnational communication Absent Absent 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Absent 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Present Absent 
 Sustainability outcome Present Absent 
Note: Poland does only partially achieve the phase of implementation by 2009. 
 
The first phase begins with the analysis of the status quo characterised by a state-owned 
model established during the Communist period and analyses the progress to the transposition 
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of the European municipal waste requirements in the Hungarian and Polish legislation. The 
transposition of the European municipal waste legislation at the national level occurred in 
Hungary with the Act on Waste Management of 2000 and in Poland with the Act on Waste of 
2001. The performance of both Hungary and Poland at the time when transposition was 
completed must still be deemed as non-compliance, despite the fact that the two countries 
slightly differed in their respective stages of sustainable compliance with the EU municipal 
waste requirements (i.e. 3 for Hungary, 2 for Poland). Nevertheless, the mechanisms that 
allowed the transposition of the Waste Framework and Landfill directives in Hungary and 
Poland differed significantly.  
Transposition in Hungary was influenced by the presence of market incentives and 
cooperative strategies. In particular, the Hungarian system and stakeholders rapidly adapted 
to the EU standards because of market penetration by foreign waste collecting companies, 
who recognised profit in exporting costly EU standards to Hungary. Since the early 1990s, in 
fact, the foreign waste companies acquired a dominant position in the municipal waste 
treatment operations by constructing new or modernising obsolete disposal facilities. Their 
position in the market allowed the assumption that their costs would be covered by 
anticipated profits, hence they implemented costly EU technology and also exported the EU 
standards in the collection of municipal waste. Furthermore, cooperative strategies 
established within the OKT influenced the discussion of legislation that would be in line with 
the EU requirements. This arena of discussion, in which business representatives, NGOs and 
academics could discuss the draft legislation, served to reassure the different parties about the 
sharing of the costs, resulting in consensus on the adoption of stricter and costlier EU 
standards.  
 Transposition in Poland has been influenced mostly by transnational communication 
which generated limited assistance alliances. Since the end of the 1990s, the UK Department 
of Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) established a twinning project with the 
aim of strengthening the Polish Ministry of Environment's capacity to implement the 
European waste legislation. This twinning fostered the exchange of knowledge and best 
practices between British and Polish experts and influenced the elaboration of a draft, 
approved in 2001 as the Act on Waste.  However, the assistance arising from this twinning 
was limited to a bilateral exchange of information and knowledge between British and Polish 
experts at the ministerial and governmental level, with the sole aim of transposing the EU 
requirements to the Polish legislation. Moreover, since the early 1990s foreign waste 
collecting companies and family businesses emerged on the Polish waste market that 
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favoured cost/benefit calculations. Not recognising a competitive advantage in adopting or 
exporting costly EU standards, Polish family businesses focused on increasing their market 
share at the lowest possible cost, while foreign companies, to become viable competitors, 
adapted to the existing reality and did not strive to export the EU standards to the Polish 
system.  
 The second phase begins after the transposition of the Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives in the Hungarian and Polish legislation and comprises the implementation of this 
national legislation ‘on the ground’. In particular, the Hungarian Act on Waste Management 
of 2000 demanded the establishment of compliant operating disposal sites and the closure and 
after-care of those old and obsolete. Similarly, the Polish Act on Waste of 2001 required the 
development of national and regional planning through the adoption of National and Regional 
waste management plans as well as of a network of regional disposal installations. In 2003, 
Hungary successfully completed implementation of the objectives contained in the Waste 
Management Act, progressing further towards sustainable compliance. In contrast, Poland 
still struggled with implementation of its respective legislation and by 2009 it still had not 
progressed beyond stage 2. 
The implementation of the Hungarian Waste Management Act of 2000 was influenced 
by three interconnected mechanisms: market incentives, cooperative strategies and assistance 
alliances. In 2000, PHARE financed a survey to acknowledge the number of sites operating 
in Hungary, their ownership and degree of compliance with EU requirements. This survey 
determined that disposal sites constructed or managed by private foreign companies were 
compliant with EU requirements, whereas the majority of municipally-owned sites had to be 
closed or modernised. Foreign companies investing in the treatment of municipal waste, in 
fact, recognised a competitive advantage in exporting the EU standards when building, 
managing or modernising disposal sites. Municipal companies instead applied for EU funding 
to improve their facilities. Despite some problems linked to an initial poor level of municipal 
expertise and poor level of project planning Hungarian stakeholders were able to establish 
assistance alliances with external actors and cooperative strategies. These assistance projects 
had not been limited to the provision of expertise on the planning phase of specific ISPA 
projects, or to the adoption of the Regional Waste Management Plans. Instead, the good 
cooperation established between domestic and external actors allowed, in a number of cases, 
to expand the scope of the project to other environmental and waste issues. Furthermore, 
when cooperative strategies were established in the form of public-private-partnerships, and 
to a minor extent through associations of municipalities, the implementation of the ISPA 
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projects was very effective. 
 The pathway to implementation of the Polish 2001 Act on Waste was riddled with 
problems. In particular, the lack of assistance alliances with external actors, the lack of 
cooperative strategies between stakeholders and in the policy-making as well as the private 
actors' pursuit of strategies favouring the cost/benefit ratio negatively impacted the 
implementation of the European requirements, rendering Poland unable to achieve full 
conformity with the EU municipal waste requirements by 2009. While exchange of 
information and best-practices (transnational communication) was ensured by various EU 
PHARE and ISPA projects, the lack of assistance alliances among Polish and external experts 
and the participation of only a small group of stakeholders delayed the accomplishment of the 
EU projects. Moreover, the lack of cooperative strategies among stakeholders, and 
specifically between municipalities, foreign waste collecting companies and Polish family 
businesses, delayed the implementation of the ISPA projects. Specifically, the lack of 
cooperation influenced the establishment of overcapacity of treatment facilities in a number 
of regions, and did not favour the definition of public-private-partnerships (PPPs) to cover the 
co-financing costs arising from the modernisation or construction of waste disposal facilities 
through ISPA. Furthermore, not recognising profit in the EU compliance but rather the 
pursuit of higher profits at the lowest costs (cost/benefit ratio), foreign and Polish private 
firms were discouraged to invest in compliant but costly technology in the construction or 
modernisation of waste treatment facilities. The lack of cooperative strategies was influenced 
as well by the establishment of direct and bilateral contacts between stakeholders and the 
Polish government, or the Parliament in the policy-making phase. Environmental NGOs and 
particularly waste-collecting lobby associations, in fact, preferred to discuss draft legislation 
outside the arenas of consultation such as PROS or the environmental parliamentary 
Committees by establishing direct and bilateral interrelations with Ministry of Environment 
officials or MPs.  
 Contrariwise, since 2004, Hungary achieved sustainable compliance with the 
European municipal waste legislation (stage 4). The factors that allowed achievement of 
sustainability were assistance alliances, cooperative strategies among stakeholders but also 
the market incentives and the profit recognised by foreign companies exporting EU standards 
in the construction and modernisation of disposal sites. After the adoption of the National and 
Regional Waste Management Plans in the early 2000s, some problems persisted in the 
location of certain disposal facilities and the existence of overcapacity in specific regions. 
These problems were, however, limited to cases in which there had not been sufficient 
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coordination and cooperation among the existing operating concessions. In the majority of 
cases, coordination was achieved through public-private-partnerships. Foreign and municipal 
companies recognised a number of benefits in establishing such partnerships: while 
municipal companies could now avail themselves of foreign capital and internalize EU 
standards exported by foreign companies; those, in turn, had a certainty of return on capital 
invested in the construction and modernisation of these joint facilities.  
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Table 4: The mechanisms enhancing compliance in the packaging waste management 
dimension 
 
Packaging waste management dimension 
 Hungary Poland 
T
ra
n
sp
o
sitio
n
 
Transnational communication Absent Present 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Present 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Absent Present 
 Transposition outcome Present Present 
Im
p
le
m
en
ta
tio
n
 
Transnational communication Absent Present 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Present 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Absent Absent 
 Implementation outcome Present Absent 
S
u
sta
in
a
b
ility
 
Transnational communication Absent Absent 
Stakeholders’ cost/benefit ratio Absent Absent 
Market incentives Present Absent 
Cooperative strategies   Present Absent 
Assistance alliances Present Absent 
 Sustainability outcome Present Absent 
Note: Poland does only partially achieve the phase of implementation by 2009. 
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The first phase begins with the analysis of the status quo characterised by non-existent 
packaging legislation and very few and locally based selective collection systems from the 
Communist era. The transposition of the European packaging waste legislation at the national 
level occurred in Hungary with the Governmental Decree on Packaging of 2002 and in 
Poland with the Acts on Packaging and Packaging Waste and the Act on Duties of 
Entrepreneurs of 2001 which, however, entered into force in the following year. By the time 
of transposition, the performance of both Hungary and Poland was still considered as non-
compliant (i.e. stage 2 for Hungary, stage 0 for Poland). However, the achievement of 
transposition of the European Packaging Waste directive was based on different mechanisms 
for each of the two countries.   
 In Hungary, the first impulse towards the adoption of a specific legislation on 
packaging was a result of the country’s application to become a member of the OECD. 
Recognising the need for establishing a law to transpose the OECD decisions on packaging, 
discussions occurred between the government, environmental NGOs, packaging stakeholders 
and business associations. These discussions were characterised by cooperative strategies 
between parties which led to a preliminary agreement and influenced the adoption of the 
Product Charge Act in 1995. Nevertheless, this Act did not oblige the packaging producers 
and fillers to meet European packaging recovery and recycling targets. Cooperative strategies 
were also pursued within the OKT where discussions occurred between the business 
representatives, NGOs and academics on modifications to the Packaging Charge Act of 1995 
for a full transposition of the EU packaging requirements. Nevertheless, the definition of a 
compliant packaging recovery and recycling system was mostly influenced by the market 
incentives mechanism. In 1996, striving to fulfil the European packaging targets, in the 
absence of relevant Hungarian legislation, thirty-five Hungarian packaging stakeholders with 
a dominant position on the packaging market founded Öko-Pannon which would fulfil the 
EU packaging obligations on their behalf. Moreover, recognising profit in the adoption of 
stringent EU requirements, György Viszkei visited the EU countries to learn about the 
existing models for recovery and recycling of packaging waste and for preparing a draft that 
would fit the Hungarian reality. This draft was then introduced in the form of pilot projects 
for members of Öko-Pannon, who could join the system on a voluntary basis. In 2000, the 
Act on Waste Management created confusion on the packaging objectives to be fulfilled by 
private actors. Business representatives, recognising profit in the compliance with the EU 
packaging requirements strongly lobbied the government for the establishment of clear 
legislation for the management of packaging waste. As a result, in 2002, the government 
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adopted the Governmental Decree on Packaging Waste that fully transposed the EU 
packaging legislation.     
 The transposition of the European packaging requirements in the Polish national 
legislation was driven by discussions that took place between packaging stakeholders and the 
Polish policy-makers. On the one hand, the government and the packaging lobby 
associations, such as EKO-PAK, directly discussed the definition of detailed legislation and 
of a system for the recovery and recycling of packaging waste. Limited assistance alliances 
were also established between EKO-PAK and PRO-EUROPE that provided assistance in the 
form of transnational communication. In parallel to these direct contacts, the Ministry of 
Environment established the EPR Advisory Group with the specific aim of discussing the 
implementation of the EPR system in Poland. However, these discussions involved only a 
limited number of stakeholders, mainly business representatives, which pursued strategies 
strongly based on the cost/benefit ratio and focused on the promotion of their own interests. 
Nonetheless, both levels of discussion influenced the adoption, in 2001, of the Act on 
Packaging and Packaging Waste and the Act on Duties of Entrepreneurs, which transposed 
the EU legislation on packaging. 
 The second phase begins after the transposition of the European Packaging Waste 
directive in the Hungarian and Polish legislation and comprises the implementation of this 
national legislation ‘on the ground’. In particular, the Hungarian Governmental Decree did 
not mention concrete measures for its implementation 'on the ground'. However, by defining 
the system for the management and treatment of packaging waste it required the 
establishment of recovery organisations. The Polish Act on Packaging and on Duties of the 
Entrepreneurs set packaging recovery and recycling targets and the charges to be paid on a 
yearly basis by packaging producers and fillers in the event that they failed to achieve the 
targets. By the time of implementation of the objectives contained in these Acts, the 
performance of Hungary and Poland must still be considered as non-compliant (stage 3 for 
Hungary, stage 2 for Poland). However, while Hungary implemented the objectives in 2003, 
by the year 2009 Poland had still not fully implemented the objectives set in the 2001 Acts.  
 The implementation of the national packaging legislation was influenced in Hungary 
by cooperative strategies among packaging stakeholders, as well as market incentives and the 
competitive advantage achieved by Öko-Pannon members through early adoption of the EU 
packaging system in the course of voluntary pilot projects. Soon after the adoption of the 
Governmental Decree, Öko-Pannon registered as the first recovery organisation in the 
packaging waste fraction which, considering its membership, soon had a dominant position 
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on the packaging market. It then continued to follow its already EU-compliant packaging 
recovery and recycling system as established earlier via its voluntary projects; this system 
was also adopted as model in the 2002 Decree.  Moreover, Öko-Pannon’s establishment of 
cooperative strategies between packaging firms, collecting companies and recycling firms 
influenced the adoption of a 'collective' system which fulfilled the EU packaging targets. In 
contrast, in those waste fractions subject to EPR where packaging stakeholders operated on 
the basis of cost/benefit calculations, the EU targets were not always attained.   
 The process of implementation of the Polish packaging legislation was plagued by 
defects. Collection of packaging waste from households was the responsibility of the 
municipalities which, following cost/benefit calculations and specifically considering the 
high costs in the establishment of such a system and the lack of interest on the part of 
households, implemented only highly imperfect systems achieving low rates of packaging 
recovery and recycling. The collection of packaging waste from commercial sources was the 
responsibility of the newly created recovery organisations which were selected directly by the 
packaging producers and fillers on the basis of a collection fee. Hence, soon after the 
adoption of the 2001 Acts, a wide number of recovery organisations following a cost/benefit 
ratio were created and a “competitive liberal market” was established. This competition was 
influenced too by a preference for direct and bilateral policy-making negotiations. The EPR 
Advisory Group was dismantled and rapidly replaced by direct lobbying of the Ministry and 
the Parliament from business associations. The lack of cooperative strategies among 
stakeholders in the policy-making process had serious policy implications: the absence of 
horizontal discussions on the EPR legislation further strengthened the lobbying for single 
interests, as well as a lack of governmental monitoring. Consequently, Poland was 
characterised by over-capacity in the number of recovery organisations, which either operated 
at the lowest cost and using fraudulent practices by trading in “recycling papers”, without 
fulfilling the recycling and recovery packaging obligations, or followed the rules but then 
struggled to remain in the market. As a matter of fact, by 2009, Poland had still not yet fully 
implemented the European packaging legislation. 
 As against this, by 2004, Hungary achieved full conformity with the European 
packaging legislation and sustainable compliance. This achievement was strongly influenced 
by the market incentives mechanism pursued by Öko-Pannon which, recognising profit in EU 
compliance and having a dominant position in the packaging market, was able to establish a 
stable system for the collection, recovery and recycling of packaging waste and to monitor 
the achievement of the EU packaging targets by its affiliates. Furthermore, considering its 
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position on the market, Öko-Pannon was recognised as the main beneficiary of initiatives 
promoted by PRO-EUROPE with whom it also established assistance alliances. Moreover, 
participation in these European initiatives was not limited to Öko-Pannon; on the contrary, 
Hungarian NGOs, local authorities and business associations participated in activities 
organised by PRO-EUROPE136 (interview 3). In addition, the environmental NGOs such as 
HUMUSZ cooperated with the Öko-Pannon on a number of activities while the government 
took into account its policy proposals and comments. These three-way cooperative strategies 
were further strengthened within the OKT. Since the mid-2000s, the OKT has proposed 
modifications of packaging legislation to further harmonise the Hungarian packaging 
legislation with the EU requirements which further strengthened the compliance performance 
of Hungary.    
 
 
Necessity and sufficiency conditions of the hypotheses and reference to QCA testing 
 
 
The summary of the five tested hypotheses shows differences in the mechanisms that 
influenced, by the end of the period considered, a full-conformity and sustainable compliance 
level in Hungary and a partial conformity and non-compliance in Poland for both municipal 
and packaging waste dimensions. Considering the research question defined at the beginning 
of the dissertation, the process-tracing suggests that explanations for variation in the 
implementation compliance of Hungary and Poland are linked to the presence or absence of 
specific mechanisms. In particular, what emerges from the analysis of Tables 3 and 4 
emphasises that the positive case of Hungary is influenced by the presence of market 
incentives, cooperative strategies and assistance alliances. In contrast, the negative case of 
Poland is influenced by the absence of market incentives and cooperatives strategies, limited 
assistance alliances and mostly by the presence of the two alternative explanations of 
transnational communication and cost/benefit ratio. This analysis, however, does not clarify 
which interaction of these mechanisms influenced the sustainable compliance of Hungary as 
against the non-compliance of Poland.  
 In order to determine the fit between the five hypotheses and the compliance 
outcomes for each phase of the implementation process, I elaborated a QCA truth table and 
                                                 
136 For further details, see http://www.kooperation-international.de/detail/info/itut-internationales-
transferzentrum-fuer-umwelttechnik-gmbh.html. 
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minimisation analysis of the findings for each phase.  For the purposes of the truth table, the 
five conditions derived from the hypotheses considered in the analysis are: 1) transnational 
communication (COMM); 2) cost/benefit ratio (BEN); 3) market incentives (MKT); 4) 
cooperative strategies (COOP); and 5) assistance alliances (ALL). Following a linear 
dichotomy logic, I assigned the value 0 when such conditions were absent and 1 when they 
were present. Such assignment has been done for each phase of the implementation 
compliance process, namely transposition (T), implementation (I) and sustainability (S). 
Table 5 displays this dichotomy. 
 
Table 5:  Cases by explanatory conditions in each stage 
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H-MW 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
H-PW 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
P-MW 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P-PW 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Key: For the cases: H = Hungary; P = Poland; MW = municipal waste; PW = packaging waste. 
For the conditions:  COM = Transnational communication; BEN = Cost/benefit ration; MKT = market 
incentives; COOP = cooperative strategies; ALL = assistance alliances; OT = outcome transposition; OI = 
outcome implementation; OS = outcome sustainability. 
 
 
The table shows that, in the phase of transposition, the lack of negative instances of the 
outcome generates an incongruent image. The presence and the absence of each explanatory 
factor is sufficient to the occurrence of the transposition for half of the cases whereas the 
necessity of the relationship between each factor and the breakdown of the transposition 
process is vague. Hence, the case selection in this phase renders any evidence inconclusive. 
In the phase of implementation, the occurrence of market incentives, cooperative strategies 
and assistance alliances is connected to the occurrence of the outcome, while the occurrence 
of transnational communication and cost/benefit ratio leads to the non-occurrence of the 
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outcome. From the analysis of the individual relationships we also learn that market 
incentives and cooperative strategies are both necessary and sufficient to successful 
implementation; while market fragmentation and competition are equally necessary and 
sufficient to failing implementation. Moreover, alliances are here proven sufficient to ensure 
the positive outcome. Furthermore, transnational communication and cost/benefit ratio are 
necessary conditions to the non-compliant outcome and, therefore, are excluded as 
explicative variables. In the phase of sustainability, market incentives and cooperative 
strategies maintain their ability to explain the positive outcome while assistance alliances 
reinforce their contribution to its achievement. However, the QCA analysis carried out in 
Annex 2 emphasises that assistance alliances are not required for the implementation to 
occur, but that are an insufficient but necessary condition for sustainable compliance. 
Therefore, the condition of assistance alliances is rejected as explicative for the sustainable 
compliance outcome of Hungary.  
 
  
The “business” of compliance 
 
 
This dissertation tackled implementation compliance and the achievement of sustainable 
institutional change from the outside. In doing so, it has recounted two different stories of 
compliance with the European legislation and its sustainability over time in similarly rule-
taking countries: Poland progressed, but only partially fulfilled the EU requirements while 
Hungary fully achieved and sustained compliance over the decade 1999-2009. As shown by 
the analysis of table 5, market incentives and cooperative strategies are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the achievement of sustainable compliance. Moreover, assistance 
alliances is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for sustainable compliance. In other 
words, the study proves the significance of market incentives and pre-existing cooperative 
strategies in fostering sustainable compliance while showing how the two strong explanatory 
variables are interlinked: compliance is not a "business" per se. It has, nevertheless, a grand 
potential to be made a "good deal" via cooperative strategies among diverse stakeholders, 
thus creating a win-win situation. This research, in fact, highlighted that there must be 
mechanisms in place to guarantee that those who are to comply with the European – external 
– rules are granted an increasing return (or at least: some return) from compliance; then, as 
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they profit from compliance, they become agents of locking-in externally induced 
institutional change.  
When considering stakeholders, Europeanisation researchers have generally referred 
to them as 'veto players', capable of blocking or delaying the implementation of EU 
legislation (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Héritier et al., 2001; 
Green Cowles et al., 2001). Moreover, when looking at the stakeholders involved in the 
implementation of European environmental policies, within the “push-and-pull” framework, 
Tanja Börzel engaged mainly with the topic of societal non-state actors (Börzel, 2003 and 
Börzel and Buzogány, 2010). However, while this framework emphasised the active role of 
the domestic mobilisation or “pull” by the social actors and specifically the environmental 
NGOs, it also highlighted that the other domestic actors and specifically the policy-makers, 
administrators and business actors “who have to bear the costs of EU environmental policies” 
often resisted the implementation of such policies (Börzel and Buzogány, 2010, p. 721).  
 As against this, the findings of this dissertation shed light on the primary role of 
private actors as promoters and “demanders” of domestic compliance. In this sense, the 
findings contribute to the work of Liliana Andonova who integrated open-economy and 
Europeanisation approaches in her work on the effects of the dual forces of EU markets and 
institutions on domestic political processes, and who concentrated on the role of industries, 
international norms and domestic institutions in linking international and domestic politics 
(Andonova, 2004). Furthermore, these findings also contribute to the work of Julia Langbein 
who, in her doctoral dissertation and in a recent book, has analysed the link between the 
competitive pressures faced by domestic and foreign firms and the compliance with 
transnational market rules (Langbein, 2010; Langbein, 2015).  
 The first hypothesis considered in this dissertation then concerned the existence of 
specific market incentives which influenced the strategies of private actors. The underlying 
assumption for the adoption of stricter and costly EU standards was the converging 
preferences that these profit-oriented firms had and the recognition that EU compliance was 
the only way to make profits. This dissertation has particularly demonstrated that strategies 
of private firms were shaped by their dominant position in terms of holding bigger shares 
of the market which allowed them to recognise the benefit of EU compliance. In the 
packaging waste dimension, the Hungarian Öko-Pannon brought together the largest 
Hungarian and international packaging producers and fillers, representing approximately half 
of the existing packaging market at that time. Moreover, it had contracts with a vast number 
of packaging collectors and recyclers. The position of Öko-Pannon on the Hungarian 
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packaging market was the trigger for creating awareness of the systems already established 
in Europe and the definition by Viszkei of a draft system of recycling and recovery in line 
with the European packaging legislation. Contrariwise, the Polish packaging reality 
fragmented the market between a high number of ROs, which influenced the establishment 
of an overcapacity of infrastructures but also affected the quality of services offered by the 
ROs which, to remain competitive, in some cases operated without actually fulfilling the 
packaging recovery and recycling requirements and at the lowest possible price.   
 Similarly, in the municipal waste dimension foreign firms entering less-regulated 
markets exported EU standards only if they had (or rapidly acquired) a dominant position in 
the market. Despite the fact that foreign companies could decide to adopt lower standards in 
the treatment and collection of municipal waste, international companies in Hungary 
maintained EU standards by constructing new and modernising obsolete treatment facilities 
or by using EU technology and machinery in the collection of waste. On the contrary, the 
fragmented municipal waste market established in Poland contributed to a "race for survival" 
rather than boosting compliance strategies. This survival race was a direct consequence of 
the extreme competition between municipally-owned companies, Polish private companies 
and international companies for shares of the collection and treatment market. As a result, 
Polish private companies developed strategies to attract the highest number of customers at 
the lowest possible cost, striving to stay in business. Similarly, foreign companies strived to 
adapt to the existing provisions by lowering prices and standards. Furthermore, waste 
disposal sites were selected by waste-collecting companies based on in-site landfill tax, with 
the result that most of the selected sites were among the cheapest and geographically distant, 
frequently not fulfilling the EU requirements. This also influenced the strategies of many 
international companies, which had no incentive to invest in modernising and building EU-
conforming disposal facilities.  
 This dissertation also demonstrated that other factors shaped the interests of private 
actors as well. In particular, it highlighted the role of cooperation between stakeholders in 
enhancing the adoption of EU requirements at the domestic level. The cooperative strategies 
hypothesis assumed that the existence of mechanisms of cost-sharing would positively affect 
the strategies of stakeholders towards EU requirements compliance. However, while both 
countries established advisory bodies to the Ministry of Environment and parliamentary 
committees for the discussion of environmental draft legislation, discussions were effective 
when they involved a broad number of actors with their interests at stake. In Hungarian 
policy- and decision-making, the OKT, which grouped representatives from business, NGOs 
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and academics played a leading role. With the mediation of academics, NGOs and business 
representatives sought cooperation and compromise and elaborated numerous common 
opinions in plenary sessions and in the permanent waste policy working group. In Poland, 
instead, despite the existence of consultative bodies at the ministerial and parliamentary 
levels, only a limited number of stakeholders became involved, and the most common 
method of consultation was the establishment of direct contacts. However, the consultations 
were limited to only a small number of stakeholders among the representatives of business, 
NGOs, the Chambers of Commerce and representatives of local authorities. Moreover, the 
broad number of stakeholders involved in the Hungarian policy- and decision-making had 
implications also on the strategies of private firms which, directly participating in the policy-
making process acknowledged the costs of EU compliance and established partnerships and 
joint-ventures to share these costs. 
 The mechanism of cooperation between stakeholders also positively influenced 
external assistance. This dissertation particularly shows that the definition of assistance 
alliances between external and domestic actors was linked to cooperation considered as a 
relevant pre-condition for the successful implementation of external assistance. In Hungary, 
the PHARE twinning with OVAM on the definition of Regional Waste Management Plans 
was particularly successful, because, alongside experts from the Ministry of Environment, 
Hungarian regional and local authorities were also involved. Moreover, the construction and 
modernisation of landfill sites financed with EU funds were successfully implemented when 
there was sufficient cooperation among foreign and municipal companies through the 
establishment of PPPs. Contrariwise, the lack of pre-existing cooperative strategies 
negatively impacted the development of external assistance programmes in Poland. Indeed, 
the 2001 twinning project on the preparation of waste management plans at the county and 
municipal levels failed to achieve its objectives because EU experts were not able to establish 
alliances with their Polish counterparts to influence an “ownership-feeling” of the project by 
the Polish beneficiaries (EC, 2004). Furthermore, in the implementation of the ISPA projects, 
lack of cooperation between foreign and municipal companies in the management of EU-
funded disposal facilities prevented the establishment of PPPs. This finding contributes to the 
work of Jacoby, Stark, Vedres and Bruszt (Jacoby, 2005; Stark, Vedres and Bruszt, 2006; 
Stark and Vedres, 2006; Bruszt and Vedres, 2013) who first analysed the relationship between 
external and domestic actors in assistance programmes.  
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Everlasting compliance? 
 
 
The dissertation has treated the period covering the pre- and the post-Accession years in 
Hungary and Poland. As mentioned at the beginning of the dissertation, the decade selected 
for the analysis of the compliance of Hungary and Poland began in 1999, the year in which 
the European Commission released its first reports screening the situation in Hungary and 
Poland (and the other CEE countries together with Malta and Cyprus) before accession. The 
analysis ended in 2009, five years after the date of the accession of Hungary and Poland and 
the year of the latest available data contained in the Tri-Annual Monitoring Reports. The data 
from Poland and Hungary were collected between 2011 and 2014, thanks to periods of 
intense fieldwork in Warsaw, Budapest and other cities of Hungary and Poland. During my 
visits, I witnessed the introduction of policy and legislative measures affecting the municipal 
and packaging waste management systems of Hungary and Poland which, considering the 
novelties introduced might have an impact on the mechanisms that influenced the variation in 
compliance and allowed Hungary to sustain its compliance in the post-Accession period.   
In July 2011, the Polish government adopted a new Act which introduced a system of 
public tenders in appointing the waste collecting company collecting waste within a 
municipality. The Polish municipal waste management system was modified following the 
initiative of Professor Andrzej Kraszewski, former Minister of Environment (from February 
2010 until November 2011). In 2010, PROS supported the attempts of Minister Kraszewski 
to change the law on waste management by promoting a specific statement on the topic137. 
However, the major interlocutors in the discussions on the draft Act were KIGO and PIGO, 
which represented the two ends of the discussion. On the one hand, KIGO represented MPOs 
and municipally owned companies which favoured the adoption of the Act because it moved 
the ownership of waste from households to municipalities and recognised the pre-eminent 
role of municipalities in the establishment of public tenders for the selection of the waste-
collecting companies within a municipality. On the other hand, PIGO represented the private 
and foreign waste-collecting companies, which opposed the changes in the non-regulated and 
competitive system because they feared that they would lose big shares of the market 
(interview 44). After an agreement was drawn up between these two lobbies, in 2011, the 
                                                 
137 For further details on the PROS' role in supporting the recent changes in the municipal waste management 
system, see http://ekorozwoj.pol.lublin.pl/no10/pros.pdf.  
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draft was approved by the Parliament as the new Act on Maintaining the Cleanliness and 
Order in Communes (No. 152 item 897 of 2011). This Act aimed at re-organising and 
rationalising the system of municipal waste management by granting the ownership of waste 
to the municipalities and requiring public tenders for the selection of waste management 
companies operating within a single municipality (interview 44; interview 42). Despite the 
fact that the EU Commission as well as Brussels-based interest groups have positively 
welcomed these changes (interview 3; interview 76), the implementation of the Act was still 
incomplete at the end of 2014. Polish, municipal and foreign waste-collecting companies 
have, in fact, lobbied to preserve the existing competitive system in which they could do 
business at lower costs (and in some cases also in dishonest ways).   
At the close of 2011, the Hungarian government adopted a new Product Charge Act 
which established the National Waste Management Agency (hereafter also NWMA). The aim 
of this Act was “basically to coordinate the Hungarian selective waste collection and 
treatment system in a transparent way based on uniform criteria” thus establishing the 
NWWA as the sole coordinator in charge of managing, organising and controlling “the public 
and industrial separate waste collection” (NWMA website) and monitor the data on the 
generation of this type of waste. This Act served to change the system of licensing fee system 
because the organisation and management of waste was subject to EPR. For instance, 
packaging was now the responsibility of the NWMA while the recovery organisations were 
out of the system, and could either close down or modify their objectives. Öko-Pannon, for 
instance, chose the latter opinion, and become a consultant for “compliance with the 
environmental product charge138”. Furthermore, at the end of 2012, the Hungarian Parliament 
adopted a new Act on Waste to transpose the dispositions and the principles contained in the 
new European Waste Framework Directive. This Act, however, contained additional 
provisions that restricted the collection of municipal waste exclusively for collecting 
companies with a majority interest held by municipalities. Thus, only those companies owned 
in at least fifty-one per cent by municipalities were permitted to collect waste, which 
weakened the market position of multinational and foreign waste-collecting companies.  
 Recent legislative developments, then, have impacted strongly on the system of 
collection and treatment of municipal and packaging waste in Hungary and the municipal 
collection system in Poland. Despite the fact that it is still too early to assess precisely the 
effects on the compliance performances of Hungary and Poland, it is plausible that, in the 
                                                 
138  For more details on the recent services provided by Öko-Pannon, see http://www.okopannon. 
hu/en/our_services/.  
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case of Poland, recent changes could influence the development of more consolidated 
markets and positively impact on its compliance performance. Yet, progress may still be 
hampered by the persistent bilateral and adversarial strategy of policy-making at the 
ministerial and parliamentary levels. Contrariwise, the changes occurring in Hungary could 
strongly impact on the dominant position on the market of private actors in both municipal 
and packaging systems, implying also possible changes in the sustained compliance of 
Hungary. Indeed, private actors may have fewer incentives to comply with the EU legislation 
and may either disappear from the market or find other ways to make their voice heard. At the 
moment, the search for new arenas of discussion seems to be the main strategy followed by 
the private actors operating in Hungary. During the discussions on the new Act on Waste, the 
strongest reactions to the legislation were at the European level, mostly voiced by Germany, 
Austria and France, who raised objections to the Hungarian draft during the phase of 
notification of new legislation to the European Commission. These reactions showcase the 
strong international interests operating in the Hungarian municipal waste management sector, 
which in 2012 created a paralysis in the legislative process for the adoption of the draft Act 
on Waste. Moreover, in 2011, the Brussels-based PRO-EUROPE released a position paper on 
Öko-Pannon after the adoption of the new Product Charge Act139. There, it recognised the 
achievements obtained in Hungary through the system of packaging recovery and recycling 
defined by Öko-Pannon. As well, it expressed concern that with the adoption of the Act, “the 
major achievements of Öko-Pannon over the last 15 years would fade away” meaning “a 
massive step backwards” in the compliance of Hungary with the EU requirements because, 
according to Mr Quoden, “since the establishment of, a collection and recycling system has 
been established all over Hungary which has always fulfilled (and exceeded) all national and 
European targets.”  (PRO-EUROPE Press Release, 2011) 
 
 
Limitations and further directions 
 
 
This dissertation may be limited by the generalisability of the theoretical insights linked to 
the empirical findings. The thesis demonstrated the role played by private actors who, 
bolstered by their dominant position on the market, either lobbied for the introduction of 
                                                 
139  For details on the Press Release of PRO-EUROPE on the Hungarian changes, see http://www.pro-
e.org/files/PRO-Europe-Hungary-Press-release-on-15-year-anniversary_23-June-2011.pdf  
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stricter standards or exported the standards and technology when penetrating less-regulated 
markets. To explore the conditions which made compliance “profitable” for private actors, I 
chose to focus on the waste management sector, which was strongly market-driven and in 
which a wide number of domestic and foreign firms operated. The thesis offers as well an 
analysis of the mechanisms which made the achievement of compliance “profitable” for other 
stakeholders. The thesis, in fact, demonstrated that the existence of cooperative strategies and 
the decision-making involvement of a wide range of stakeholders assured not only private 
actors but also environmental NGOs and local authorities of the sharing of costs, thus 
boosting requests for the introduction of stricter standards in national legislation (e.g. through 
the OKT) or investments in costly technology (e.g. in the recultivation of old disposal sites). 
Furthermore, the existence of cooperative strategies influenced the implementation of 
external assistance projects, as in the establishment of public-private-partnerships for the 
management of joint facilities or the knowledge-based activities which involved a wide 
number of stakeholders and further strengthened knowledge of EU requirements at the 
domestic level.   
 The second limitation of the dissertation may pertain to the generalisability of the 
findings with respect to the research design and the methodology. Scholars have emphasised 
“the difficulty of practitioners of case study research to articulate their epistemological and 
methodological contributions” (Della Porta and Keating, 2008, p. 224). In particular, when 
considering a small-N research design, the case studies approach allows for an in-depth 
empirical investigation of a phenomenon or event, but it also has implications “on extracting 
generalisable knowledge actually or potentially related to other cases” (Della Porta and 
Keating, 2008, p. 226). Moreover, when adopting the methodology of tracing causal 
processes in small-N research designs, scholars have highlighted problems in the 
generalisability of the findings (Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Bennet and Checkel, 2015). In 
order to test the soundness and the nature of the relationship between the characteristics 
hypothesised as causal and the differences in compliance across cases it has been provided 
some formalization and further treatment of qualitative data with the aid of csQCA truth 
table. Nevertheless, the csQCA conclusion maintains its validity within the strict boundaries 
of the two cases under analysis. A future widening of the cases selected and a wider 
variability in outcome and explanatory factors could surely improve the scope of results. 
 Despite these possible limitations, this dissertation offers important insights on the 
theoretical hypotheses and the mechanisms which allowed the “sustainability of compliance” 
in only one of the two similar countries under examination. Focusing on the “sustainability” 
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over time triggered by the idea of making compliance a “business” with concrete gains and 
profits for policy-makers transposing EU legislation at a domestic level and for the 
stakeholders in charge of the implementation “on the ground”, the empirical and theoretical 
insights of this dissertation may be generalisable to other sectors and a broader number of 
cases. Indeed, scholars have emphasised that “a researcher focusing on one or [a] few cases 
might uncover a new hypothesis that is broadly applicable” (Bennet and Checkel, 2015, p. 
14). With this quote I do not mean to imply that I have discovered a new theory, nor clear-cut 
explanations of the phenomenon of variation in European legislation compliance. However, I 
propose that this dissertation offers a key to understanding the mechanisms that made 
compliance sustainable over time. Having uncovered the primary role played by private 
actors and the link between private actors and cooperative strategies in explaining the 
sustainability of compliance with EU rules (in this case: waste management), the possible 
directions of analysis then may lead my research to study the role of other factors in shaping 
the interests of private actors.  
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Annex 1:  
Hungary’s and Poland’s performance in the two dimensions according to 
the European monitoring reports 
 
 
This Annex provides the analysis of the data used to measure the performances of Hungary 
and Poland in the municipal and packaging waste dimensions. It contains the information on 
how the performances of Hungary and Poland were measured using as sources the 
Commission’s 1999 Screening Report, the Annual Monitoring Reports for the years 1999-
2003, the Tri-Annual Monitoring Reports for the periods 2004-2006 and 2007-2009 and the 
related National Questionnaires of Hungary and Poland. In particular, Figures 1 and 2 of the 
explanandum chapter elaborated from the data contained in Table 6 and 7 of this Annex. 
Table 6 summarises the performances of Hungary and Poland in the implementation 
compliance of the municipal waste management dimension in the period 1999-2009. 
 
 
Table 6: Performances of Hungary and Poland in implementing the municipal waste 
dimension  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Municipal 
waste 
management 
dimension 
 
H
U
 
2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 
P
L
 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Source of the data: Commission Annual Reports (1999-2003), National questionnaires for Hungary and Poland 
(2004-2009)  
 
 
According to data from the 1999 Screening Reports and 1999 Annual Monitoring Reports, 
Hungary and Poland did not initially comply with the municipal waste management 
dimension. The performance of Hungary was characterised by a duality of compliant and 
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non-compliant elements; thus, the country only reached stage 2 at the time. On the one hand, 
the Reports documented the existence of approximately two thousand landfills that did not 
fulfil the environmental standards, as well as the absence of any framework legislation on 
waste. On the other hand, Hungary constructed ten new and compliant regional landfills and 
defined an environmental legislation which set specific requirements for the management of 
waste (1999 Annual Report). The performance of Poland was characterised by its “difficulty 
in establishing networks of disposal installations”, the issue of “one third of existing 
landfills” having had exhausted their capacity and the old landfill sites in a technical 
condition that raised “many objections” (1999 Screening Report). Furthermore, it was 
recognised that Poland only partially transposed the European Waste Framework Directive 
with the 1997 Act on Waste (1999 Annual Report). Considering these elements, the 
performance of Poland was coded as achieving stage 1 with the EU requirements. 
 In the years 2000 and 2001, the performance of Hungary allowed it to advance to 
stage 3 but was still not sufficient to achieve sustainable compliance. The European Annual 
Reports for these years accounted for the improvements, such as the adoption of the Act on 
Waste Management in June 2000, considered as “an important step in aligning with the 
relevant acquis”, and the establishment of “four modern regional landfills” (2000 Annual 
Monitoring Report for Hungary). Moreover, they reported the transposition of the Landfill 
directive and the setting up of “four modern regional landfills” as well as the launching of 
several training programmes for local authorities to facilitate the implementation of the Act 
on Waste Management (2001 Annual Monitoring Report for Hungary). However, these 
Reports also acknowledged that only 30% of the disposal facilities in operation were 
compliant in 2000. In other words, there were not enough compliant facilities and it was 
necessary as well to provide for the closure and after-care of the old and obsolete sites (2001 
Annual Monitoring Report for Hungary). Hence, considering the co-existence between 
measures stepping-up in the compliance and those non-compliant, the performance of 
Hungary in the years 2000 and 2001 was coded as stage 3. The 2002 Report did not 
specifically mention the elements considered to measure compliance changes in the 
municipal waste management dimension. The Report only mentioned that Hungary adopted 
the National Waste Management Plan and required further improvements in the definition of 
regional and municipal plans as well as individual plans.  
 The 2000 Annual Monitoring Report for Poland did not evaluate the municipal waste 
management dimension; thus, the performance of Poland for that year was coded as stage 1. 
Furthermore, despite changes in the Polish performance over the years 2001 and 2002, 
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sustainable compliance was not achieved. In particular, while the 2001 Annual Monitoring 
Report noted the adoption of the Act on Waste transposing the EU legislation, the 2002 
annual report urged an improvement in compliance with the European waste requirements. 
The 2002 report, in particular, called for the adoption of national and regional waste 
management plans and the upgrading of landfill disposal sites. Therefore, considering the 
number of elements that Poland had to improve, its performance for the year 2001 and 2002 
qualifies as stage 2.  
 The 2003 Annual Monitoring Reports for Hungary and Poland did not evaluate in 
detail the municipal waste management dimension. In fact, these Reports considered the 
adoption of the waste management legislation only to be “in place” and “in line with the 
acquis” and required both countries “to continue” with the establishment of collection 
systems and recovery and disposal facilities. Some minor differences were reported on the 
issue of waste management planning. In particular, the Report for Hungary specifically 
required “the completion” of the setting up of local plans while the Polish Report required 
“the preparation” of regional, provincial and local plans (2003 Annual Monitoring Reports 
for Hungary and Poland). Considering the lack of detailed information, the degree of 
conformity was coded as stage 3 for Hungary and stage 2 for Poland.  
By contrast, the post-Accession national questionnaires sent by Hungary and Poland 
on the progresses in the implementation of the European Waste Framework and Landfill 
directives contain greater information on the performances of these two countries in the 
municipal waste management dimension. These questionnaires were aggregated by the 
European Commission in the Tri-Annual Implementation Reports for the years 2004-2006 
and 2007-2009. Specifically, the Hungarian national questionnaire for the years 2004-2006 
reported the existence of national legislation implementing the European directives. 
Moreover, it was also assessed that all the existing disposal sites had been examined by 2003 
and that a schedule had been developed for the modernisation of the operating sites. In light 
of these improvements, the performance of Hungary for the years 2004-2006 reached 
sustainable compliance and was coded as stage 4. The Polish national questionnaire for the 
years 2004-2006 also reported the adoption of national legislation implementing the 
European directives. However, the implementation of these requirements was conditional to 
the transitory periods granted by the European Commission140 in relation to the European 
Landfill directive which, in 2006, still needed “remarkable efforts” to be implemented in 
                                                 
140  In particular, in the accession Treaty of 2003, a transitory period until the year 2012 was negotiated in 
relation to the modernisation of the disposal sites in operation and the closure and after-care of the old ones. 
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Poland (ETCRWM, 2006; interview 75). Moreover, the Polish national questionnaire 
reported the compliance of only 40% of the existing landfill in the year 2006 (Polish national 
questionnaire, 2009). Hence, the performance of Poland for the years 2004-2006 was still 
coded as stage 2.   
 The data for the period 2007-2009 showed a sustainable compliant performance for 
Hungary and a partially compliant performance for Poland. Data from the national 
questionnaire of Hungary, in particular, highlighted the transposition and implementation of 
the European requirements contained in the Waste Framework and Landfill directives thus 
determining a maintenance of stage 4 for the years 2007 and 2008. A step forward in the 
performance of Hungary was achieved in 2009 with the closure of all the existing non-
conforming landfill sites and the compliance of all the existing and operating landfill sites141, 
80 in number by 2009 (National Questionnaire for Hungary, 2010). Moreover, since 
Ministerial Decree No. 20/2006 IV. 5, adopted in 2006, landfill operators were obliged in the 
closure of obsolete sites and had to report to the Inspectorate during the after-care period. 
Therefore, by 2009, Hungary had achieved stage 5 in the municipal waste management 
dimension. 
 Data for the period 2007-2009 indicated a number of improvements but also 
drawbacks in Poland's compliance with the municipal waste management dimension. On the 
one hand, the Polish questionnaire documented the adoption of legislation implementing the 
Waste Framework and Landfill directives in Poland. Moreover, it noted a reduction in the 
number of existing landfill sites and an increase in the compliant ones in 2009. On the other 
hand, the questionnaire did not reflect modifications in the implementation of the 
requirements on the closure and after-care of old and obsolete landfill sites. Furthermore, in 
2007, the European Commission started legal action against Poland on the “inadequate 
implementation of the Landfill directive” (Commission's Press Release142). Therefore, despite 
improvements in compliance with the Waste Framework Directive, Poland's performance in 
the municipal waste management dimension was still coded as stage 2 for the years 2007-
2009. 
Table 7 summarises the performances of Hungary and Poland in the implementation 
compliance of the packaging waste management dimension in the period 1999-2009.  
 
                                                 
141  The Hungarian National Waste Management Plan set the total number of existing and operating landfill sites 
for Hungary to a maximum of 100 landfills and an incinerator per region to be achieved by 2009. 
142 For further details, see Commission's Press Release (IP/07/387) of 21 March 2007 (http://europa 
.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-387_en.htm).  
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Table 7: Performances of Hungary and Poland in implementing the packaging waste 
dimension  
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Packaging 
waste 
management 
dimension 
 
H
U
 
2 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
P
L
 
0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 Source of the data: Commission Annual Reports (1999-2003), National questionnaires of Hungary and Poland 
(2004-2009) 
 
 
In 1999, Hungary and Poland diverged markedly regarding compliance with the packaging 
waste management dimension. Hungary had already adopted measures such as the Product 
Fee Act (Act LVI 1995), which partially transposed the European packaging directive by 
obliging producers of specific waste streams (e.g. batteries, packaging and tyres) to pay an 
annual tax on the amount of products put on the market (1999 Screening Report for 
Hungary). Moreover, Hungary had established systems for the collection and recovery of 
packaging waste which, in 1997, reached the rates of 25% for the collection and of 15% for 
the recovery (1999 Screening Report on Hungary). Additionally, in the mid-1990s, Hungary 
had established a deposit refund system on glass and plastic bottles. The Screening Report 
underscored a need for major efforts and important investments for Hungary to achieve full 
compliance with the European directive. As such, the performance of Hungary for the year 
1999 was coded as stage 2.  
 The Screening Report for Poland assessed a very low degree of conformity with the 
packaging waste management dimension. According to this Report, by 1999, Poland had 
transposed the European packaging directive “to a very minor degree”, systems for the 
collection, recovery and recycling of packaging waste had not been established and “recovery 
and recycling quotas” were considered as “low” (1999 Screening Report for Poland). 
Furthermore, in the Report, the Commission invited Poland to “start working on cost 
assessments and implementation planning immediately” (1999 Screening Report for Poland). 
Thus, the performance of Poland in 1999 was coded as stage 0 due to failure to commence 
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the implementation compliance process.  
 The respective compliance performance of both Hungary and Poland remained 
substantially unchanged until 2001. The Annual Monitoring Report for Hungary mentioned 
several improvements associated with the 2000 signing of a joint declaration with Ukraine, 
Romania and Slovakia on the need “to cooperate in averting ecological disasters based on the 
'polluter pays' principle” (2000 Annual Monitoring Report) and the adoption of the Act on 
Waste Management in June 2000, which recognised the “polluter pays” concept. The 2001 
Report on Hungary, however, documented the need for “further efforts” in the harmonisation 
with the EU legislation on packaging and packaging waste. Hence, considering the 
improvements, but also the Commission's admonition to adopt further compliance measures 
vis-a-vis the European packaging legislation, Hungary's performance in the years 2000 and 
2001 was coded as stage 2. The 2000 Annual Monitoring Report for Poland did not mention 
the packaging waste management dimension and, therefore, the conformity degree for this 
year was coded as stage 0. Contrariwise, the 2001 Report acknowledged that Poland had 
adopted two Acts transposing the European packaging legislation, namely, the Act on 
Packaging and Packaging waste and the Act on Duties of Entrepreneurs; however, these Acts 
did not enter into force until 2002. Moreover, the Report did not document efforts for the 
setting up of collection, recovery and recycling waste. As a result, the conformity degree for 
Poland was coded as stage 0. 
 In 2002, Hungary and Poland had made limited progress in complying with the 
packaging waste management dimension. The 2002 Report for Hungary emphasised progress 
in the transposition of the European packaging directive with the adoption of the 
Governmental Decree on Packaging waste in May 2002. Nevertheless, this Report also noted 
the need to create “a comprehensive system on the selective collection of packaging waste 
from communal sources”. Therefore, the performance with the EU requirements for Hungary 
in 2002 was coded as stage 3. In January 2002, the two Polish Acts transposing the European 
packaging legislation entered into force. However, the 2002 Report for Poland highlighted 
the need to adopt ministerial regulations to complete transposition in the European packaging 
directive. According to the ETCRWM, in 2002, the big retailer shops were obliged to operate 
at their own expense collection systems for non-returnable packed products (ETCRWM, 
2006). Nevertheless, the 2002 Annual Report did not mention the establishment of collection, 
recovery and recycling systems for packaging waste established at the national level. Thus, 
considering the improvement in transposition but also the continued absence of a system to 
collect and recover packaging, the performance of Poland for 2002 was coded as stage 2.  
 The 2003 Annual Monitoring Reports did not detail the progress of Hungary and 
Poland in the packaging waste management dimension. These Reports determined that 
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legislation in the waste management sector had been put into place but no specific mention 
was made of the packaging waste legislation and implementing measures. Therefore, the 
coding of the performances of Hungary and Poland remained as those of the previous year, 
namely 3 for Hungary and 2 for Poland. More information was offered in the national 
questionnaires of Hungary and Poland for the years 2004-2006 and 2007-2009. These 
national questionnaires, did disclose progress made in compliance with the EU packaging 
legislation but the respective performances of Hungary and Poland did not change between 
the two reporting periods.  
The two Hungarian questionnaires for the years 2004-2009 noted the adoption of 
implementing legislation for the packaging waste and the establishment of collection, 
recycling and recovery systems. These systems could be managed either individually by 
industries or by the recovery organisations that had been established since 2003 and which, 
upon the payment of a licence fee, would organise the collection, recovery and recycling of 
packaging waste. The performance of Hungary was therefore coded as of stage 5 for the years 
2004-2009. 
 The two Polish questionnaires for the years 2004-2009 observed some progress in 
compliance with the EU packaging requirements. In particular, these questionnaires 
highlighted the adoption of implementing legislation and the establishment of systems for 
return, collection, recovery and recycling of packaging. Moreover, retailers and wholesalers 
were obliged to take back reusable packaging while businesses that place packaged goods on 
the market were obliged to set recovery and recycling rates individually or through recovery 
organisations; in the event that the firms failed to achieve such rates, they were also subject to 
the payment of a penalty. However, reports elaborated by BIPRO and PRO-EUROPE 
highlighted the fact that Poland, at the close of the 2000s, still had an “insufficiently 
developed scheme for selective collection of packaging waste originated from households” 
which, according to estimates, covered only 50% of the population (PRO-Europe, 2012) and, 
in general, it had established only “limited collection infrastructure for packaging waste” 
(BIPRO, 2009). According to these reports then, further efforts were necessary in the separate 
collection of packaging waste in order to fulfil the requirements and achieve the EU 
packaging recovery and recycling targets (BIPRO, 2009; PRO-Europe, 2012). The 
performance of Poland in the packaging waste management dimension was therefore coded 
for the years 2004-2009 still as stage 2. In fact, in spite of the adoption of the implementing 
legislation on packaging waste, major efforts were still required to achieve the recovery and 
recycling targets and to establish a nationwide separate collection system for packaging 
waste. 
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Annex 2: 
Discussing the validity of the hypotheses on implementation compliance 
and its sustainability 
 
 
The analysis shows that Hungary and Poland followed two separate causal paths along their 
road to compliance with European legislation. In particular, the empirical findings 
demonstrated that the sustainable compliance performance of Hungary was influenced by the 
existence of market incentives which catalysed economic actors’ achievement of compliance 
with the EU requirements and by a cooperative style of policy-making which also enhanced 
external assistance alliances. In contrast, Poland's partial and discontinued compliance can be 
ascribed to the absence of market incentives and to a competitive style of policy-making 
which hampered the establishment of alliances between external and domestic actors. 
The claim is supported by a process tracing analysis that guided the selection of data 
from contexts on the basis of the driving hypotheses, and gave them the sense of a causal 
story. However, whilst the applied strategy can provide a plausible story, it is also little suited 
to prove that it is a sound one. Proof requires some formalization and further treatment of 
qualitative data that can expose and assess the nature of the relationship between the 
characteristics hypothesised as causal and the differences in compliance across cases. As 
shown by the process tracing analysis, and further highlighted in Table 5 in the concluding 
chapter, the hypotheses on transnational communication and cost/benefit ratio do not 
sufficiently explain the observed variation in the implementation compliance performances of 
Hungary and Poland nor do they explain the sustainable compliance performance of Hungary. 
Therefore, explanations for the positive outcome of Hungary revolve around the three 
demand-side hypotheses, namely market incentives, cooperative strategies and assistance 
alliances.  
For the purposes of the truth table a binary opposition was applied to the 
presence/absence of these conditions. The condition market incentives <MKT> is considered 
present, and given value 1, when one or a group of private domestic/international actors 
having a dominant position in the municipal and packaging waste management markets in 
terms of detaining bigger shares of the collection, recovery and recycling of such wastes in 
comparison to other existing actors (e.g. municipal waste collecting companies) adopt stricter 
EU standards or export them when penetrating the market. Otherwise, is considered absent 
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and given a 0 score. The hypothesis cooperative strategy <COOP>, is present (scoring 1) 
when cooperation was established in the form of joint-ventures and PPPs between private 
(domestic/foreign) and municipally-owned waste-collecting companies as well as when 
private actors, NGOs and state actors collaborated in the promotion of municipal and 
packaging waste measures in environmental consultative bodies and committees. With the 
absence of joint-ventures, PPPs as well as the lack of cooperation in environmental policy-
making, the condition is considered absent and given a 0 score. The assistance alliances 
hypothesis, labelled <ALL>, is present (scoring 1) when external assistance in the form of 
capacity-building and knowledge-based projects was supported not only by the cooperation 
between external and domestic actors but also by the involvement of a wide number of 
stakeholders in carrying out such projects. When cooperation between external and domestic 
actors is absent the condition is considered absent and given a 0 score. Table 8 shows this 
dichotomy. 
 
Table 8: Cases by explanatory conditions in each phase 
cases M
K
T
-T
 
C
O
O
P
-T
 
A
L
L
-T
 
O
T
 
M
K
T
-I
 
C
O
O
P
-I
 
A
L
L
-I
 
O
I 
M
K
T
-S
 
C
O
O
P
-S
 
A
L
L
-S
 
O
S
 
H-MW 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
H-PW 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
P-MW 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
P-PW 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Key:  In the first column: H is for Hungarian case, P for Polish case; MW is for 
municipal waste market, PW for package waste market. In the first row, MKT is the 
causal factor from HP1, COOP, from HP2; ALL, from HP3. The suffix -T refers a factor 
to the first phase of the compliance process; the suffix -I to the second phase; the suffix 
-S, to the third. OT, OI, OS indicate the outcome of the first, second, and third phase 
respectively.  
In cells: the value of the factors and of outcome by case (1=present, 0=absent).  
 
The dataset can be first explored with the aid of “truth tables”. Truth tables move the analytic 
attention from cases to configurations of causal factors. In truth tables, each case is reduced 
to the presence and absence of the explanatory factors - which allows them to be associated 
with the outcome. The truth table generated by the original dataset are shown in Table 9 
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below. 
 
Table 9: Possible observed and unobserved configurations given HP.1, HP.2, HP.3. 
 
MKT COOP ALL cases in T OT cases in I OI cases in S OS 
1 1 1   H-MW 1 
H-MW, H-
PW 
1 
1 1 0 
H-MW, H-
PW 
1 H-PW 1   
1 0 1       
1 0 0       
0 1 1       
0 1 0       
0 0 1 
P-MW, P-
PW 
1     
0 0 0   
P-MW, 
P-PW 
0 
P-MW, P-
PW 
0 
 
Key:  The first three columns list all the possible combinations of presence and 
absence of the factors MKT, COOP, ALL. As the explanatory factors are always the 
same over time, and their possible combinations are finite and constant, they are not 
referred to any stage. Stages instead qualify the remaining columns. In the “cases” 
column, the cases are ascribed to the configuration (i.e., to the combination of presence 
(1 scores) and absence (0 scores) of the three factors) that each displays in a given phase 
(again indicated by T, I, and S). In so doing, cases make the configuration observed and 
associated to an outcome in that phase - as listed in the next column (under the headings 
of OT, OI, OS respectively). Empty cells in cases and outcome columns indicate 
unobserved configurations in that phase.  
 
The truth table provides the answer to the first question about the explanatory potential of the 
factors of HP.1, HP.2, and HP.3. The factors identify 8 possible combinations:  
2 in phase T - i.e., 1-1-0 observed in both the Hungarian cases, and 0-0-1, observed in both 
the Polish cases; 
3 in phase I - i.e., 1-1-1 in the Hungarian municipal waste case; 1-1-0 in the Hungarian 
packaging waste case; and 0-0-0 in both the Polish cases; 
2 in phase S – i.e., 1-1-1 in both the Hungarian cases, and 0-0-0 in the Polish cases. 
 
As shown by the table, when two cases share the same configuration of factors, they also 
display the same outcome. This means that the explanatory factors are truly capable of 
separating cases with a positive outcome from those with a negative one. The factors hence 
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prove to be “difference-makers” (Lewis 2001) – a formal property that validates the 
theoretical assumptions set out in the hypotheses.  
The following analysis further shows consistency of causal relationships between 
individual conditions and the outcome. Table 10 illustrates how, given lack of a negative 
outcome in phase T, the presence and the absence of each explanatory factor is sufficient to 
the occurrence of the transposition, while the necessity of the relationship between each 
factor and the breakdown of the transposition process is indeterminate.  
 
Table 10: Direction and strength of the relationship between factors and outcomes in 
phase T. 
 
Outcome: 
OT1 
 
Outcome: 
OT0 
 
Factors: Necessity Sufficiency Necessity Sufficiency 
MKT1 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
MKT0 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
COOP1 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
COOP0 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
ALL-T1 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
ALL-T0 0.500000 1.000000 -1.#IND00 0.000000 
 
 
 
As Table 11 on phase I shows, the occurrence of each explanatory factors is connected to the 
occurrence of the outcome, while their non-occurrence leads to the non-occurrence of the 
outcome. From the analysis of the individual relationships we also learn that consolidated 
economic players, and cooperative practices, are necessary and sufficient to successful 
administrative implementation; while market fragmentation, and competition, are equally 
necessary and sufficient to failing implementation. Moreover, alliances are here proven 
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sufficient to positive outcome, and necessary to non-compliance in this phase.  
 
Table 11: Direction and strength of the relationship between factors and outcomes, phase I. 
 
Outcome: 
OI1 
 
Outcome: 
OI0 
 
Factors: Necessity Sufficiency Necessity Sufficiency 
MKT1 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
MKT0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
COOP1 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
COOP0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
ALL-I1 0.500000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
ALL-I0 0.500000 0.333333 1.000000 0.666667 
     
 
 
 
 
The individual causal relationships become stronger in the sustainability phase. As shown by 
Table 12, not only market incentives and cooperative strategies maintain their explanatory 
potential, but also assistance alliances influence the outcome and become a necessary and 
sufficient condition of the positive outcome when they are present, but also necessity and 
sufficient condition to the negative outcome when they are absent. Therefore, it fails to 
provide an explanation on its own. 
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Table 12: Direction and strength of the relationship between factors and outcomes, stage S. 
 
Outcome: 
OS1 
 
Outcome: 
OS0 
 
Factors: Necessity Sufficiency Necessity Sufficiency 
MKT1 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
MKT0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
COOP1 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
COOP0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
ALL-S1 1.000000 1.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
ALL-S0 0.000000 0.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The QCA analysis seeks to identify the smallest configuration of conditions capable of 
providing a non-contradictory explanation of an outcome. This is done by comparing pairs of 
configurations from the truth table that display the same outcome, dropping those conditions 
which vary in two otherwise identical configurations. This “minimization” is operated in 
multiple rounds until the minimal configuration is found and proven sufficient to an outcome. 
Minimizations take into consideration both observed and unobserved configurations. The 
unobserved configurations are applied under three different assumptions 143  of which the 
                                                 
143 The three assumptions are: 1) that none could have led to the outcome, thus, only observed configurations are 
minimized (i.e., “complex” or “conservative” solution); 2) that any could have led to the outcome, thus, any 
unobserved configuration can enter minimization regardless of its plausibility as far as it can drop a further 
condition (i.e., “parsimonious solution”); 3) that only those consistent with the starting hypothesis could 
have generated the outcome thus that only plausible configurations enter minimizations (i.e., “intermediate 
solution”).  
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intermediate solution alone is worth discussing because its inference reinforces observational 
findings with counterfactual reasoning, but entrenches such reasoning within the domain of 
theoretical plausibility. Yet, contrary to many theory-driven strategies, the reliance on theory 
does not result into confirmation bias, because minimization use theoretically plausible 
unobserved configurations for establishing the irrelevance of a condition - so that theory is 
put at work against itself, which secures the validity of findings. When run on the 
configurations of the second stage, the Standard Analysis returns the intermediate solutions of 
Output 1. 
 
Output 1: Intermediate solutions, stage I. 
 
a) Model: OI1 = f(ALL-I, COOP, MKT) 
   
 raw  
coverage 
unique 
coverage 
consistency 
 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
          COOP1 MKT1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
 
 
Notes:  Covered cases: H-MWS (1,1), H-PWS (1,1) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey   
frequency cutoff: 1.000000; consistency cutoff: 1.000000  
Assumptions: ALL-I1 COOP1 MKT1 all contribute to OI1 
 
 
 
b) Model: OI0 = f(ALL-I, COOP, MKT)   
   
 raw unique  
 coverage coverage consistency 
 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
ALL-I0 COOP0 MKT0 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
 
 
Notes: Covered cases: P-MWS (1,1), P-PWS (1,1) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey   
frequency cutoff: 1.000000; consistency cutoff: 1.000000  
Assumptions: ALL-I0 COOP0 MKT0 all contribute to OI0 
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Output 1 shows that, in phase I, the joint presence of market incentives and cooperative 
strategies can alone explain the two positive cases, while the negative cases can be properly 
accounted only by a combination of lack of market incentives, lack of assistance alliances 
and competitive strategies. Therefore, the two necessary and sufficient factors are enough to 
explain positive implementation, while non-implementation requires that the three factors are 
all absent. The explanatory relevance of the combination of the three factors is supported by 
the results from the minimizations to the outcome in phase S, as displayed in Output 2. 
 
Output 2: Intermediate solutions, stage S. 
 
a) Model: OS1 = f(ALL-S, COOP, MKT) 
   
 raw  
coverage 
unique 
coverage 
 
consistency 
 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
COOP1 MKT1 ALL-S1 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
 
 
Notes:  Covered cases: H-MWS (1,1), H-PWS (1,1) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey   
frequency cutoff: 2.000000; consistency cutoff: 1.000000  
Assumptions: ALL-S1 COOP1 MKT1 all contribute to OS1 
 
 
b) Model: OS0 = f(ALL-S, COOP, MKT)   
   
 raw unique  
 coverage coverage consistency 
 ---------- ---------- ---------- 
ALL-
S0 COOP0 MKT0 
1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
 
 
Notes: Covered cases: P-MWS (1,1), P-PWS (1,1) 
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey   
frequency cutoff: 2.000000; consistency cutoff: 1.000000  
Assumptions: ALL-S0 COOP0 MKT0 all contribute to OS0 
 
Output 2 confirms that, in phase S, the explanation of non-compliance in the two Polish 
markets requires the concurrent absence of the three explanatory factors, while the 
sustainable compliance in the two Hungarian cases can properly be attributed to the joint 
occurrence of cooperative strategies, market incentives, and assistance alliances. 
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The QCA therefore proves that cooperative strategies and market incentives are always 
required elements of compliance performance in the implementation stages – both of its 
success and of its failure. Moreover, the technique highlights that assistance alliances are not 
required for the implementation to occur, but that are an INUS (Insufficient but Necessary 
part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the outcome) condition of 
enduring implementation and compliance. 
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Annex 3: 
The municipal and packaging waste legislation adopted in Hungary and 
Poland 
 
 
The municipal waste management in Hungary and Poland was recognised as the 
responsibility of the municipalities, and specific legislation mandated the responsibilities of 
municipalities. These included the Polish Executive Order of the Ministers' Council on the 
protection of the environment against waste and maintaining cleanliness and order in towns 
and villages of 1980, which was replaced by a new Act in 1996 and the Hungarian 1990 Act 
on Local Governments, in turn replaced in 1995 by the Act on the Mandatory Use of Certain 
Local Public Services. In addition, municipal waste management was governed by specific 
Acts on Waste Management adopted in Hungary in 2000 and the Acts on Waste adopted in 
Poland in 1997 and 2001. Table 13 summarises the key legislation concerning municipal 
waste management in Hungary and Poland. 
 
Table 13: Overview of the municipal waste legislation adopted in Hungary and Poland 
Country Act Reference to municipal waste 
Hungary 
Act on the protection of 
Human Environment of 
1976 
General reference to waste generation and 
disposal. 
Governmental Decree of 
1986 
Municipalities as mainly responsible for the 
management of municipal waste; reference to the 
establishment of standards in landfills. 
Act on Local 
Governments of 1990 
Municipalities with responsibility and authority 
in the collection, disposal and treatment of 
municipal waste and the selection of the disposal 
sites. 
Act on Environmental 
Protection of 1995 
Local governments are entrusted with developing 
municipal programmes, tasks and regulations 
concerning the disposal of municipal waste. 
Act on the Mandatory Use 
of Certain Local Public 
Services of 1995 
Municipalities granted the responsibility of 
municipal waste and households granted the duty 
of using the waste collection and disposal 
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services operating in the municipality and the 
payment of the collection fees defined by the 
local governments; private collecting companies 
have to obtain a permit for the collection of waste 
within a specific municipalities; the selection of 
the waste collecting company and the disposal 
facility are selected through public tender 
procedure for a period of five years.  
Act on Waste 
Management of 2000 
Waste management as the responsibility of 
municipalities and households obliged to use the 
services provided for the collection of waste at 
local levels; definitions and principles of waste 
management, the general duties and requirements 
for the waste management, the requirements for 
the waste treatment and recovery and the fines 
and the fees systems. 
Ministerial Decree 
20/2006 
Requirements on the landfill of waste and the 
conditions and rules for the waste deposition into 
the landfill sites. 
Poland 
Environmental Protection 
and Management Act 
of 1980 
General duties on the protection of the 
environment against waste; waste producers 
(facilities and individuals) were required to take 
measures to reduce waste; responsibility given to 
local authorities for the collection and recycling 
of waste; prioritization of recycling as a waste-
treatment option; operators or owners of disposal 
sites obliged to keep a record of the amount and 
type of waste disposed; fee for dumping waste 
materials in a disposal site. 
Executive Order of the 
Ministers’ Council on the 
protection of the 
environment against waste 
and maintaining 
cleanliness and order in 
towns and villages of 
1980 
General principals on the management and 
disposal of waste from households. 
Act on the protection of 
the environment against 
waste and maintaining 
cleanliness and order in 
towns and villages of 
1996 
Tasks of municipalities and obligations on 
property maintenance in terms of collection 
facilities and disposal sites. 
Act on Waste of 1997 
Waste-related concepts; minimisation of waste; 
safe disposal; fiscal measures to encourage re-use 
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and recycling of waste. 
Act on Waste of 2001 
Obligation to prepare waste management plans; 
disposal of waste as last option and only for those 
wastes which could not be recycled; division of 
competencies between national and local 
authorities; penalties and fines in case of bad 
management of waste. 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The management and treatment of packaging waste was recognised to be responsibility of the 
producers of such products, accordance with the European producers’ responsibility principle. 
Moreover, it has been generally managed through producer responsibility arrangements 
which introduce “measures relating to the prevention, reduction and elimination of pollution 
caused by waste and the management of packaging and packaging waste” (Eurostat website). 
The management and treatment of this type of waste has been ruled in Hungary since 1995 
with the Product Charge Act and with the 2002 Governmental Decree on Packaging and 
Packaging Waste. Only in 2001 Poland adopted a specific legislation on packaging and 
packaging waste followed by an Act on Duties of entrepreneurs concerning waste 
management, product fees and deposit fees. Table 14 summarises the key Hungarian and 
Polish packaging waste legislation. 
 
Table 14: Overview of the packaging waste legislation adopted in Hungary and Poland 
Country Act Reference to packaging waste 
Hungary 
Act on Product Charge of 
1995 
Established economic instruments to encourage 
the recycling, recovery and reuse of certain 
products including packaging goods. 
Act on Waste 
Management of 2000 
Extended Producer Responsibility principle. 
Governmental Decree on 
Packaging and Packaging 
Waste 
Dual system for the management of packaging 
waste. Packaging producers and fillers entitled to 
pay a penalty or transfer the recovery and 
recycling obligations to recovery organisations 
upon the payment of a licence fee but not a 
product fee. 
Governmental Decree on 
Exemptions to the Product 
Fee of 2003 
Exemptions on product fee and reduced product 
fee for those producers paying the licence fee. 
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Ministerial Decree on the 
regulations of the 
environmental compliance 
assessment of packaging 
of 2006 
Heavy metal content in packaging goods and 
annual levels of product charge to be paid for not 
fulfilling packaging recovery and recycling 
requirements. 
Poland 
Environmental Protection 
and Management Act of 
1980 
Polluter pays principle; the polluter was 
responsible for damage, and was obliged to pay 
environmental charges and fines. 
Act on Packaging and 
Packaging waste of 2001 
Prevention of packaging waste creation and 
minimisation; recovery and recycling targets for 
packaging manufacturers and importers. 
Act on Duties of 
entrepreneurs concerning 
waste management, 
product fees and deposit 
fees of 2001 
Entrepreneurs were obliged in the payment of 
fees for the introduction of packages goods on 
the market. 
Act on Packaging and 
Packaging waste of 2003 
Producers, importers and entrepreneurs were 
obliged to collect from salesmen at their own 
cost, while salesmen had to collect from 
customers. 
Act on Duties of 
entrepreneurs concerning 
waste management, 
product fees and deposit 
fees of 2005 
Requirements for entrepreneurs on weight and 
amount of reused and recycled packaging waste. 
Source: own elaboration 
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Reference to the interviews 
 
Reference 
No. 
Name Institution and position Date and place 
1 Andrew Murphy DG Environment, European 
Commission; former desk officer for 
Cyprus. 
Brussels, 20.03.2013 
2 Peter Dröll European Commission, DG 
Enterprise and Industry; former  
Cabinet member of Enlargement  
with Commissioner Verheugen; 
accession negotiator with Poland and 
coordinator of the environmental 
negotiations with all the accession 
countries. 
Brussels, 23.06.2011 
3 Joachim Quoden Managing Director of EXPRA; 
former Managing Director of PRO-
EUROPE. 
Brussels, 19.09.2013 and 
by email 
4 Unico Van Kooten Policy Officer at Van Gansewinkel 
Groep. 
By phone, 25.07.2013  
5 Stephane Arditi Policy manager for products and 
waste, European Environmental 
Bureau. 
Brussels, 14.03.2013 
6 Ariadna Rodrigo Policy manager of resources and 
consumption, Friends of the Earth 
Europe.  
Brussels, 8.04.2013 
7 Peter Balazs Professor at the Central European 
University; former Ambassador of 
Hungary in Denmark (1994-1996). 
Budapest, 13.05.2013 
8 Csaba Marko Environmental consultant at 
EnviCult Kft; former Deputy Head 
of the Waste Management 
Department of the Hungarian 
Ministry of Environment. 
Budapest, 21.05.2013 
9 Hilda Farkas Managing director of KSZGYSZ; 
Member of OKT (business); former 
Head of the Waste Management 
Department of the Hungarian 
Ministry of Environment. 
Budapest, 6.07.2011 and 
23.05.2012 
10 Henrik Balatoni Head of the FE-Group Invest. Budapest, 25.04.2012 
11 Sylvia Graczka Head of HUMUSZ. Budapest, 24.05.2012 
12 Eszter Hejja Environmental and International 
Relations Manager of the Hungarian 
Association of Recyclers (HOE). 
Budapest, 4.05.2012 
13 Judit Pump PhD on environmental legislation 
and waste issues, currently working 
in the Ombudsman office. 
Budapest, 29.04.2013 and 
22.05.2013 
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14 László Szilágyi Member of the Parliament (Politics 
Can Be Different, LMP); former 
Head of HUMUSZ. 
Budapest, 4.05.2013 
15 Csaba Kiss Environmental Attorney and EU law 
expert at the Environmental Law 
Association of Hungary (EMLA); 
former member of the OKT (NGOs). 
Budapest, 24.04.2013 
16 Attila Martin  Managing Director of Greenvestor, 
Environmental Protection &Waste 
Management LDT.; former 
Managing Director A.S.A. Hungary. 
Budapest, 21.05.2013 
17 Gyula Bándi Professor at the Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University; Member of the 
OKT (academics). 
Budapest, 30.04.2013 and 
8.05.2013 
18 Janos Banhidi Former director of the Waste 
Incinerator Plant of Budapest. 
Budapest, 5.07.2011 
19 Eszter Sarosi Managing Director of the Hungarian 
Association of Recyclers (HOE). 
Budapest, 10.05.2013 
20 Attila Bencs Head of the Hamburger Hungaria 
Paper Mills, Member of the OKT 
(business). 
By Skype, 2.05.2013 
21 Eva Hajba Former professor at Corvinus 
University. 
Budapest, 8.05.2013 
22 Benedek Javor Member of the Parliament, former 
leading Member of the Party 
“Politics can be different” (LMP), 
Head of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Sustainable 
Development. 
Budapest, 25.05.2012 
23 Miklòs Bulla Head of the Environmental 
Engineering Department of the 
Széchenyi István University; 
Secretary General of the National 
Council on Environment (OKT). 
Budapest, 25.04.2013 
24 Sándor Fülöp Environmental Attorney and Director 
of EMLA; former member of the 
OKT (NGOs). 
Budapest, 24.04.2013 
25 Vilmos Civin Member of MGYOSZ and Head of 
the Committee on Energy of the 
OKT (business). 
Budapest, 25.04.2013 
26 Miklos Nagy Secretary General of the Association 
of Packaging and Material Handling 
(CSAOSZ). 
Budapest,  3.05.2013 
27 Zoltan Illes State Secretary on Environment 
appointed in 2010 (Fidesz Party); 
Associate professor at the Central 
European University in Budapest and 
adjunct professor at the Godollo 
University of Agricultural Sciences. 
Budapest, 4.07.2011 
28 Peter Heil Director and Head of Consultancy Budapest, 09.05.2013 
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Services at ConsAlt. 
29 Peter Ocsenas Policy Officer at COWI Hungary. Budapest, 23.05.2012 
30 Gabor Miklosi Policy officer for Hungary, DG 
REGIO, European Commission. 
Brussels, 10.04.2013 
31 Noemi Dalnoky Head of Unit of the Managing 
Authority for Environmental 
Programmes, National Development 
Agency. 
Budapest, 23.05.2013 
32 Carsten Rasmussen Chief of Unit in DG REGIO, 
European Commission; former Desk 
Officer for Hungary. 
Brussels, 17.07.2013 
33 Matyas Maksi  Policy Officer for Hungary, DG 
REGIO, European Commission. 
Brussels, 17.09.2013 
34 György Viszkei Managing Director of Öko-Pannon; 
former Managing Director of 
CSAOSZ; former member of OKT 
(business). 
Budapest, 2.05.2012 
35  Éva Baka Head of the Beverage Carton 
Environmental Services Association 
(IKSZ). 
Budapest, 13.05.2013 
36 Krisztina Wegner Managing Director of the National 
Waste Management Agency (OHU); 
former managing director of ROs for 
Tyres.  
Budapest, 26.04.2012 
37 Ursula Denison Managing Director of PRO-
EUROPE 
By phone, 25/03/2013 
38 Andrzej Gula President of the Institute for the 
Economic Environment. 
Warsaw, 8.10.2012 
39 Paweł Czepieł Professor at the Jagiellonian 
University. 
Cracow, 24.10.2013 
40 Beata Kłopotek  Advisor to the Minister of 
Environment; former Director of the 
Waste Management Department. 
Warsaw, 28.09.2012 and 
8.10.2013 
41 Tomasz Winnicki Deputy Chairperson and Secretary 
General of PROS; Professor 
Emeritus of the Polytechnic of 
Lublin. 
Warsaw, 5.05.2014 
42 Michał Korkozowicz Head of REBA, recovery 
organisation for batteries; former 
member of the EPR Advisory Group. 
Warsaw, 6.11.2013 and 
30.04.2014  
43 Krisztof Skąpski Head of the Political Cabinet of the 
Ministry of Environment (2010-
2011), Ministry of Environment. 
Warsaw, 25.09.2013 
44 Andrzej Kraszewski Former Minister of the Environment 
(2010-2011), professor at the 
Polytechnic University in Warsaw. 
Warsaw, 7.11.2012 and 
29.10.2013 
45 Tomasz Zylicz Dean of the Department of Economic 
Sciences at the University of 
Warsaw; founder of the Warsaw 
Warsaw, 12.11.2012 
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Ecological Economics Center. 
46 Dariusz Piechowski Director for Environmental 
Protection, MPO Warsaw. 
Warsaw, 9.11.2012 
47 Christophe Manet Desk Mercosur, DG External 
Relations, European Commission; 
former Desk Officer for Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
By phone, 14.03.2013 
48 Pierre Schellekens  Head of Representation in Sweden, 
European Commission; former Desk 
Officer for Poland. 
By phone, 15.04.2013 
49 Krisztof Kawczynski Head of the Environmental 
Committee in the Chamber of 
Economy (Krajowa Izba 
Gospodarcza). 
Warsaw, 13.11.2013 and 
18.11.2013 
50 Wladysław Janikowski General Director of REKARTON. Warsaw, 15.11.2013 
51 Jerzy Jendrośka Head of the Polish Association of 
Environmental Lawyers (PELA). 
Wrocław, 13.11.2012 
52 Zbigniew Karaczun Head of the Mazovian branch of the 
PKE, professor at the Agricultural 
University in Warsaw. 
Warsaw, 16.10.2012 
53 Jerzy Ziaja Managing Director of the Chamber 
of Recyclers (OIGR). 
Warsaw, 3.10.2012 
54 Andrzej Zwawa Head of Polska Zielona Sieć, 
coordinating body for the Polish 
environmental NGOs. 
Cracow, 1.10.2012 
55 Joanna Czajewska Head of Unit for Coordination of 
Implementation, Department for 
Coordination of Infrastructural 
Programmes, Ministry of Regional 
Development. 
Warsaw,  31.10.2012 
56 Pascal Boijmans  Head of Unit, competence Centre 
Administrative Capacity Building, 
DG REGIO, European Commission. 
Brussels, 17.07.2013 
57 Brendan Smyth  Principal Administrator Financial 
Engineering, DG REGIO, European 
Commission; former responsible for 
ISPA projects. 
Brussels, 22.07.2013 
58 Wojciech Deska Head of Warsaw Office, European 
Investment Bank. 
Warsaw, 10.10.2013 
59 Edyta Stankiewicz Project Economist and JASPERS, 
European Investment Bank, Warsaw 
Office. 
Warsaw, 10.10.2013 
60 Patrick Dorvil  Senior Economist at the European 
Investment Bank. 
By phone, 30.09.2013 
61 Marcin Jurasz  Director of the Department for 
special wastes, REMONDIS.  
Warsaw, 18.11.2013 
62 Julia Majewska Head of Unit of the Department of 
European Funds in the Ministry of 
Environment. 
Warsaw, 30.10.2013 
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63 Robert Markiewicz Vice-director of the Department of 
Land Protection at the NFOSiGW. 
Warsaw, 17.10.2013 
64 Tadeusz Arkit Member of Sejm (Civil Forum 
Party), member of the OSZ 
Committee.  
Warsaw, 20.11.2013 
65 Hanna Zakowska Deputy Director for Research at the 
Packaging Research Institute 
(COBRO). 
Warsaw, 25.10.2013 
66 Grzegorz Ganczewski Specialist in Packaging and 
Environment Department at the 
Packaging Research Institute 
(COBRO). 
Warsaw, 25.10.2013 
67 Andrzej Grzymala Country Office Director of REC; 
former Purchasing and Project 
Manager of Rekopol. 
Warsaw, 26.11.2012 
68 Mikolaj Jozefowicz Director of ERP Batteries Poland. Warsaw, 6.11.2012 
69 Marek Rosłon Member of the Council of the Polish 
Chamber of Packaging. 
Warsaw, 7.11.2013 
70 Katarzyna 
Michniewska  
President of Eko-Cykl and Logistyka 
Odzysku. 
Warsaw, 20.11.2013 
71 Grzegorz Karnicki Operational Director of the 
Utilizational Center OPON.  
Warsaw, 20.11.2012 
72 Ian Clark  Head of Unit, Policy and 
Implementation Frameworks, DG for 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection, European Commission; 
former coordinator for the team and 
desk officer for Hungary and Slovak 
Republic in the Enlargement team of 
DG Environment. 
Brussels, 22.03.2013 
73 Jan Mikołaj 
Dzięczołowski 
 Programme Manager for Poland, 
DG REGIO, European Commission. 
Brussels, 15.04.2013 
74 Piotr Manczarski Professor at the Polytechnic 
University in Warsaw. 
Warsaw, 19.11.2013 
75 Ludwig Krämer Senior Lawyer at ClientEarth; former 
Head of the Legal Unit  and Waste 
Management Unit in the DG 
Environment of the European 
Commission; former professor at 
Kiel and Judge with Landgericht in 
Kiel. 
Brussels, 20.03.2013 
76 Witold Willak Programme Manager for Poland – 
EU Policies, DG REGIO, European 
Commission. 
Brussels, 19.07.2013 
77 Małgorzata 
Grodzińska-Jurczak 
Professor at the Institute of 
Environmental Sciences, Jagiellonian 
University of Cracow. 
Cracow, 2.10.2012 
78 Szabolcs Szogyenyi-
Kovacs 
Head of Waste Management Unit, 
Ministry of Rural Development 
Budapest, 27.04.2012 
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79 Tristan Azbej Environmental expert of the Fidesz 
Party 
Budapest, 3.05.2012 
80 Magdalena Dziczek Assistant Director of KIGO Warsaw, 27.11.2012 
81 Dariusz Matlak President of PIGO Warsaw, 8.11.2012 
82 Mira Stanisławska-
Meysztowicz 
Founder of the NGO Foundation Our 
Earth (Fundacja Nasza Ziemia) 
Warsaw, 27.11.2013 
83 Ewa Synowiec Director of the European 
Commission Representation in 
Poland 
Warsaw, 21.11.2013 
84 Krzysztof Bolesta Principal Advisor to the Minister, 
Energy and Climate Policy, Ministry 
of Environment 
Warsaw, 29.11.2013 
85 Tibor Stelbaczky Head of Department, EU Sectoral 
Policies Department, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Hungary 
Budapest, 23.05.2013 
86 Katarzyna Iwinska Rector's Plenipotentiary for 
Scientific Research, Collegium 
Civitas 
Warsaw, 31.10.2012 
87 Joanna Huczko Chief Specialist on international 
cooperation and management of 
project activities on control 
activities, Chief Inspectorate of 
Environmental Protection 
Warsaw, 12.11.2012 
88 Joanna Piekutowska  Deputy Regional Inspector for 
Environmental Protection in Warsaw, 
Regional Inspectorate for 
Environmental Protection 
Warsaw, 27.11.2012 
89 Andrea Mogyorósi  Chief Environmental Protection 
Inspectorate 
Budapest, 25.05.2012 
90 Fraçois Delcueillerie Head of the Enlargement Sector, 
Desk officer for Croatia and Former 
Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, 
DG Environment, European 
Commission 
Brussels, 30.06.2012 
91 Barbara Iwanska Professor at the Jagiellonian 
University in Cracow 
Cracow, 24.10.2013 
92 Rosalinde Van der 
Vlies 
Equal Treatment Legislation Unit in 
DG Justice; former deputy head of 
unit in the DG Environment, 
European Commission 
Brussels, 16.06.2011 
93 Karolina Fras Team Leader 
DG Environment, European 
Commission 
Brussels, 28.06.2011 
94 Michel Sponar Resource and Waste Management, 
DG Environment, European 
Commission 
Brussels, 21.03.2013 
95 Françoise Bonnet Secretary General ACR Plus, 
Association of Cities and Regions for 
Recycling and Sustainable Resource 
Brussels, 16.07.2013 
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Management 
96 Jean Hannequart General Director of the Brussels 
Institute for the Management of the 
Environment, former President of 
Association of Cities and Regions for 
Recycling and Sustainable Resource 
Management 
By phone, 19.07.2013 
97 Marek Pszoncka Waste Management Office, 
Department of Government, Mazovia 
Region 
Warsaw, 19.11.2012 
98 Gabor Szylagyi Hungarian Central Statistical Office Budapest, 15.05.2012 
99 Dariusz Bochenek Polish Central Statistical Office Warsaw, 9.10.2012 
100 Magda Gosk Head of Waste Shipment Unit, Chief 
Inspectorate of Environmental 
Protection 
Warsaw, 11.10.2012 
101 Gabor Fazekas Managing Director of the NGO 
Magyar Természetvédők Szövetsége 
Budapest, 14.05.2012 
102 Sibylle Grohs Compliance Promotion, Governance 
& Legal Issues, DG Environment, 
European Commission; former 
member of the Waste Unit during the 
accession negotiations 
By phone, 14.03.2013 
103 Guillaume Perron-
Piché 
European Suppliers of Waste to 
Energy Technology 
Brussels, 24.11.2012 
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